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113, 648, 162 Sinkiang AIl

[For a brief discussion of the political-military role assigned to the Dungan and Uigur minorities of Sinkiang by the Soviet regime of the USSR, see 21: Kolarz, Rl Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 296-298. Bibliographic notes appear on pp. 300-302.]

113, 648 Sinkiang AI1

/For information pertaining to relations with Russia, see 40: Rostow, AF1 China, Category 116./

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

CHAPTER II Anglo-Russian Rivalry over Sinkiang, 1800–1917

Early British and Russian Empire Building

648 SINKIANG's modern international relations began in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Britain, moving westward and northward through India, became increasingly sensitive to the Russian expansion southward from Siberia. The concern of Britain and Russia with Sinkiang rose steadily during the 1850's and 1860's, and came to a climax in the 1870's, during the exciting days of the adventurer Yakub Beg, who for a time seemed to have succeeded in carving out a new kingdom in the no man's land between the great powers. The forerunners of both British and Russian interest were geographers, explorers, and other daring individualists. Some of these men were primarily in search of scientific information, while others were government officials, traders or intelligence agents.[1]

000 An impetus to obtain improved knowledge of Sinkiang was furnished in the first half of the nineteenth century by talk of the French and later the Russian menace to India. In his march to Moscow in 1812, Napoleon had carried with him dictionaries and maps of India. Perhaps he thought of persuading the Tsar to cooperate with him in a vast expedition to India which would dwarf

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[1] The fullest description of the explorations in the third quarter of the nineteenth century is furnished by Herman von Schlagintweit-Sakünlünski (brother of the Adolph Schlagintweit who was murdered at Kashgar in 1857) in his *Reisen in Indien und Hochasien*, 4 vols., Jena, 1869–1880, Vol. IV, pp. 217–404.

[p. 24]

000 British finally decided, the position of foreign powers and foreign trade would deteriorate. London's policy therefore switched over to support of the Manchus, to whom in the years after 1867 British banks extended a number of advances and loans. These helped finance the pacification force which the Manchus in 1867 began to organize to regain control of China's rebellious Northwestern Provinces. These were the first foreign loans obtained by China and it is noteworthy that they were made available for military rather than productive purposes.

Yakub Beg, Inner Asian Adventurer

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To the British in India, however, apprehensive about Russia and desirous of Central Asian trade, the future of Sinkiang was too important to be allowed to depend solely on the slow and uneven progress of Manchu arms. By the end of the 1860's, the adventurer Yakub Beg had already been in power in Sinkiang for half a decade. High British officials, influenced by a series of optimistic reports from Shaw and other travelers and agents in Sinkiang, came to feel that Yakub Beg was well entrenched in power. They saw in his "strong state" a possible "convenient buffer," not only between China and Russia, but also between British India and expanding Russia.[13] In language that has a quaintly modern ring, they referred to Central Asia as an area where "Russian influence immediately fills any space that is left vacant by the English powers. This political process has been aptly compared by a very high authority to the natural rushing of air into a vacuum."[14] Informed British writers pointed with alarm to the progress of relations between Yakub Beg and the Russians. This had occurred, they explained, because of the failure of Britain to respond to earlier overtures from the Kashgar ruler, who had been left with no alternative but "to obey the law of . . . POLITICAL GRAVITATION, under which his small kingdom, in com-

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[13] Sir Valentine Chirol (part author), article "China," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th ed., Suppl. Vol. III, p. 31, London, 1902.

[14] Sir Richard Temple, *India in 1880*, London, 1880, p. 434.

mon with all small States similarly situated in isolation between two large Powers, existed, viz. to lean upon one or the other."[15] At the very time that London policy was supporting the recovery of Manchu authority in China, therefore, the British in India ended the policy of "watchful waiting" and in the 1870's threw aid and support to Yakub Beg.

This celebrated and colorful figure first appeared in Sinkiang in 1864, in connection with an effort to re-establish Khoja power. The Khojas had been hereditary Moslem potentates in Sinkiang from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, when they were driven out, first by the Mongols and then by the Manchus. They found refuge in Khokand (modern Ferghana), from which base they made periodic sorties toward Kashgar and other towns in the Tarim Basin. When the Manchus lost control of Sinkiang during the Moslem uprisings of the 1860's, the Khojas struck again. In 1864 a descendant of the former Khoja ruling house of Kashgar led a small band of men from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865 he had taken over Kashgar and Yarkand. His chief of staff was Yakub Beg, a Khokandi of humble birth whose youth had been spent as a dancing boy. In his manhood he turned to soldiering, and he played a part in the struggles of Khokand and neighboring Khanates to resist the tide of Tsarist expansion.

After the first wave of successes in the western Tarim Basin, the Khoja prince under whom Yakub Beg was serving devoted himself to dissipation. Yakub Beg soon displaced him and rounded off the Moslem reconquest of Eastern Turkistan by seizing Aksu, Khotan, and Urumchi.

Soon after seizing power, Yakub Beg had tried to buttress himself against the Manchus by securing recognition as an independent sovereign from his two powerful neighbors, Russia and British India. The British response, after an initial period of hesitation, was encouraging. For just as the Russians were arousing British sensitivity about India, the British were bringing pressure on Russia's weakest point, the Black Sea area. To this end the British, and particularly the British Indian Government, desired

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[15] Showers, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

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"to build up a common front between Great Britain and Islam against Russia. . . ."[16] As part of this program the British encouraged the pretensions of the Sultan of Turkey to the Caliphate — that is, to the primacy of the entire Islamic world, in the hope that the Sultan would direct that world against Russia.

When Yakub Beg, who had taken the title of Atalik Ghazi, sent an envoy to India in late 1869, he was received much more warmly than earlier emissaries from Kashgar. Partly this was because C. U. Aitchison, former Secretary of the Punjab Government, was now Secretary of the Foreign Department directly under the Governor General. More important was the fact that the attitude of the Government of India toward Inner Asian states was now colored by the conception of an Islamic front against Russia, in which Sinkiang might well play an important part. Even in its internal policy the Government of India was at this time in the process of swinging away from the pronounced anti-Moslem phase which characterized the decade after the great rebellion of 1857–1858, the outbreak of which had been attributed by the Government of India chiefly to India's discontented Moslems.

Yakub Beg's envoy was "honorably received" in Lahore by the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab and then granted an interview in Calcutta by the Viceroy. The envoy transmitted Yakub Beg's request that a British officer pay "a friendly visit" to the Atalik Ghazi's court in Yarkand. The Viceroy agreed to send T. Douglas Forsyth to Yarkand, but strictly as an amicable gesture and not for any official business: his "sole purpose" was to be that of "opening up and giving impulse to the trade with that country."[17] Yakub Beg's envoy was permitted to buy four hundred muskets in Calcutta to be carried over the mountains to Yarkand. Forsyth

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[16] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, Vol. I, *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement*, London, 1927, pp. 40–41; and L. E. Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1863–1881," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXVI, London, 1939, p. 479.

[17] Sir T. Douglas Forsyth's *Report* of his visit to Yarkand, in *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, London, 1871, Vol. LI, p. 46.

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soon left at the head of a small party, but on his arrival at Yarkand he found that Yakub Beg was far away fighting around Urumchi. He thereupon turned around hastily and just managed to cross the mountains back to India in 1870, before snow closed the passes for the winter.

When a later envoy, Yakub Beg's own nephew Saiyid Yakub Khan Tora, appeared in India in 1873, he was received most warmly and was aided in journeying on to Constantinople. There, the Sultan gave the high title of Amir-ul-Mu'minn (Commander of the Faithful) to Yakub Beg, and advised him to be friendly with Britain and shun dealings with the Tsar. The Sultan also sent Yakub Beg two hundred rifles, three cannon, and three army officers as instructors. As Yakub Beg's envoy traveled through India on his return journey, he was joined by a well-staffed British mission, again headed by Forsyth. Together they crossed over the Karakoram Pass to Kashgar, where in 1874 Forsyth signed a treaty which threw Sinkiang open to trade with India and accorded Yakub Beg the high privilege — unprecedented for any other Central Asian ruler — of exchanging with India envoys carrying the full status of Ambassador. The Forsyth Mission reported that Yakub Beg was securely entrenched in power; British strategists began to look forward to setting up a protectorate over Sinkiang; arms flowed from India to Yakub Beg via a trading company established in 1873 under Government of India inspiration, and in 1876 the Government of India formally ratified the Treaty of 1874.

One year later Yakub Beg was dead, his power shattered, and his realm overrun by Manchu forces.

The Russians, in contrast to the British, had always regarded Yakub Beg coldly. They were extracting many concessions from the Manchus and had no desire to alienate Peking by recognizing the pretensions of Yakub Beg — who, in any event, was an old enemy of theirs and had fought against them before he left Russian Turkistan. They felt that his regime could become a rallying point for the Moslems of all Inner Asia, including Russian Turkistan, against the power of the Tsar. Uneasy Russian officers termed

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Kashgaria "a powerful Mussulman State, to which as to a center would be drawn the sympathy of the population, not only of the weak Mussulman States which had preserved their independence, but also of the population of the provinces which we had conquered. The importance of Kashgaria in our eyes was, moreover, increased in consequence of the attempts of the English to draw this country to their side so as to incorporate it, (1) in a neutral zone of countries, which was to separate Russia from India, and (2) to acquire in Kashgaria a fresh market for the sale of their manufactured goods."[18]

Throughout the period of Yakub Beg's rule Tsarist officers took care to safeguard what they considered to be Russia's basic strategic and commercial interests in Sinkiang. Strategically, their chief concern was with the Ili River Valley, an ancient inland trade and military highway between Russia and China, which a titled Russian historian has termed as important to Russia as the Khyber Pass was to the British in India.[19] About the time of the first Forsyth visit to Yarkand in 1870, Yakub Beg, who was operating around Urumchi, turned westward and seemed to be making a movement in the direction of Ili. "Under the spur of Yakub Beg's move, and concerned for the safety of this trade route, Russia in 1871 moved troops into Kulja and occupied the territory of Ili. . . ."[20] To reassure the Manchu Court in Peking, Tsarist officials announced that the occupied area would be returned as soon as Manchu forces were strong enough to maintain effective control there.

Impressed if not intimidated by Russian military action, Yakub Beg agreed in 1872 to Tsarist proposals for opening Eastern Turkistan to Russian commerce. Up to then he had tried to seal off his state against Tsarist merchants, largely from fear that they might pave the way for political penetration. His sweeping commercial treaty with Forsyth in 1874 was doubtless intended in

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[18] A. N. Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria,* Calcutta, 1882, pp. 4–5.

[19] A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "Russian Imperialism in Asia: Its Origin, Evolution, and Character," *Slavonic Review,* London, Vol. VIII, 1929–1930, p. 44.

[20] H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire,* 3 vols., London, 1918, Vol. II, p. 331.

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large part to balance the British against the Russians. Worse still, from the Russian point of view, was Yakub Beg's action, during the winter of 1873–1874, in accepting arms from the Sultan of Turkey and the title of Amir — the latter in such a way as to make Sinkiang something like a vassal state of the Sultan. Turkey was then the bitterest of Russia's enemies and strongly under British influence. Tsarist officers considered Yakub Beg's action tantamount to waving a red flag in their faces.[21] The Tsarist Governor General of Turkistan concentrated troops in 1874–1875 in locations where they could best be deployed against Kashgar. Perhaps they actually would have been used against Yakub Beg had not a serious uprising broken out in Khokand, in 1875, draining off all Tsarist troops available in the area. In 1876, however, a Russian mission under Kuropatkin descended upon Yakub Beg and made a peremptory demand for strategic posts in the mountain passes west of Kashgar. Yakub Beg reluctantly but speedily acceded.

Yakub Beg's position, by 1876, was in fact becoming very difficult. To the west and north stood the menace of unfriendly Russia. To the east, the Manchu pacification force under the indomitable Tso Tsung-t'ang was moving slowly but relentlessly in Yakub Beg's direction, having already occupied Barkul, Hami, and Kuchengtze. Tso's forces, moreover, were by 1876 receiving at Kuchengtze (a little more than one hundred miles east of Urumchi) important grain supplies from the Russians — thanks to an agreement negotiated in 1875 between Tso and the famous Russian explorer, Colonel Sosnovskii. Funds to purchase that grain came in part from loans to the Manchus by British banks in China.

The British, still interested in preserving Yakub Beg's realm — for, despite their loans, they did not believe that the Manchus would be able to reconquer Eastern Turkistan — tried to medi-

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[21] Kaufmann, the Tsarist Governor General of Turkistan, is said to have spoken of Kashgar as "*une création de Monsieur Forsyth*" and to have charged the British with making a strong Muslim state out of a hitherto unimportant country. (Louis E. Frechtling, *British Policy* [an unpublished Oxford dissertation], p. 62 *n.*)

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ate between him and the Manchus. Sir Thomas Wade, the British minister to Peking, proposed to the Manchus in 1876 "that Yakub Beg would surrender should China allow him to keep his kingdom under Chinese suzerainty. When the offer was reported to Tso he memorialized the throne that the status of Yakub was purely a domestic question and if Britain wished to create a buffer state in Central Asia she was herself well able to furnish the territory."[22] Whether or not Yakub Beg felt himself cornered, he did dispatch to London his nephew and chief adviser, Saiyid Yakub Khan Tora. Wade also journeyed on leave from Peking to London, and secret negotiations began on the basis of Wade's formula. Wade acted as intermediary for the Manchu minister in London, while Sir Douglas Forsyth served as go-between for Yakub Beg's envoy. Meanwhile Tso's soldiers penetrated deeper and deeper into Sinkiang. Even before a decisive battle was joined, Yakub Beg's forces became confused and disheartened, and Yakub Beg himself took (or was given) poison and died.[23] In the ensuing disorder Manchu dominion was quickly reasserted over the entire province, except for Russian-held Ili.

The Age of Stable Empires before the Russian Revolution

000 The Russians were in no hurry to return Ili. They had expected the Manchus to win, and their grain supplies had played a significant part in the victory. But the Tsar did not intend to go unrecompensed. As early as March 1876 a conference of the half-

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[22] A. W. Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period,* 2 vols., Washington, D. C., 1944, Vol. II, p. 766, article on Tso by Tu Lieh-che.

[23] There are many conflicting accounts of Yakub Beg's death. Mohammed Yusuf Effendi, a Turkish officer — one of the three originally lent as "instructors" by the Sultan in 1873 — has left us a valuable eyewitness account. His version is that Yakub Beg became prostrated after bleeding from the nose. Previously he had been despondent but not ill. The cause of the bleeding is unknown, but Yusuf Effendi believed "the probability is that the Ameer was poisoned." Statement of Mahd. Yusuf Effendi, September, 1878, in *Parl. Papers,* House of Commons, 1880, Vol. 78 (*c.* 2470), pp. 21–23. According to Bales, "the Chinese seem to have had no doubt about Yakub Beg taking his own life." (W. L. Bales, *Tso Tsung-t'ang,* Shanghai, 1937, p. 365, citing *Nien P'u,* VIII, p. 22).

Merchants from Tientsin have flourished as far north as the city of Kulja in the Ili Valley. 441. Nearly twenty years ago a British observer remarked that "successful merchants at Kulja come from the towns of Tou Liu and Yang Liu Ch'ing near Tientsin; the commerce of Ili has been kept in the families for generations, and considering the numbers of relations and connections every Chinese has, it is not to be wondered at that Tientsin people form a whole community, ranging from barbers to landowners, at Kulja."[11]

Ever since Sinkiang became a province a small Chinese minority has ruled it by the indirect methods which many colonial governments have found effective. 631 648 The traditional Uighur and Kazakh and Mongol feudal structures have been left more or less undisturbed, with the existing Begs and princes used as instruments of Chinese rule. In Sinkiang, just as in Sikang and the southernmost parts of Yunnan, the result of this indirect rule is an administration with a Chinese upper stratum and an indigenous lower stratum. The chief defect of this system is that instead of promoting political and administrative progress, it fortifies and preserves the feudal system, and hinders the evolution of a more modern form of society.

While bribery, corruption and venality are almost endemic in the lower stratum of administration, the quality of the upper administration is naturally subject to the policy of the governor or the chairman of the provincial government. At this top level Chinese policy has passed through three distinct stages. From 1884 to 1933 there was a period of about half a century dominated by an old-fashioned feudal bureaucracy. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin and Governor Chin Shu-jen can best be described as the last of the old imperial bureaucrats, though both served under the Chinese Republic. Then followed a decade of war lord rule from 1933 to 1944, under General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whose policy was at first liberal and later harshly repressive. Finally, from 1944 until Sinkiang became enveloped by Chinese Communism on the east as well as Russian Communism on the west,

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[11] *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, Jan. 1931, Vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 140.

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Kuomintang policy in this frontier region can best be described as one of fitful opportunism in the face of chronic emergency.

Feudal Bureaucracy, 1884

*175 Of all the feudal bureaucrats in Sinkiang the most able was Yang Tseng-hsin. He was born in Yunnan, though his family originally moved there from Nanking. After having successfully passed the Imperial Civil Service Examinations, he was appointed district magistrate in Kansu and later promoted to be prefecture head and regional administrative head (Taot'ai) in that province. His record was so good that it attracted the attention of Wang Shu-t'ang, Commissioner of Civil Affairs in Sinkiang, who recommended his appointment as Taot'ai of the Aksu region. Still later he became Taot'ai (Intendant of the Circuit) of Urumchi and Barkul. In 1912, after disturbances accompanying the Chinese Revolution, the Governor of Sinkiang resigned and made Yang Tseng-hsin his successor. Yang negotiated with separatist leaders in Ili, prevented a Moslem revolt in Komul, quickly suppressed a rebellion of the Ko Lao Hui (Elder Brethren) secret society in the Tarim Basin, and unified the whole provincial administration.

Most of the important military and police officers under Yang were from Yunnan. These were young men, enthusiastic about the new Chinese Republic. When in 1916 General Ts'ai Ao in their distant home province of Yunnan raised the banner of revolt against Yuan Shih-k'ai's attempt to set up a monarchy, they wanted to join the Republican movement. Because Yang Tseng-hsin refused to join, they plotted to kill him, but the plot was discovered by one of his intelligence agents. The steps that Yang then took showed his alertness and cunning.

First he called the Yunnanese officials before him to answer the charge. When they denied it, he executed his own intelligence agent to convince them that he believed they had been falsely accused. He then had their families moved into his own residential quarters. Shortly afterward, when he had to entertain an inspector from the Peking Ministry of Education, he invited all

The maintenance of different exchange rates in different parts of 175 *
the province enabled the Governor to keep a political check on 436
remittances. The undue concentration of money in any one part of the province, possibly indicating preparations for a political move of some kind, would be detectable through the resulting pressure on exchange rates.

Until the Russian Revolution, Tsarist Russia had by treaty the 175 *
right to maintain branches of the Russo-Asiatic bank at Urumchi, 436
Ili, Chuguchak, and Kashgar. (After the Russian Revolution, 648
these branches continued to operate for some years under French protection.) Like other foreign banks in China, the Russo-Asiatic bank had the right to issue its own paper currency. In 1916, under the stress of war financing in Russia, it suddenly increased its note circulation in Sinkiang from one million to five million rubles.[22] Then, when the Russian ruble fell, it dragged the Sinkiang tael with it, thus aggravating the inflation in Sinkiang. In that year the total provincial revenue was a little over 5,200,000 taels and the budget deficit amounted to more than 700,000 taels. The most important source of revenue was the tax on cultivated land, which then totaled 10,500,000 *mu.*[23] The gold mined in Sinkiang in that year, under government license or monopoly, was worth less than 5000 taels.

The Provincial Government at this period had no money for 175 *
irrigation schemes which might have opened large areas for cultivation. 661
Poor finance and inflation not only hindered economic improvement through public works but intensified corruption among officials. While in all fairness it must be repeated that Yang Tseng-hsin was both an honest and a competent official by old mandarin standards, it must also be admitted that economic and political conditions toward the end of his rule were shrewdly summed up by the Swiss traveler Bosshard:

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[22] *Hsi Pei Yen Chiu* (*Northwest Research*), Peiping, 1932, Vol. 6, issue of April 15, pp. 55 and 129 (in Chinese).

[23] The *mu*, a traditional land measure, varies from place to place. Six *mu* to the acre is often taken as an average figure.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

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> In Chinese Turkestan, where corruptness permeated all classes, advancement, like other marketable commodities, was bought and sold. . . . The result was that nothing was done which was not specially paid for, and the people were plundered in order that their rulers might grow rich. Such were the ways in which villages and towns were vampired.[24]

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As an official of the old school, Yang's attitude toward foreign civilization was definitely conservative. Though he was too courteous to show his feelings to foreigners directly, it is known that he disliked them. When a Chinese student attached to the Sino-Swedish Expedition under Sven Hedin asked him why he did not employ foreign engineers to introduce modern techniques into his province, he flew into a rage and said: "Yes, that is just like you students, ready to sell your country to the foreigner." [25]

Yet he was a realist in handling as best he could the international situations with which he was confronted. In 1912, when he was inaugurated as Military Governor, he said in an official statement:

> From the Han and T'ang Dynasties on, whenever China was at peace and powerful the frontier people became obedient; but whenever China was weak and in confusion they revolted. Today the situation has greatly changed. We are being threatened by Outer Mongolia and powerful foreign nations. We shall not be able to come back to Sinkiang if we once lose it.[26]

As soon as he took office as Governor in 1912, Yang Tseng-hsin had to concern himself with problems on the Sinkiang frontier with Outer Mongolia. Then, in 1916, there was a revolt of the Kazakhs in Russian territory, set off by a Tsarist order for labor conscription.[27] When it was crushed, many armed Kazakhs crossed into Sinkiang, plundering and murdering as they swarmed in thousands over the frontier passes, especially near the mountain lake of Issik Kul. They then dispersed among the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. Governor Yang did not attempt to prevent their entry, and let them go where they pleased.

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[24] Bosshard, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

[25] *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, London, 1929, Vol. 16, pt. 1, p. 89.

[26] *A Survey of Sinkiang*, edited by the Provincial Government, 1938, p. 111 (in Chinese).

As soon as the October Revolution broke out in Russia, refugees began to enter Sinkiang. In 1920 and 1921 two groups of armed "White" (anti-Red) Russians retreated into Sinkiang. They totaled between 30,000 and 40,000 men. Some wished merely to retreat through Sinkiang into China proper; others wished to reach India; others attempted to join up with the counterrevolutionary Russian bands in Outer Mongolia. Yang, who had only about 10,000 troops under his command, dealt with the emergency cautiously but firmly. He disarmed some of the Russian troops and interned them in and near Kuchengtze. He then negotiated with Moscow for amnesty for all those who would return peacefully to Russian territory. At the same time, he asked for help from Moscow to dislodge armed "White" Russians from the Altai region on the Outer Mongolian frontier. He also took advantage of this emergency to revise the administrative structure of the Altai region — which before 1912 had been in some ways subject to the jurisdiction of the Manchu Amban in Kobdo, in Outer Mongolia, as well as to the provincial authorities in Sinkiang — a stronghold of Mongols and Kazakhs, by dividing it into three districts and three subdistricts.

In his dealings with the new Soviet regime across the frontier from him, Yang Tseng-hsin was cautious but not hostile. The National Government at Peking to which he was nominally subordinate was virtually powerless, and for some years had no relations with Moscow. He himself, however, had to deal with a dual

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[27] *The Rising of the Year 1916 in Kazakhstan. Documents and Materials.* Edited bv B. S. Suleimanov. Compilers: F. N. Kireev, Sh. Ya. Shafiro. Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh S.S.R. (In Russian). We have not had access to this volume but there is a review of it by M. Kim in *Questions of History*, Moscow-Leningrad, 9, 1948, pp. 111–13 (in Russian).

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heritage of Russian interests in Sinkiang and Chinese interests in adjoining Russian territory. In 1920 he closed the frontier toward Russia west of Kashgar — a move which may have been prompted by the fact that the British, who were especially hostile to the new Soviet regime, had strong influence in Kashgar and had, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, used it as a subsidiary base for their activities in Russian Central Asia.[28] In the same year, however, he concluded a trade agreement between Sinkiang and the local authorities in Soviet territory. Under this agreement he encouraged the return of Russian refugees, while the authorities at Tashkent agreed to take a friendly attitude on the problem of the private property of Chinese citizens which had been affected by the Soviet program of confiscation.[29]

At the same time, the trade route through the Ili Valley was fostered as an alternative to that through Kashgar. Instead of the previous seven Russian consulates, there were to be only two, both in the Ili Valley. A Chinese consulate was provided for at Semipalatinsk and another — in spite of the fact that this was a local agreement made by a Chinese province, not by the National Government — at Verkhne-Udinsk, on the frontier between Siberia and Outer Mongolia. The reason for a consulate at the main gateway of trade between Russia and Outer Mongolia is not clear; there can have been little trade of concern to Sinkiang passing by this route. Most important of all, extraterritoriality was abolished and traders and travelers were made subject to the law of the locality where they happened to be.

This makeshift arrangement was superseded in May 1924 when diplomatic relations were restored between China and the Soviet Union under a treaty signed at Peking. In December of the same year a Soviet consulate was opened at Chuguchak; in the spring of 1925 one at Sharasume and one (already provided for under the provincial agreement) at Ining; in August, a Soviet consul general arrived at Urumchi; and finally toward the end of 1925 a Soviet consulate was established at Kashgar. Reciprocally, the previous "provincial" Chinese consulate at Semipalatinsk was made a consulate general, and consulates were opened at Tashkent, Andijan, Zaisan, and Alma-Ata.

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[28] Among accounts by British officers, see L. V. S. Blacker, *On Secret Patrol in High Asia*, London, 1922, and F. M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent*, London, 1946.

[29] M. R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia*, N. Y., 1944, p. 62.

In the period of civil war leading up to the establishment of the National Government of the Kuomintang, organized at Nanking by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, Yang Tseng-hsin continued to observe neutrality in China's domestic politics. In 1926, he feared that Sinkiang might be entered by the troops of the "Christian General" Feng Yü-hsiang, who was then retreating before the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. He therefore negotiated with Moscow and agreed to a Russian proposal for opening a motor service from the Siberian frontier to Urumchi. Since the Russians were at that time on good terms with Feng Yü-hsiang, to whom they had supplied arms (by routes leading across Mongolia, not Sinkiang), there is a suggestion that Russian good offices averted a retreat of Feng's troops into Sinkiang.

In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek broke off Chinese relations with the Soviet Union, Yang Tseng-hsin kept up his contacts with the Russians and with the staffs of the Chinese consular offices in Soviet territory within the field of Sinkiang trade. Thus on December 28, 1927, the Consul General at Semipalatinsk and his secretary sent a statement to the local newspaper in which they declared: "The Consulate at Semipalatinsk has nothing in common with Central China and is not able, consequently, to take upon itself the responsibility for events which have occurred recently in Central China. This consulate is dependent upon Western China, which does not wish, in any case, to sever its friendship with the U.S.S.R." In conclusion the statement, as cited by *Izvestiya*, referred to "relations between Western China [Sinkiang] and the friendly Republic of the U.S.S.R. . . . so dear and so necessary for us, from the point of view not only of commerce but also of politics."[30]

Only in June 1928, when he ordered a change from the old

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[30] *Izvestiya*, Moscow, Jan. 8, 1928.

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five-barred flag of the Chinese Republic to the new blue-field, white-sun national flag of the Kuomintang, did Yang Tseng-hsin acknowledge the Nanking Government; but in practice the internal administration of Sinkiang was scarcely affected. In this year, the Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition, headed by Sven Hedin and backed by the authority of the Chinese Government, reached Sinkiang after a journey through Inner Mongolia. The movements of its Chinese members as well as its Swedish and German members were carefully circumscribed by the provincial authorities. Only reluctantly was Sven Hedin permitted to leave Urumchi for Komul; and in his own words his "reception by the Chinese officials of Hami was as disagreeable as that by the Sultan [of Hami] was the reverse."[31]

In the same year of 1928 Yang Tseng-hsin was assassinated, after he had ruled Sinkiang for seventeen years, dealing successfully with the events that followed the Chinese Revolution, the Outer Mongolian Revolution, and the Russian Revolution. When in 1928 he changed flags and nominally proclaimed allegiance to Nanking, he seems to have anticipated an early end to his career. He had transferred his enormous wealth to British and American banks, and placed his family in Manila, beyond Chinese jurisdiction.[32] To that extent, he was ready for the death that came to him at the hands of his trusted subordinate Fan Yao-nan, in a manner that recalled the way in which he himself, at the outset of his career as Governor, had murdered his Yunnanese colleagues.

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Fan Yao-nan, Yang's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, gave a feast on July 7, 1928, on the occasion of the graduation exercises of the Government Law School in Urumchi. As that school used the Russian language in its curriculum, Soviet consular officials and other Russians were invited together with all the leading Chinese officials. Yang Tseng-hsin arrived with an escort of two hundred soldiers in addition to his regular bodyguards. Fan's

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[31] Sven Hedin, "Hami or Kumul," in *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, London, 1929, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, p. 92.

[32] Bosshard, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

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The completion in 1930 of the Turksib Railway, pass- ing close 175* 648

Chinese Policies in Sinkiang

to the Chinese frontier in the Ili region, naturally encouraged Sinkiang-Soviet trade, which in that year passed the level of 32,000,000 rubles. In the following year, 1931, shortly after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Urumchi was threatened by Ma Ch'ung-ying, the leader of a Moslem invasion from Kansu, who had already captured Barkul and Komul and was taking over the leadership of a Moslem rising within the province. Since Ma was accompanied by Japanese "advisers" and believed to be backed by Japanese militarists, he was not only a menace to the province but a danger to Soviet frontier interests. Chin Shu-jen, in order to obtain arms from the Russians, and because the rising cut off trade with China, signed a trade agreement in October 1931 which gave Soviet interests new privileges.

Under this agreement eight Soviet trade agencies were established, at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan. Customs duties on Soviet goods were reduced, and new Sinkiang-Soviet telegraph and radio communications were opened. Chin signed the agreement without authorization from Nanking and without reporting it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and for this he was imprisoned when, later, he fled the province and returned to China.

Chin was forced out of Sinkiang by a combination of insurrection, invasion, and a mutiny of "White" (exile) Russian mercenary troops. 175* 669 The insurrection began in the Komul oasis in 1931 and was joined by Chinese Moslem (Tungan) invaders from Kansu. Urumchi was attacked in the winter of 1932 and again in January 1934. In November 1933 an Eastern Turkistan Republic was proclaimed in Kashgar. In the main, the rebellion was brought under control by June 1934; but as late as the fall of 1935 there were still 20,000 Tungans, who had originally come from Kansu, holding out in Guma Bazar on the southern rim of the Tarim Basin. It is estimated that these dark and bloody years cost about 100,000 lives.

The original revolt in Komul was certainly precipitated by the weak and avaricious Chin. In the winter of 1930 the last Uighur ruler of the ancient principality of Komul died. His son and sucextension of education; encouragement of self-government; judiciary reform.[40] [185]

Before he could do much in the way of reform, however, Sheng had still to cope with the Moslem rebellion led by Ma Ch'ung-ying. While Sheng was taking the first steps toward power in the north, Ma was threatening to secure control in the south, most of which he now held from Komul in the east to Kashgar in the west. By June 1933 Ma's forces had also entered Kuchengtze, in Jungaria, and begun to push toward Urumchi. By this time, however, Ma's ruthlessness and his plundering of the countryside were weakening him by arousing the hatred even of his fellow Moslems. At Komul the shops were closed and the villages nearby had become heaps of rubble. At Ch'ichiaoching, on the main trade route, the streets were littered with the bodies of dead horses. Trade through Turfan had been suspended. 175*

As Sheng Shih-ts'ai at the head of his Manchurian troops went out to meet him, Ma cut south across the mountains and took Turfan, main valve of the trade routes both eastward to China and westward to Kashgar. At the beginning of 1934, when Sheng Shih-ts'ai had to detach some of his forces to face a fresh revolt in Ili, Ma advanced once more from Turfan against Urumchi—only to meet, this time, his decisive defeat. Sheng had been able to obtain war materials from the Soviet Union, including even planes. He threw back Ma's attack and harassed his retreat by bombing the road between Toksun and Kharashahr. Ma himself barely escaped to Kucha, and fled on to Kashgar. There he remained from April to June, 1934; but when Sheng's troops approached, he fled once more—this time to Soviet territory. He was reported to have been seen in Moscow at the beginning of 1936.[41] For some years, Soviet policy was to hold an exceptionally advantageous position. Sinkiang was now to be governed by a non-Moslem Chinese who depended on Russia not only for arms but for economic co-operation. Yet the chief alternative 175* 648

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[40] Tu Chung-yuan, *Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the New Sinkiang*, Hankow, 1938, pp. 67–72 (in Chinese).

[41] Hedin, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

*175 648 claimant to power, the Moslem leader Ma Ch'ung-ying, was living in Soviet territory.

There can be no doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in addition to being dependent on good relations with Russia, was genuinely opposed to Japanese imperialism — which, like many Chinese who had studied in Japan, he thoroughly understood. There is also no doubt that Ma Ch'ung-ying had Japanese agents at his headquarters — agents who can be described as adventurous forerunners rather than acknowledged representatives of Japanese policy. Had Ma won, Japanese policy could have followed up these agents; when Ma lost, Japan had nothing to say in public.

The operations of Japanese agents, however, did not end immediately with the flight of Ma to Russia. As late as 1937, from February to October there was a revolt in Kashgar in which the Japanese were accused of having a hand. In October 1937 Sheng told Tu Chung-yuan, a former fellow student in Japan who was then working with him in Urumchi, that he knew of Japanese intelligence agents in the Moslem strongholds of Ninghsia and Ch'inghai (Kokonor) — Chinese frontier provinces adjoining Inner Mongolia and Tibet — and that Japanese remittances to Sinkiang through the coastal Treaty Port of Tientsin in recent months had amounted to more than three million yen. He believed that another ten million yen or more would be sent into Sinkiang. Tu Chung-yuan describes how four important government officials and some merchants with traitorous connections were then arrested.[42]

*175 185 In the meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai had embarked on a period of real reform. His "Eight Points," announced in 1933, have already been listed. In the following year he declared that Sinkiang was to be considered "the New Sinkiang," and that his "Eight Points" were to be implemented through "Six Great Policies." The first of these was anti-imperialism (subsequently to be interpreted in a strongly anti-British as well as anti-Japanese sense); this was followed by rapprochement with the Soviets,

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[42] Tu Chung-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30, 62–63, 97.

Sheng himself is quoted by the man who was the director of his provincial newspaper as saying that he was not a member of the Kuomintang, so that "It is strange that they should have elected me a member of the Kuomintang Central Control Committee!"[47] 175*

After coming to power with Soviet military assistance, Sheng negotiated a Soviet loan of five million gold rubles for reconstruction purposes. This loan, which involved no political or economic conditions, carried an interest of 4 per cent.[48] Sheng also asked for Soviet technical assistance. In 1937 he instituted a three-year plan of reconstruction, during the course of which he obtained a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans. In 1938 the Provincial Commercial Bank was reorganized as the Sinkiang Commercial Bank, with partly private and partly Provincial Government capital. It issued new notes, and the currency was to a large extent stabilized. By the end of 1939 the old paper currency was declared invalid. During 1939 credits of $17,872,500 (Chinese) were granted to the bank to promote commercial and agricultural capitalization. Funds from the Soviet loans were used to build more motor roads, and trucks in use increased from only 20 in 1933 to 400 in 1938 and eventually to 3000 in 1941. In the same period, 1350 miles of telephone lines were installed. By 1939, there were some 20 factories in the province, and over 400 tons of Soviet machinery had gone into the construction of a refinery at an oil field northwest of Urumchi. 175* 178 648

The development of aviation involved the National Govern-

Communist advisers from Yenan to come to Sinkiang. He later executed some of these advisers and jailed the rest. Miss Anna Louise Strong has kindly let me see her unpublished notes of interviews with survivors of this group, at Yenan, after the war. These notes suggest that the Communists are inclined to claim credit for all the reforms of Sheng Shih-ts'ai in his "progressive" period, even before 1938; but the record as a whole seems to make it clear that the reforms were initiated by National Salvationists and other liberals, before the arrival of the Communist advisers. The currency reform of 1938, however, appears to have been the work of Mao Tze-min, brother of Mao Tze-tung, who was executed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1943.

[47] Sa Kung-liao, *op. cit.*

[48] Tu Chung-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94.

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*175 ment as well as the Provincial Government. Under the Nanking-
178 Moscow Nonaggression Agreement of 1937, a through air route
648 had been stipulated. Under the Soviet-Chinese Trade Agreement
of June 16, 1939, a Sino-Soviet Aviation Corporation was organized. By the terms of these agreements, Russia obtained priority over other countries in air traffic, jointly with China, over Sinkiang.

*175 In 1941 Sheng decreed a second three-year plan. The economic
648 activities of the Provincial Government were expanded through
185 "Foreign Trade and Local Resources Companies." Reconstruction bonds were issued; and the combined effects of inflation in
436 China and a trade boom in Sinkiang raised the exchange value
of the Sinkiang dollar from the low point of 4000 to one Chinese national dollar in 1934 to a rate of six to one national dollar in 1942. At the time Sheng left the province in 1944, the rate was five provincial dollars to one national dollar. The boom was largely promoted by an arbitrary linking of the "official" exchange rate between American dollars and Soviet rubles, which enabled Sinkiang to buy from the Soviet-operated Sinkiang Trading Corporation at artificially favorable rates. During this period many Russians entered the province as technicians, but — according to the British observer already quoted, who visited the province in 1940 — there was nothing to suggest that Soviet administrative control was being forced on Sinkiang.

*175 In retrospect, it is clear that Sheng Shih-ts'ai was guided
648 throughout by opportunity rather than by principle. Even while
carrying out reforms, which for some years were encouragingly successful, he did not lose his concern for his own interest. This concern led him into a policy of sudden shifts in his relations with Russia, in contrast with the policy of steady neutrality pursued so long and so successfully by Yang Tseng-hsin. From 1933 to 1940 he leaned toward the Soviet Union and away from the National Government of China. From 1941 to 1942 he cut off his relations with the Russians roughly and suddenly, and threw himself on the support of the National Government in a manner suggesting he had little confidence in his own power in his own

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province. In 1944, however, he tried — this time unsuccessfully — to break away again from the Kuomintang and the National Government, offering to assume a position of satellite dependency on the Soviet Union.

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During the first period, Sheng Shih-ts'ai ran Sinkiang very smoothly, on the three wheels of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, democracy, and increased recognition of the identities and interests of the "nationalities" or ethnic groups of the province. In October 1938 he held a provincial congress of all nationalities, which condemned Japanese machinations in Inner Mongolia, pledged money to contribute ten airplanes to the Chinese Air Force, and promised to keep open an overland route through Sinkiang, facilitating the movement of Soviet supplies to China. Sheng himself visited Moscow, ostensibly in search of medical care.[49] Two years later, on December 8, 1940, he joined other Chinese leaders in condemning the Nanking puppet regime under Wang Ching-wei. In 1941, after the New Fourth Army incident (when Kuomintang troops attacked Communist-led troops in the Yangtze Valley), Sheng told a correspondent of *Ta Kung Pao,* China's great independent newspaper, that Sinkiang was devoting all its strength to transport work and reconstruction in order to hasten victory, and that all parties and cliques in China should continue in their united resistance to Japan.[50]

When Germany invaded Russia, Sheng was informed that he could no longer receive material aid from hard-pressed Russia. Later, with Nazi forces besieging Leningrad and Stalingrad, he appears to have been convinced that Russia, even if not defeated, would no longer be one of the dominating great powers. He turned about-face and made contact with Chungking, indicating that in his belief a man who holds power in Sinkiang must rely on outside support in addition to concentrating control within the province in his own hands. Adjusting his rule within Sinkiang to his new orientation toward Chungking, he converted his earlier

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[49] Sa Kung-liao, *op. cit.*

[50] Chen Chi-ying, *A Bird's-eye View of Sinkiang,* Chungking, 1941.

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*175 and relatively democratic policy into authoritarian repression of
● 648 the Uighurs and other non-Chinese national groups, and began to round up not only his Communist advisers but liberal Chinese as well.

*175 The sudden shift of policy was marked by the imprisonment and secret murder of Tu Chung-yuan,[51] a famous nationalist and liberal, once a schoolmate of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who had been invited to come to Sinkiang during the democratic period to head up cultural work, and had brought with him a considerable number of progressive young Chinese. By 1944 about 80,000 people had been imprisoned, including Sheng's own Soviet-trained brother and his wife. Torture was used to obtain confessions. Christopher Rand, correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune,* reported the case of a man "whom General Sheng's experts began to skin alive. After a square inch of skin had been removed, the victim wisely signed a 'confession.' The terror conflicted badly with General Sheng's 'new deal' program. He imported teachers and experts from China to develop the province; then he would become suspicious of them, throw them into jail and proceed to import more of the same. His schools turned out an increasing number of literate men who might conceivably spread ideas among the people — and a diploma came to be a ticket to jail."[52]

The idea of a transportation route through Sinkiang but independent of Russia was explored — which meant an orientation more friendly toward Britain, although previously Sheng's "anti-imperialism," while emphasizing the menace of Japan, had also brought pressure on the trade between India and Sinkiang. In February 1942, however, when Chiang Kai-shek flew to India, he inspected part of an old trade route from Northwest India into Inner Asia which might be made part of a supply route to Sin-

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[51] For some details about Tu Chung-yuan's activities in Sinkiang and his final fate at the hands of Sheng, see two articles by Sa Kung-liao, in *Kuo Hsin National News,* semi-monthly, Hongkong, Nov. 11 and 25, 1947, New Series, Vol. 1, Nos. 3 and 4 (in Chinese).

[52] *New York Herald Tribune,* Sept. 23, 1947.

*175 tance. The grazing grounds of the western slopes of the Altai were used not by Khalkha tribesmen of the main group of tribes in Outer Mongolia, but by Torguts and Ölöts of the Western Mongol groups of tribes, whose pastures were partly in northwestern Outer Mongolia and partly in Sinkiang.

*175 578 In the same region there were Kazakhs, whom the Imperial authorities had considered as "tenants" of the Mongols, paying the Mongols for the pastures that they used and having no claim to territory of their own. Some of these Kazakhs made use of summer pasture in the Baitik Bogda. The Baitik Bogda were also partly occupied by Mongols, who practiced a certain amount of agriculture in addition to owning livestock. In the winter it was the custom of the Kazakhs to leave most of their horses in the Baitik Bogda, horses being able to paw down through the snow to get winter feed, but to bring their sheep, cattle, and camels down into the Jungarian Desert, where they were clearly within the jurisdiction of Sinkiang. There was a tendency on the part of the Kazakhs to move clear across the desert and up to the lower slopes of the Bogda Ula near Kuchengtze; but the policy of the Sinkiang authorities was to drive them back toward the Baitik Bogda and to keep them out of the jurisdiction of Sinkiang, because they were regarded as cattle thieves and troublemakers. In practice, therefore, the attitude of the Sinkiang authorities was that the Baitik Bogda lay outside of Sinkiang.

*175 578 648 By 1948, however, the attitude of the Sinkiang provincial authorities and of the Chinese military command had changed. The Kazakh leader Osman Bator, who has already been mentioned, had at first joined the Kulja coalition, had later broken with it, and had withdrawn to the foothills of the Bogda Ula. The policy of the Chinese authorities was to encourage him to move northward from this region and to occupy the Baitik Bogda, which were accordingly claimed as Chinese territory.

*175 648 These attempts on the part of the Chinese-supported Kazakhs were resisted by Outer Mongolian frontier patrols, and the frontier incidents which resulted were sensationally reported. No

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widespread fighting broke out, however, and American reporters who went up to Sinkiang after the first reports tended to minimize the significance of the incidents.[96] 175* 648 ●

The exact location of the frontier in this region remains unclear. Recent Chinese maps show the entire Baitik Bogda within Sinkiang, and the Outer Mongolian frontier running along the main crest of the Altai.[97] Older maps, however, both Russian (Tsarist) and British, show the frontier running either right through the Baitik Bogda or somewhat to the south of the main height of the hills. 175* 131

In December 1948 the Chinese Government made a new move of major importance by dropping Masud Sabri as Chairman of the Province and replacing him with Burkhan, the former Vice-Chairman, who as a "middle-of-the-roader" was more acceptable to the Kulja dissidents. Burkhan, a Russian Tatar by origin, with large trading interests, had been a man of influence in Sinkiang since Tsarist times. He had managed to maintain himself under the regimes of Yang Tseng-hsin, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, and the Kuomintang. 175* 635

In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung returned to Sinkiang to attempt to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty, to replace a ten-year agreement signed in 1939 under the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. It was reported at the time that the Russians were attempting to acquire monopoly rights in mining and trade. There was also speculation that on the Chinese side an elaborate maneuver was being carried out to create a conflict of interest between the Russians and the Chinese Communists, by granting to the Russians exclusive rights in this frontier sector of Chinese territory. In the upshot, no new treaty was negotiated, but the Russian monopoly right to an air service between Komul and the 175* 648

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[96] See, for example, dispatch from Henry R. Lieberman, from Urumchi, August 27, 1948, in *New York Times*, September 8, 1948.

[97] See the map on p. 59 of the article by Chang Chih-yi, "Land Utilization and Settlement Possibilities in Sinkiang," in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 39, No. 1, New York, 1949.

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Soviet frontier, secured under the old treaty, was continued for five years.[98]

Returning from Sinkiang after the first few meetings of these negotiations, Chang Chih-chung later joined a five-man "peace team" of the Kuomintang which went to Peiping to negotiate with the Chinese Communists. There, together with the other members of the delegation, he denounced the Kuomintang and declared his adherence, not to the Chinese Communist Party, but to the movement for a coalition government headed by the Communists.

Finally, in September, 1949, all the threads of the politics of Sinkiang were drawn together and tied in one knot: Seyfuddin, of the Kulja coalition, went to Peiping as a delegate to the People's Consultative Council — called by the Communists — where another delegate was Chang Chih-chung, once the Kuomintang's top representative in Sinkiang. Almost simultaneously the oasis of Komul, key to the eastern approaches from China proper to Sinkiang, declared in favor of the new Communist regime, and the Sinkiang provincial government immediately followed with a formal declaration of adherence.[99] A chapter in the history of Inner Asia had definitely closed. The first words of the next chapter were yet to be written.

[98] See, among others, the following newspaper dispatches: Henry R. Lieberman, Nanking, January 31, 1949, in *New York Times*, February 1, 1949. United Press, Nanking, February 13, 1949; *ibid.*, February 14, 1949. Henry R. Lieberman, Canton, February 28, 1949; *ibid.*, February 28, 1949. Walter Sullivan, Urumchi, April 1, 1949; *ibid.*, April 6, 1949. Walter Sullivan, Urumchi, March 30, 1949; *ibid.*, April 18, 1949. Unsigned dispatch from Shanghai, May 11, 1949; *ibid.*, May 12, 1949. Frank Robertson, Canton, in *Christian Science Monitor*, June 6, 1949.

[99] See the following newspaper dispatches: Henry R. Lieberman, from Shanghai, September 24, 1949, in *New York Times*, September 25 and 26, 1949; unsigned dispatch from Hongkong, September 25, 1949; *ibid.*, September 26, 1949; Tillman Durdin from Hongkong, September 28, 1949; *ibid.*, September 29, 1949.

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Chinese

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Uighurs were regarded as only political rebels. When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not only political rebels but traitors to the Chinese blood.

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Since the end of the war against Japan the Chinese reinforcements sent to Sinkiang have been principally non-Moslem troops of the National Government, though crack Moslem cavalry have been stationed on the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in the disputed Baitik Bogda area. The great Moslem war lords of Northwest China have been fully engaged in the militarily difficult and politically delicate dual operation of preventing the Chinese Communists from expanding into their satrapies, while at the same time consolidating in those satrapies an autonomous power sufficiently strong to refuse to allow the National Government either to send in garrisons or to collect taxes. They have had no forces to spare for independent adventures in Sinkiang. In compensation the National Government, while losing authority over the Moslems of Northwest China, gained the upper hand over them in Sinkiang. Playing on the social conservatism of the Chinese Moslems, they were for a time at least able to align them against Turkic nationalism and still more against the more revolutionary "coalition nationalism" of the Kulja movement.

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Backed by over 100,000 National Government troops with relatively good training and American equipment, and with the Moslem Chinese unable to dispute the ascendancy of the non-Moslems, the position of the Chinese as a whole in Sinkiang, in the last years of Kuomintang rule, was curious. Their troops gave them formidable striking power against an insurrection at almost any one point, but not the decisive power to crush, as a whole, the nationalism which increasingly pervaded the entire province. Political and military decisions lay in the hands of high Chinese officials almost none of whom were natives of the province. As individuals, they were not engaged in the defense of old vested interests but, all too often, in the acquisition of new personal interests.

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Chinese
Great Russians

In this situation, an important aspect of the mentality of the ruling bureaucracy was the habit, among English-speaking officials, of referring to the non-Chinese peoples of the province in true sahib style as "the natives." That political careerists regarded Sinkiang as a juicy melon to be sliced was further indicated by a comment made by a former high official in the provincial administration: 563* 648

> One might say that China is like a bankrupt family, which is so embarrassed financially that it can hardly continue to exist, but whose ancestors, fortunately, have left it an estate in the west. If need be, there is still this vast country to fall back on.[23]

In this period the dominant trend of Chinese policy was to disregard the possibilities of securing the adherence of Sinkiang to China by the consent of the peoples of Sinkiang, and to rely instead on a show of force which was formidable for the day but not backed up by the probability of reinforcements for the morrow.

Russians. The 13,400 Russians living in Sinkiang derive almost entirely from *émigrés* who fled from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 — most of them during the years 1919–1921 — or from families that were already in Sinkiang when the Russian Revolution broke out. This was a period of intense civil strife in the Semirechie region, now part of the Kazakh S.S.R., where Cossack bands led by Annenkov, Dutov, and Bakich held positions along the frontier until the collapse of Admiral Kolchak forced first one group and then another to cross into Sinkiang. Here they were disarmed and given the choice of remaining in the province or proceeding farther east. 563* 161 101

Most of the Russians live in a few urban centers like Kulja, Chuguchak, and Urumchi. As the group with the highest average 563* 361 648 463

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[23] Aitchen K. Wu, "Will China Lose Its Far West?" *Asia*, XXXIX (1939), p. 675.

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Great Russians

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of technical training in the province, the Russians have been useful both in time of peace and in periods of internal strife. They have served as automobile drivers and mechanics, aided in the training of provincial military forces, and made use of their military experience in actual combat. Their participation in the military struggle on the side of Sheng Shih-ts'ai was an important factor in his victory over Ma Ch'ung-ying in 1934. On this and other occasions, travelers and reporters on the scene, not to mention writers thousands of miles away, have often suggested or flatly stated that these Russians were Soviet Russians rather than White Russians. Both the extent of Soviet influence in the province and the characteristics of Soviet methods of operation have been distorted by such reports.

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During the period of Yang Tseng-hsin the Russians in Sinkiang managed to get along fairly well. They encountered hard times in the interval from the death of Yang in 1928 to the establishment of Sheng's authority in 1933–1934, and again after his turnabout in policy in 1943. Normally, they lead an existence much like that of other Russian *émigré* communities in China — which means that they have their own organizations, publish their own newspapers, and otherwise attempt to preserve their cultural identity. In general they accommodate themselves to shifting political tides in so far as these do *not threaten their very existence*. It was a measure of their disquietude that so many of them threw their support behind the program of the Kulja group in opposition to the Chinese administration.

Although the Sinkiang Russian community owed its original formation to the anti-Soviet feeling of its members, this attitude has been considerably tempered with the passage of time, especially as a new generation, not directly involved in the struggles of the civil war period, has begun to assert itself. In line with changes in attitude taking place in many *émigré* communities throughout the world, a growing number of Russians in Sinkiang have taken advantage of the new Soviet policy toward expatriates to identify themselves with the U.S.S.R.

There is now a question whether the Russians in Sinkiang are

Great Russians
Manchu

citizens of China or of the Soviet Union. An important subsidiary 563*
problem is the fact that when a Russian living abroad is granted 648
a Soviet passport he is not automatically free to return to the Soviet Union at his own discretion. In the past, the Soviet authorities in China have at times given Soviet passports and protection to Russian exiles, without granting them permission to return to the Soviet Union. Turkic nationalists like Masud Sabri consider that the Russians have Soviet citizenship and hence cannot be counted among the nationalities in Sinkiang. In this attitude there is a suggestion that Soviet citizenship is incompatible with Sinkiang residence. Yet it is probable that many Russians would like to have both. Given an administration which can make use of their abilities, the Russians, because of their technical qualifications, could make important contributions to the progress of the area. This is the best they can hope for in an area where they can never represent more than a minute fraction of the population.

Manchus. The Manchus of Sinkiang include the Solons and the 563*
Sibos, who are not, tribally speaking, true Manchus. All three be- 101
long to the Manchu tribal coalition, which conquered all of China 161
and all but disappeared from sight when their rule was terminated in 1911. Only in Sinkiang have the Manchus been able to preserve the characteristics which set them off from other peoples. Manchus, Solons, and Sibos are listed together as numbering 12,362 people.

The first significant numbers of Manchus came to Sinkiang in 563*
the second half of the eighteenth century in the course of the 167
campaigns against the Jungar Mongols. Following their victory 174
the Manchus attempted to consolidate their holdings by placing administrators and troops in key positions. A city was built in the strategic Ili Valley as the center from which to administer the region as a whole and to command the Manchu garrisons stationed throughout the province. In contrast to most garrisons, which consisted of a few isolated troops, stationed in important urban centers and forbidden by Manchu dynastic law to engage

Uzbeg
Kazan Tatar

*563 economy. They absorbed many elements of the higher Iranian
197 culture which they had conquered, to such a degree that for a
174 time Persian was the only language in which literature was written
and in which the courts functioned; though the Turkic Uzbek language prevailed over Iranian as the language of the common people.

*563 In the nineteenth century, most of the territory of the Uzbeks
● 648 was conquered by the Russians. Several Khanates remained nominally
101 independent, but were actually in a vassal relationship to
Russia. After the Soviet Revolution the Uzbeks first formed part of the Turkistan Soviet Republic, and later were reorganized in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, a constituent Union Republic of the Soviet Union. The Uzbeks comprise the majority of the population in their own Republic. They live also in scattered groups in the Tajik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics, and in northern Afghanistan as well as in Sinkiang.

[197] Uzbek is a Turkic language, but it has become strongly Iranicized in the cities. Actually there are two Uzbek languages: the Iranicized city Uzbek, and the more purely Turkic country Uzbek.

[779] While the Uzbeks are Sunni Mohammedans, the mystical teachings of the Sufis were of considerable importance in their religious development.

*563 *Tatars.* The Tatars in Sinkiang number less than 5000 people.
161 More than four fifths are concentrated in the two cities of Kulja
and Chuguchak. Some are descendents of Tatar traders who settled
361 in Sinkiang in the days of the Tsar. Others derive from anti-Soviet
101 refugees who entered the province after 1917. Despite
871 their small numbers they exercise considerable influence, as the
group with the highest average of education among the Turkish-speaking peoples.

*563 Most Tatars come from the Volga region which today com-prises
174 the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. They are
the descendants of the inhabitants of the Kazan Khanate which was formed in 1438 on the territory of the former Volga Bulgarian Empire as a result of the collapse of the Golden Horde.

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CHAPTER VII At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

648 DURING the years of the second World War and the years of rapid change that followed it, the situation in the territories adjoining and surrounding Sinkiang has changed even more profoundly than the situation in Sinkiang itself. For more than half a century all writers have described Sinkiang as a partial vacuum which was being filled competitively from China, India, and Russia. The Sinkiang of today, teeming with its own nationalism, can no longer be considered a vacuum; and the most important aspect of its position is that it stands between a Communist-dominated China and a Communist-controlled Soviet Union.

Until this change took place British policy in Sinkiang was directed partly from London, partly from Britain's position as the imperial power ruling India. British policy alternated between two aims: that of establishing a sphere of influence, especially in the Kashgar region and the Tarim Basin, tacitly conceding to Russia a sphere of influence in the Ili Valley and Jungaria, and that of co-operating with the Chinese authorities and supporting the full claims of Chinese sovereignty, thus indicating that the extension of Russian influence would be undesirable. In the last years of Kuomintang rule, and after Britain negotiated withdrawal from India and Pakistan, British policy settled down to the second of these two alternatives, because the British interest is to prolong a relatively weak Chinese overlord rule in Inner Asia, whether under the Kuomintang or the Chinese

[p.200]

Communists, rather than to accelerate the development of a strong Russian overlord rule, or overriding interest. 648

In the same period Russia and its dominions in Asia passed from a centralized imperial rule under the Tsars to a federated structure of Soviet Communist Republics. China began its revolutionary changes before Russia but completed them later. Before 1911 the authority of the Manchu Empire had been weakening both in China and in the frontier territories and in 1911 it was overthrown. From 1912 to 1926 China was a republic in which power was divided between war lords; there was no firm central authority either in China or in the frontier territories. After 1927, China was a republic governed by the Kuomintang, whose central authority tended to increase within China, but to decrease in Sinkiang and other frontier territories. Finally, China has now passed under the ascendancy of the Communists, and a trend toward federalization can now be foreseen. Within this federative trend, it is likely that the new Central Government of China will have more authority in the frontier territories of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang than any Chinese government for many decades.

All of these changes must be evaluated in themselves and in their relation to and interaction on each other. The Sinkiang of today cannot properly be described as a vacuum. It has become a crossroads at which meet a number of different nationalisms and the policies of two great powers, China and Russia. These two great federative states are similar to each other in their Communist orientation, but not identical with each other in their domestic interests.

The Russian Revolution and Its Effects

A unique colonial revolution took place within the general 000 Russian Revolution. The colonial domains of the Tsar adjoined and merged into the Russian lands. The degree of interpenetration between Russians and subject peoples was much greater than it could possibly be in any overseas colony. All of the British in

000 lution and civil war in which some of the non-Russians were on both sides of the fight among Russians. As the revolution deepened from a political struggle into a class war, the lines of cleavage more and more grouped together the possessors, Russian and non-Russian, fighting to preserve at least something of the old order, and the dispossessed, Russian and non-Russian, trying to take complete possession of the new order.

167 648 In many of the regions in which the Russians were in a minority, the outcome of the revolution was determined by non-Russians who took the side of the Russian Bolsheviks.[2] Before the final outcome, however, there were two intermediate stages, and during each of these stages, and after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution, there were important migrations out of Russian territory which carried the effects of the revolution into the adjoining lands of Inner Asia.

In the first of these intermediate stages non-Russian nationalists came into power or almost within reach of power in their own territories. In Inner Asia there were two groups of these nationalists. One — including such potentates as the Emir of Bokhara and lesser representatives of the old systems of nobility and chieftainship which had been subjected to the Russsians — was not guided by political theory. Individuals of the group, rather than the group as a whole, simply tried to resume as much as possible of the power that they had had before the Russians came. If the power they could take into their hands was not enough to make them feel secure, they were inclined to look for protection to the British, who were intervening against the Russian Revolution from the side of Asia as well as from the side of Europe.

The second group — many of whose members stemmed from families in the first group — was led by non-Russians who had had some years of Russian schooling and who, very often, had

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[2] See above, Chapter I; also Owen Lattimore, "Yakutia and the Future of the North," *American Review on the Soviet Union*, New York, Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1945; reprinted in *New Compass of the World*, ed. Hans Weigert, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, and Richard Edes Harrison, New York, 1949, pp. 145–146.

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held positions in the Russian service. This group had some idea 167 of political theory and modern politics. On the whole, its ambitions 648 did not go beyond local autonomous government, with members of the group holding higher positions than they had formerly held — especially, of course, the top positions once held by Russians. For allies, this group looked to the Russian Mensheviks; as the Mensheviks weakened and failed, they also looked to the British; when the British intervention failed, those who could gave up the struggle and fled into exile — a few to Europe, but many more to Iran, Afghanistan, and Sinkiang.

The second stage, marked by the British intervention, began where the first had ended. The British intervention was directed from Iran and Mesopotamia. It endeavored to mask Afghanistan, where suspicion of British policy was very strong, and it also operated, to a minor though significant extent, from Kashgar in Sinkiang.[3] Beginning as an attempt to prevent German and Austrian prisoners of war interned in Russian Turkistan from being repatriated to Germany, and to prevent accumulated stocks of cotton from being delivered to Germany after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it quickly turned into an attempt to prevent the Bolshevik Revolution from seizing the Baku oil fields, and to complete the *cordon sanitaire* around Russia. As they failed and withdrew, the British carried along with them an ebb tide of people fleeing from the Revolution, both Russians and people of every Inner Asian nationality.

Nor did emigration end with the Bolshevik victory. With each new phase of Bolshevik policy, and especially during the bitter struggle over collectivization, which was virtually a new civil war, new waves of refugees sought an escape into Sinkiang and the other Inner Asian lands around the Soviet frontier. In this way the primary effect of the Russian Revolution was to spread alarm far and wide beyond the Russian frontiers.

In time, however, a second or long-term series of effects began 648 to become apparent. These effects were enhanced by the fact that

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[3] See, especially, Lt.-Col. F. M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent*, London, 1946; also L. V. S. Blacker, *On Secret Patrol in High Asia*, London, 1921.

● 648 everywhere in Inner Asia the Soviet frontier is in one sense artificial: because it originated in the Tsarist conquests, and stops where the Tsarist conquests stopped, it everywhere divides similar peoples from each other instead of separating different peoples from each other, as has been pointed out in previous chapters. The same languages are spoken on both sides of the Soviet-Turkish, Soviet-Iranian, Soviet-Afghan, and Soviet-Sinkiang frontiers. And, in most cases, they are spoken by people who are minorities under both the sovereignties under which they live. The effects in Inner Asia of the Soviet Revolution must therefore be studied especially from the standpoint of peoples who are minorities in the states under which they live, and who talk in the same language and against the background of a common cultural and social tradition about the different conditions under which they live on the two sides of the frontier that divides them. Five principal phases, which followed each other in chronological order, can be distinguished among the long-term effects of the Soviet Revolution.

565
563 1. As the possessors of advanced skills, refugees from the Soviet Revolution became an elite in Sinkiang. Among the Russians, especially, there were doctors, geologists, and other scientists; engineers, mechanics, and many artisans. Among the Uzbeks, Tatars, and others there were also many whose literacy, skill, and experience in trade — or proficiency as carpenters, builders, leather tanners, or metalworkers — put them above the average level prevailing in Sinkiang. Having escaped from the disorder and insecurity of revolution, they now found that the country to which they had come was culturally and politically even more backward than the one from which they had escaped. They learned that if the superior skills which gave them the qualities of an elite were not enough to make them a political elite, and frequently not enough even to assure them economic security, it was because of the backwardness of the society in which they had settled, and the corruption or incompetence of the officials to whom they now had to defer.

2. Having fled because there was no force in Russian Inner

Asia capable of resisting the Revolution, the refugees now found 563 that there was no adjoining state capable of intervening successfully against the Revolution. As the years of the interwar period went by, they found that in Sinkiang and in every other territory in Asia adjoining their old homes there was not a single anti-Russian government that was able to build up political and military strength as fast as the new Soviet Republics of Inner Asia, or to open up educational and employment opportunities as fast. In their old homes, there was still suffering, and often persecution of those who had belonged to the old order of politics and society; but this was the suffering of revolutionary dislocation, and the same dislocation also offered new careers for those who were willing to work hard and those who were able to profit by education. In their new homes, however, there was also suffering: the suffering of old and stagnant societies, in which opportunities were decreasing, rather than increasing. Even the rich man might suddenly be impoverished if he fell foul of a corrupt official; and there was a steady production of landless peasants in the rural districts and beggars in the towns.

3. In the atmosphere of rapid change and spreading insecurity 648 after the second World War, both the refugees and the peoples among whom they live have begun to fear the Soviet Republics of Inner Asia, and the Russia standing behind them, more in some ways but less in other ways. They fear them more, as the source of a power that may reach out and take over the adjoining territories or parts of them. They fear them less, because in comparison with most of the adjoining territories, such as Sinkiang itself, Afghanistan, and Iran, and even to some extent Turkey, they have become a focus of stability and of that "law and order" which all stabilizing empires proclaim. The Soviet Republics do not offer security for the investments of the rich, but they do offer a new kind of security, never known before in the "back blocks" of Asia — in a multiplying number of careers, especially for the young and especially for those who pass through universities and technical training schools of all kinds.

4. A cycle has, in fact, been completed. The old Russia was

648 once the greatest and most stable state in Inner Asia. As far as men of the Inner Asian peoples could hope for modern training and modern careers at all, it was in Russian employment or the Tsarist service. A "Russian-trained man" was a man who had escaped from the old ruts of the tribal or oasis life. Even when the Tsarist Empire fell, the refugees who scattered into other Inner Asian countries were respected for their superior knowledge and skills. In the new cycle, the new Russia has regained this position. Its ideology is feared by those whose social or economic advantages are protected by the old orders that still stand just beyond the Soviet frontiers; but these old orders are old, and they are weak, and all know it. The present influence of the Soviet Union beyond its own borders in Inner Asia therefore bears heavily on the stress lines of class conflict and economic inefficiency in weak social structures that have little confidence in themselves. This influence has, especially, a marked tendency to divide the old and the young. Among those who are old enough to know that they could not adapt easily to great changes, fear is strong. Among those who are young enough to know that they could take advantage of new opportunities in education and the making of careers, there is a stir of curiosity and adventure.

5. The gathering momentum of Soviet prestige is enhanced by the withdrawal of other powers that were once great in Inner Asia. The overlord power of China in Sinkiang is diminishing. Even the Communists, triumphant in China itself, have to handle the Inner Asian frontiers of China more by negotiation than by the issuing of decrees. With British power withdrawn from India, neither the Union of India nor Pakistan has the kind of power that can project its influence as deeply into Inner Asia as that of Britain once did. British power has also receded in Iran, and has not been fully replaced by American power. The American influence in Iran is that of a country which is strong enough to fight Russia, but not that of a country with the knack — which Britain once had — of simultaneously propping up both a weak government and a decaying social order. In the short run, the American 000

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175 region, in which it had always been strongest; and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the years in which his policy was most active, most progressive, and most successful, bracketed the British with the Japanese as imperialists menacing Sinkiang. Partly as a device for turning the pressure of the nationalisms of the Uighurs and others away from his administration, he directed it against the British. The shadow of Japan over Sinkiang never hardened into the reality of a Japanese invasion or even raid; but in the years in which British policy appeased Japan the shadow of Britain over Sinkiang wore thinner.[16]

The Chinese Revolution Reaches Sinkiang

175 648 It was only after Russian revolutionary influences had become strong and well established in Inner Asia, and after the decline of British power and prestige in the 1930's had obviously begun that the effects of China's own revolution really began to penetrate into Sinkiang. In the 1911 Revolution, all that really happened in Sinkiang was that the title of the Manchu Empire passed to the Chinese Republic. The governing group remained essentially the same, guided by the strong hand of Yang Tseng-hsin. That same strong hand sealed Sinkiang off from the stormy events and heady ideas of the Second or "Great" Revolution of 1925–1927.

175 648 669 Revolutionary developments began with the Moslem and nationalist risings at the beginning of the 1930's, which were rebellions against Chinese rule that turned into revolutions against the traditional social orders of Sinkiang. By an odd twist, however, it was these rebellions that gave the first opportunity of action for those Chinese in Sinkiang whose minds were also turned toward revolution.

There seems little doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, at the time he came to power, was a mixture of the revolutionary and the mili-

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[16] For contemporary expressions of Chinese hostility to Britain on the subject of Sinkiang, see Edgar Snow, *Battle for Asia*, Random House, New York, 1941, p. 307 and note, citing the most important independent Chinese newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao;* also Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, 1944, pp. 48 and 56, also citing Chinese sources.

tary adventurer. In the Northern Expedition of 1927 he had 175
accompanied the famous First Army column which was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek with Ho Ying-ch'in as Chief of Staff 648
and Pai Chung-hsi as Assistant Chief of Staff, and had himself 669
served in the Planning Section of the Staff. He had, therefore, watched at close hand those military leaders of the Kuomintang who boldly used class conflict to create a situation in which they could control the balance of power. They developed, and for a time seemed to have perfected, a method of riding the revolutionary tiger without losing control of it and becoming unable to dismount. Sheng Shih-ts'ai may well have thought, when he first assumed power in Sinkiang, that he too could use the methods of revolution without losing control of the process of revolution.

What Sheng Shih-ts'ai faced in Sinkiang was not revolution, but a widespread rebellion which could not be suppressed by force with the military resources at his command. On the other hand, he had no mandate to protect the vested interests of the colonial Chinese families that had long been established in the province. He was a newcomer. There lay before him the opportunity to take command of the situation if he could do so by use of the means available to him.

These means included:

1. Getting material aid from the Russians, in return for preventing Japanese infiltration into Inner Asia.
2. Getting the Russians to repatriate, into Sinkiang, Chinese troops which, after being defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria, had retreated into Siberia and had there been interned. As a Manchurian Chinese himself, he could present himself to these troops as a sympathetic commander, while they in turn had no local political loyalties in Sinkiang, and made him independent of reinforcements sent from China.
3. Concessions to Uighur and other non-Chinese political leaders at the expense of the old Chinese official clique in Sinkiang — a clique to which Sheng was not bound, and whose interests he did not have to defend, if by abandoning them he could create new interests allied to himself and dependent on his new policy.

175 As was shown in Chapter III, Sheng's "nationality policy" was
648 worded as if it had been based on concessions to peoples, but was
in fact directed primarily to winning over some of the leaders of
669 those peoples, whose ambition was simply to hold offices that had
been open previously only to Chinese.

4. The recruiting of a new body of Chinese experts and advisers who, like himself, were not tied by common interests to the old regime, and would support his two bold policies of dealing with the Russians and making greater concessions to the non-Chinese nationalities of Sinkiang than their Chinese rulers had ever made to them before.

The first three points have been dealt with earlier in this book, in Chapter III. They are mentioned again here only because of their connection with the fourth point, which concerns the manner in which the characteristics of the Chinese Revolution became, after so long a delay, transplanted to Sinkiang and began to operate there.

Sheng had no difficulty in collecting Chinese, previously strangers to the province, who were far enough to the left to go along with him enthusiastically in his first years of radical innovation. Between the loss of Manchuria in 1931 and the formation of a united front between Communists and Kuomintang at the beginning of 1937, China was a bitter and disillusioned country. Thousands of ardent patriots, who did not want to follow the Communists, were disappointed in the Kuomintang's refusal to make a stand against the Japanese and its insistence, instead, on continuing the civil war against the Communists. Afraid of the Communists as "too revolutionary," but eager for reform, they were ready to rally to a leader like Sheng Shih-ts'ai who was proclaiming internal unity, democratic reforms, and unlimited hostility to imperialism.

Nor were Chinese who felt this way easily frightened by Sheng's friendly association with the Russians. Many Chinese were in favor of good relations with Russia, in view of the clear menace of Japan. To keep one foreign nation balanced against another was an old Chinese tradition; a great many Chinese

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feared that this technique was being turned against them when 175
they were warned that, because of Russian Communism, they 648
must not seek friendly relations with Russia even in face of the 669
rapidly increasing encroachment of Japan.

In addition to leftists and liberals, Sheng Shih-ts'ai also enlisted Chinese Communists. These were not concealed Communists; Sheng invited them to enter his service, and employed them deliberately for the sake of their techniques of popular organization, and also as economic and financial experts, feeling sure that he could take the upper hand over them whenever he felt it necessary to do so. When, in his opinion, Russia at the time of Stalingrad had become so weak that he thought it prudent to come to terms with the Kuomintang, he arrested both his Communist and his liberal assistants and tortured and killed many of them, including a brother of Mao Tze-tung. Only at the end of the war with Japan were a few of them released from jail and allowed to go to Yenan.[17]

The men of whom Sheng Shih-ts'ai made use brought with 175
them into Sinkiang the thought, the emotion, the methods of or-
ganization and some of the factionalism that had been develop- 648
ing in revolutionary China for more than twenty years. Their 563
scope of action, however, did not lie within a Chinese environ- 186
ment. Whether they turned to the problem of strengthening the state or to the problem of reforming society, they found themselves part of a Chinese minority surrounded by peoples of several nationalities, all of them differing from the Chinese, and from each other, in their responses to social and political issues.

In this situation theories of nationalism and the policies based on them became of more and more importance in determining all political alignments. Among the Chinese, at one end of the scale stood those who considered that they must maintain themselves as the ruling people, treating the non-Chinese as subjects. Next to them stood Chinese who, in contrast, considered themselves

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[17] For the foregoing information I am indebted to unpublished notes by Miss Anna Louise Strong of her interviews in Yenan with some of these surviving Communists.

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175 generous and progressive because they believed that non-Chinese
should acquire equal status, as individuals, as fast as they could
648 acquire the Chinese language and assimilate themselves to the
563 Chinese culturally; but this attitude was not accepted as "pro-
gressive" by non-Chinese who had their own loyalties to their
186 own languages and cultures. At the other end of the scale stood Chinese who believed in conceding full citizenship to all non-Chinese, combined with independence — including independence in education — in the use of non-Chinese languages, and local self-government based on recognition of the language community rather than on the territorial unit; but while these Chinese were considered liberal and progressive by the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and others, they were considered dangerously radical and disruptive by other Chinese.

Among non-Chinese, the appeal to nationalism also evoked many responses. There were individuals whose hereditary position or political privileges were so closely associated with Chinese rule that they hesitated to approve any change. There were others who wanted, as individuals, to rise to positions formerly held only by Chinese, but did not want to change the structure of government and administration in any other way. There were Uighurs who considered that the Uighurs, as the most numerous nationality, constituting an absolute majority, should take over the province and should have the same rights over minorities that the Chinese had formerly had over all Sinkiang. There were Kazakhs, Mongols, and others who wanted to be as independent of the Uighurs as of the Chinese. And, finally, there were radical nationalists who wanted to change the social order as well as the political structure: to unseat their own Begs, Sultans, and Princes as well as to govern themselves without the Chinese District Magistrates.

All of these groups and tendencies worked out their relationship to each other in a pattern of constantly changing coalitions. In the politics of reform and revolution, coalitions are the characteristic phenomena. They are formed by groups which have interests in common to defend or to assert and which, in forming

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the coalition, emphasize convergent interests and avoid emphasis 175
on divergent interests. The coalition breaks up when one of its
component groups has secured the interest that it thinks most 648
essential, and is unwilling to risk this gain by pushing ahead in 563
support of interests more essential to other groups. New coali- 186
tions then form, grouped on the one hand around those who wish
to stabilize the situation and on the other hand around those who
still have unsatisfied interests to assert.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the first phase of his rule, achieved considerable success by building around himself a left-of-center coalition of progressive, radical, and Communist Chinese — together with non-Chinese leaders, to whom he granted more freedom of political action than had ever been granted by any previous Chinese Governor. In the second phase of his rule he tried, and eventually failed, to build a new right-of-center coalition by combining representatives of the Kuomintang, freshly sent in from China, with those of his own followers whom he considered personally loyal to himself rather than to political principles.

After the fall of Sheng and the end of the war with Japan, 175
different factions of the Kuomintang, frequently weakened by
purely factional quarrels with each other, formed a series of un- 662
steady coalitions in which they enlisted representatives of the
most conservative interests among the non-Chinese, especially
the Uighurs and Kazakhs. These Chinese-controlled coalitions
were opposed by the Kulja coalition in the Ili Valley and western Jungaria, which rested on leftist and pro-Communist groups among the non-Chinese nationalities, but at the same time sought to maintain contact with moderate representatives, such as Chang Chih-chung, within the right-wing coalition which dominated most of the Tarim Basin and eastern Jungaria.

The Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and the Russian Frontier

In coalition politics of this kind the shifts of allegiance of Osman Bator, the freebooting Kazakh leader, who has been fre-

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175 quently interviewed by American correspondents, were typical. First, as a military leader with an independent following, he
662 sought to take advantage of Chinese military weakness by joining the Ili coalition. Later, failing to dominate the Ili coalition, he went over to the Chinese side, where by this time his price had risen because popular sympathy was turning away from the conservative Uighur and other leaders who had accepted Chinese protection.

During this phase of Sinkiang politics the Ili coalition, holding territory along the Soviet frontier, received aid and comfort from Soviet Kazakhstan. The coalition of Kuomintang officials and generals, conservative Uighur figureheads supported by the Kuomintang, and Kazakh auxiliaries received subsidies and American arms from the American-supported government at Nanking. This phase ended when the advances of the Chinese Communist armies across the Yangtze cut off the Kuomintang outposts in Sinkiang from any hope of support from within China.

175 An entirely new situation was thus created. Ever since the Russian Revolution, the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang had stood
563 between a government controlled by Russian Communists on the
● 648 one side and a government controlled by non-Communist or anti-Communist Chinese on the other side. They now stand between a government controlled by Russian Communists and a government dominated by Chinese Communists.

In this new situation the aims of the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists, as Marxists, are generally the same; but the domestic interests of the Chinese Republic and the Soviet Union are not necessarily identical. In the Soviet Union the Russians are the dominant people; but there are vast territories inhabited by many millions of people who are not Russians. In the Chinese Republic the Chinese people are the overwhelming majority; they dominate China much more decisively than the Russians dominate the Soviet Union; but in the Chinese Republic also there are vast territories inhabited by peoples who are not Chinese. The geographical center of gravity of the non-Chinese territories of China lies in Sinkiang. The frontiers of Sinkiang touch the Inner Asian Soviet Republics, the most important block of territory in the Soviet Union inhabited by peoples who are not Russians and not Slavs. 175 563

This situation gives a new aspect to old problems and creates new problems of its own. There is the question whether, in the Soviet Union, the interests of the Russians are to override the interests of the other peoples, and the question whether, in the Chinese Republic, the interests of the Chinese are to override those of all others. These are old problems, the development of which has long been watched warily by the neighbors of Russia and China. In addition, there is now the new problem of the relationship between the Soviet Union and China: are the interests of the Soviet Union, as a state, to be made paramount over those of China, as a state? 648

If statesmen were efficiency engineers, and no more than that, a very good case could be made for annexing parts of Sinkiang to the Mongolian People's Republic and to the Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Tajik Republics of the Soviet Union, and for setting up most of the Tarim Basin as an Uighur Republic, also to be annexed to the Soviet Union. In terms of the affinities of peoples, languages, and cultures, geographical accessibility, the most economical laying-out of modern communications, and the rapid promotion of material progress, the natural orientation of Sinkiang is toward Mongolia and the Soviet Union, rather than toward China. On the other hand, however, the material and sentimental interests of China in Sinkiang, though they have been much abused, are real; and so are the interests of Sinkiang in its connection with China, if this connection is wisely handled. 000

The probability is that the Chinese Communists will, as Chinese, renounce no sovereignty in lands long claimed as Chinese. At the same time, it is to be expected that they will attempt to apply new policies — not only to Sinkiang, but to Inner Mongolia, to the districts in which Chinese Moslems predominate in Ninghsia and Kansu, and to such parts of Tibet as they can penetrate. It is to be expected that, as Marxists, they will model these policies on those of the Russians in Soviet Asia. The Sinkiang of

alone, resources are available in such an abundance as can furnish the 135
foundation for a thriving industrialization.

Iron, [illegible] copper and gold have been found near Sui-ting (I-li). 135
Henceforth this important center on the Soviet-Chinese border may 316
take its prosperous tea and fur trade for granted and brag, instead, of blazing furnaces. T'a Ch'eng (Chuguchak), a frontier locality on the road from the Turksib Railway and probably the only city to have boomed more than Sui-ting, is already boasting of the iron vein one hundred and thirty miles long which runs right through the town, and of the Black Oil Mountain nearby. The oil appears abundantly in the form of springs and is especially black and thick. It is probably a tar, for it gets hard and has been used in the laying out and paving of the new provincial highways. There is coal too, not far away. But miners are nothing new for T'a Ch'eng; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were thousands of them prospecting in the fifty square miles or so of gold mines roundabout, or so the old people say.

Tihwa (Urumchi), the provincial capital, with a population judged 135
at around 100,000, dominates both the North and South Roads: hence its 361
military and political importance. Nowadays, not to be outdone, it has also been showing great industrial promise. Most of its houses are heated with oil or coal produced in the vicinity. One visitor to Sheng Shih-ts'ai's headquarters saw a piece of coal so huge that it took two men to carry it.

Farther south, Kashgar (Su-fu), largest oasis in Sinkiang and hub of 361
both transport and political interests from the neighboring lands of 315
Northwest India, Afghanistan, and Soviet Turkestan, is also blessed 648
with natural resources. Kashgar oil, though often merely "scooped out" by primitive means, has long provided the city with gasoline, kerosene, machine oil, and grease. Even Ma Titai, old-school Commander-in-Chief of the Kashgar district at the close of World War I, guessed at the worth of the oil in his domain. He put most of his personal army to the task of tapping wells for him, and almost negotiated a deal with Soviet Russians of Ferghana for modern machinery. The Russians had said they would supply the machinery and would personally see to its being escorted to Kashgar, when Ma's plans hit a snag. His ambitions

361 had come to the ears of Lieutenant-Colonel P. T. Etherton, local British
315 Consul-General and Political Resident, who made haste to point out
648 “that the advantages to be gained were out of all proportion to the danger incurred. . . .” The Titai is said to have agreed, the Russians are said to have been “checkmated,” and (unsaid) the industrial development of Kashgar was retarded for another stretch of years. This is a sample of the sort of thing that has long been holding back Sinkiang development.

181 Yet it is doubtful whether the tribesmen of the Sinkiang steppes and oases spent much time yearning for progress as such. They clung to their time-honored ways, and a thousand years more or less seemed to bring little change or concern. For Sinkiang did have color and charm —charm especially of a human, a warm temperament. A perfect host might sometimes put his wife or pretty daughter at the disposal of an overnight guest but paradoxically the modesty of a woman was protected by a face veil. A wealthy khan might expand his harem until it almost rivaled that of Yakub Beg, self-made “King of Kashgar,” who maintained three hundred favorites in state and always took at least four with him on his trips to outlying areas. At Sinkiang merry-makings, as befitted a nomad’s paradise, mare’s milk was quaffed with gusto and horse meat was regarded an expensive luxury. A fortune-teller was always ready to deal out prosperity for the throng of a local bazaar; somewhere near by a tambourine would jingle merrily; and a samovar was usually singing its own happy song. Uighur, Mongol, Kazakh, and Son of Han, all and more, mingled, yet maintained their own traditions; and religion ran the gamut—from Mohammedanism, Lamaist Buddhism, and ancient Manichaeism to Christianity.

735 But in the old Sinkiang, as has too often been the case elsewhere, along with the enchanting and the bizarre there were poverty, cruelty, and crime. The Sinkiang peasant in most cases made his home in a dirty, mud-wood hovel or, on the steppe, in a primitive, tent-like abode. It was at times hard going for him to scrape up enough food on which to feed himself and his family, and often he took to begging and to
681 thievery, only to be apportioned harsh punishment. It was not unusual
696 for a servant, caught stealing, to have his fingers or part of his tongue

IV

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

648 A frontier, it has been written, is by its own nature usually an unsettled region. There rough, unscrupulous men come to seek quick, easy riches; and there the good living of peace, education, responsible government, and material comforts is often either lacking or only ostensibly proffered from the embattled mansions of outlaws or despots. Usually confronting another country, the frontier is the place which feels most suddenly and severely the shocks of changing political and military relationships in the world: the slightest overt military incident on an international frontier time and time again has been the spark to set nations aflame with war. Multiplied a hundred-fold or more is this disquiet and tension when a frontier lies helpless and unprotected at the crossroads of world empire.

Such a frontier has Sinkiang been. Tu Chung-yüan writes:

> Behind the facade of the racial and cultural complex of the province every imperialist force has sought to cause dissension and division. A certain imperialist force, for instance, has increasingly fostered independence for South Sinkiang, and Japanese imperialism has helped the Ch'an Hui [Turban Moslems] promote a Mussulman state. If this matter is not put foremost, if it is not struck a decisive blow, if all the people of the province are not cautioned about it, then all Sinkiang government will share a like fate.

A nineteenth-century outpost for the commerce of China, Russia, Britain, and Japan, Sinkiang has seen her borders patrolled incessantly by the armies of the first three while her steppes and oases have been infiltrated by the counter-agents of probably all four and more. The pulse of life in Sinkiang might be said to have been timed almost literally to beat with the tread of a marching frontier guard. One day it was bruited about that the Russians were plotting to march through Sinkiang to Lhasa and Bombay; the next, that the British coveted Sinkiang as a road to Urga; a third, that Japanese would use Sinkiang as a base to set the Moslems of the Middle East in revolt! Nor has

it only been these. China has had great difficulty in defending this 648
frontier during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, yet she herself probably began imperialism in Sinkiang some two thousand years ago. And she had to compete even then with the nomads of Siberia, Mongolia, and Turkestan. It is through "Anti-imperialism" that the New Sinkiang has attempted to arm herself against all this.

Chinese Imperialism in the Western Regions

The "Anti-imperialism" of the New Sinkiang may well have been, 648
in the first place, a reproach for Chinese imperialist frontier policies 175
of the past. For Sinkiang Province was not always Chinese territory. The area appears to have been inhabited in ancient times by a number of separate independent clans, principalities, and states which Chinese gradually came to know collectively as the *Hsi Yü*, or "Western Regions." By conquest, and often by repression, of the natives of these Western Regions, Chinese were among the first to acquaint them with imperialism. A related, but slightly different, approach to this point is made by Owen Lattimore in his study, *Inner Asian Frontiers of* China:

> The history of the Chinese in Central Asia . . . is a history of imperialism, of conquest. The Chinese could not here expand, adding contiguous region to contiguous region as they did in their advance toward the Yangtze and beyond, but had to subjugate and dominate from afar. They had, moreover, to compete with the imperialism of the steppe, which also attempted to assert its control over the oasis world. The record of the Chinese in Central Asia is therefore by no means continuous; in fact, their effective control has been estimated at only about 425 out of about 2,000 years, divided into a number of periods, of which the present Chinese rule in the province of Sinkiang is the fifth major period.

China seems to have had earliest contact with the Western Regions during the Han Dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.). The Hsiung-nu (Hun?) nomads of Mongolia had been raiding the Chinese frontier, and the Chinese Emperor, Han Wu Ti, wanted to outflank them with bases in the Western Regions. He didn't get those bases at first; but through an emissary, Chang Ch'ien, he did initiate Chinese frontier activity

648 175 in Central Asia. By the end of the first century A.D. a Han general Pan Ch'ao had expanded that activity so successfully in a military sense that "more than fifty kingdoms" of the Western Regions had "sent hostages," and countries as far away as Persia were regularly sending "tributary" missions to the Chinese throne.

China did not retain this position permanently. Some three to four hundred years later, Chinese of the Sui and T'ang Dynasties had to play off "western Turks" (apparently a people of the Western Regions) against the "northern Turks" (probably a people then in present-day Mongolia) to regain mastery of Turkestan. In this period, during the reign of the Emperor Hsüan Tsung of the T'ang Dynasty (713-756) Chinese power extended as far as the sites of Kashmir and Gilgit (in present-day Northwest India).

But this was the limit to which Chinese westward expansion was then to go, and later it even met with severe reverses. When the Sons of Han did carry their authority back to Turkestan, it was centuries later and then they were mainly henchmen to their own "barbarian" overlords: the Mongols in the thirteenth, and the Manchus in the seventeenth century. What memories must have been left the people of Sinkiang by plundering Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan! And by the Manchus! In 1750 during the reign of Emperor Ch'ien Lung, their armies laid waste the Altai region and annihilated 600,000 inhabitants. A century later they slaughtered numberless Moslems in the "pacification" of such Asiatic revolts as that of Yakub Beg of Kashgar.

Nor, for almost a quarter century after Chinese revolt from Manchu rule in 1911 and 1912, did Sinkiang have an opportunity to dissociate the idea of Chinese rule from that of stern military conquest. The administration of the first Republican governor of the province, Yang Tseng-hsin, aroused so much resentment that he was assassinated on July 7, 1928. Once his firm hand was withdrawn unrest again stirred; and it was thus that the Sinkiang civil war which brought Sheng Shih-ts'ai to power broke out in the 1930's.

Tsarist Imperialism

In the later days of the Manchu Dynasty, meanwhile, a new imperialism had come to Sinkiang. The expanding Russian Empire had not been slow to profit from her proximity to China, and in the Treaty of Kuldja of 1851 she gained her first sizable foothold in the Sinkiang economic door. The treaty, kept secret for a time, was made public in 1861. It gave Russia the right to send agents into the region, permitted Russian commercial dealings with Kuldja (Sui-ting or I-li) and Chuguchak (T'a Ch'eng), and foresaw the opening of a Russian consulate at Kuldja. In the Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860, this beginning was enlarged to permit the opening of another consulate, at Kashgar.

Then came the Yakub Beg revolt of the 1860's and an upset in the Central Asian balance of power. The Turkestan frontier was so "disturbed" that in 1871 Russia occupied points on the Chinese side, promising that her forces would be evacuated as soon as China had restored order. There was doubt at the time as to Russia's true intentions, and all might not have gone so well subsequently had China's army under Tso Tsung-t'ang not been successful in its bitter campaign to "pacify" the Moslem uprising. Russia, unable in 1881 to challenge the victorious Chinese, reluctantly signed new conventions with China. By these the Tsar, in return for a monetary payment, ultimately gave back much of the Chinese territory he had occupied. A *modus operandi* was achieved by which China, among other matters, recognized the Russian right to open consulates at Kuldja, Chuguchak, Kashgar, and Turfan, and assented to creation of other Russian consulates at Ha-mi, Tihwa, and Ch'i-t'ai (Ku Ch'eng-tzu) should commercial relations warrant.

British Imperialism

Russian ambitions in Chinese Turkestan in the time of the Tsars had, however, additional reactions farther south. It is not too surprising that, once Russian troops had moved across the Sinkiang frontier in 1871, authorities of the British Empire tendered political "recognition" to the "government" which the rebel Yakub Beg had

648 then organized at Kashgar. The British felt their "preserve" in nearby
175 India was being "threatened" and as a consequence "countered" Russian action both by recognizing the Beg and by taking a more active interest in "trade" with South Sinkiang.

Sinkiang-Indian trade had been under way for some time, but the British Government became officially committed to its furtherance in 1876. This policy, they found, could not be pursued satisfactorily without dispatch of an armed force to pacify the Northwest Frontier of India. In taking this step, they trespassed on what Chinese feel was and is their ground. Thereupon, say Chinese, when in 1884 a British force marched into "Kanjut" *(K'an-chü-t'i* or *Kan-chu-t'e)*—the site of the Gilgit Agency and Hunza Valley of modern Northwest India—outright English "aggression" against Sinkiang began. Subsequently a British agent and a British consul were established at Kashgar. This South Sinkiang metropolis became a focus for British activity which, under the aegis of the Indian trade agent, the British consul, and native *aqsaqals* (headmen), was carried on mainly as an intra-Mohammedan affair. It became, consequently, subject to a persistent suspicion on the part of Chinese non-Moslems.

Manchu Commercial Efforts

439 That the Russians and British were attempting to dominate Sinkiang trade became apparent to China by the closing years of Manchu rule. In a limited and tardy way the Manchus attempted to strengthen administration in the province, therefore, and to foster new development of intra-Chinese trade. New colonizing blood was poured into the veins of Sinkiang. At the same time went manufacturers and ideas; and from the province came jade, gold, furs, skins, and a number of other items. The avidity with which foreigners in Tientsin and Shanghai sought the furs, skins, and wool especially helped, and by the beginning of the twentieth century Chinese traders were bringing these goods out of Sinkiang in such amounts that she was beginning to experience a new prosperity. But the process of itself could not develop to satisfactory proportions, due to the then current weakness of the

to the Chinese frontier; thus Russia gained another great advantage 439· over her rivals in the markets of Sinkiang. Total recorded Sinkiang-Soviet trade in 1930 had already jumped to over 32,000,000 rubles, and in 1931 Soviet Russia reportedly obtained new and considerable trade and communications privileges in the Chinese province. When the revolt of Sinkiang Moslems during 1930-1933 led to the emergence of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Soviet Russia extended him such substantial aid that he was able to institute sweeping changes in the territory under his administration.

The Soviet Position: One Chinese View

There are Chinese, such as the writer Chiang Chün-chang, who 648 have intimated that the Soviet record in Sinkiang has been merely a continuation of old Tsarist imperial policy and who hint that Sheng Shih-ts'ai has been merely an instrument in the hands of Soviet Russia. Chiang, whose opinion does not necessarily represent that of most Chinese, appears to feel that Soviet as well as Tsarist Russia has been an "aggressor" in Sinkiang. His argument (in public print, 1937-1939) has been that Soviet Russia began to make great headway in Sinkiang after the assassination of Yang Tseng-hsin and after Chin Shu-jen (by specific agreement in October, 1931) had welcomed the importation of Soviet arms into the province. When Sheng Shih-ts'ai's influence had succeeded that of Chin Shu-jen, Sheng got Soviet help in overcoming provincial opposition, and relates Chiang, "has since then been one of the Soviet brood." "Sheng Shih-ts'ai has engaged Soviet advisers in his army," has not conferred "with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," and has not sent "duplicate copies of treaties for the Executive Yüan to keep on record," Chiang adds. Though information on the extent of the authority which is held by such Soviet advisers as have been in Sinkiang is not clear and is largely based on foreign reports, Chang Chün-chang continues, it is to be feared that Soviet Russia has been sending many Kazakhs across the Soviet border into Sinkiang and has planned to have part of Sinkiang enter Soviet Kazakhstan. At the same time, he says, she has reportedly prepared Sinkiang Moslems to form a "Moslem Soviet under Soviet Russia."

648 These last accusations of Chiang Chün-chang are notably absent from Tu Chung-yüan's writing, and that Tu takes quite a different point of view is clear. But Chiang's statements ought not, on that account, to be eliminated from consideration completely. Their existence emphasizes that, in the recent past at least, certain influential Chinese have been suspicious of Soviet Russian intentions toward Sinkiang just as Chinese used to be suspicious of Tsarist Russia and of other powers. Since "Anti-imperialism" precedes "Kinship to Sovietism" among the Six Great Policies it is not unreasonable to feel, then, that these Policies have from the first at least been linked with a certain amount of reservation in regard to Soviet Russia. No doubt some Chinese would adhere to the following: To the degree that what Chiang Chün-chang calls Soviet "aggression" may come into too sharp conflict in Sinkiang with "Anti-imperialism" as Tu Chung-yüan conceives it, to that same degree, Sinkiang "Kinship to Sovietism" may very well be weakened. In a word, "Anti-imperialism," so far as Sinkiang is concerned, all along has been a warning to Soviet Russia as well as to other powers.

Other "Aggressors"

Yet Sinkiang "Anti-imperialism" seems to have been formulated as a reaction not only to past policies of the Chinese and Russians, but also to former ambitions of the British and others as well. Chiang Chün-chang has been more outspoken than Tu Chung-yüan about this matter. Whereas the latter has hinted mainly that a "certain" imperialist force "has increasingly fostered independence for South Sinkiang," Chiang has bluntly called the English an "aggressive force" aiming to establish an "independent government" "around Kashgar." He has even cited a "Turkish" report that British have "already" spent a considerable sum in the "South Sinkiang Movement," and he has named an A-k'un-pa-yeh-fu (Akonbaiev?) Trading Company as the supposed center for an English-sponsored Moslem movement in the province. He has even expressed his concern over the religious and other connections between the people of South Sinkiang and the people of Turkey. It is apparently his belief that France had hoped to help

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develop an unbroken overland empire from Syria to Indo-China through seizure of Sinkiang, and he also suspects that foreign trade interests—notably German—have been approached in Afghanistan in regard to a Sinkiang movement for Moslem independence. Such Chinese imputations may very well be exaggerated, yet they ought not to be ignored. So far as the principal Axis powers are concerned, by 1939 when war broke out in Europe, all three had openly become active sponsors of Islamic revolutionary activities with direct or indirect effect on Sinkiang Moslems.

Japan—the Foremost Imperialist

Of all these "imperialist" threats to Sinkiang, the foremost in recent years has undoubtedly been that originating in Japan. Chiang Chün-chang has reported not only Japanese sponsorship of a Moslem organization in the Altai region, but even Japanese military support of Ma Chung-ying's revolting forces during the Sinkiang insurrection of the 1930's. Since 1931, when Chinese troops were routed in Manchuria and fled through Siberia to Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai has emphasized that the Japanese is the worst form of imperialism. This point of view has since pervaded the entire atmosphere as is strikingly evident now in Sinkiang's co-operation with the rest of China and the United Nations. When Japan attacked Manchuria on September 18, 1931, and began World War II, she set forces in motion which were to be felt not only in Manchuria but on China's whole inland frontier. From Manchuria, if unchecked, Japan might have had easy access to caravan routes which cross Outer and Inner Mongolia and which in normal times enter Sinkiang and Northwest China. Had she been able to master those overland passages she might have broken down the whole inland structure of Chinese Northwest defenses. Sheng Shih-ts'ai knew this, and as a consequence he quickly declared his opposition to Japanese imperialism. In at least this one respect he might well have been thinking along the lines of Marshal Tso Tsung-t'ang who in the nineteenth century said:

> Great weight should be given to Sinkiang as a protection to Mongolia. For as it protects Mongolia, it ensures that the power of the

> capital and the forearm of the Northwest work in unison. It also ensures that there is no break in the country's topographical defenses. But if Sinkiang is not strong, then Mongolia will not be at peace. Moreover, then bandits might outflank the whole Kansu, Shensi, and Shansi frontier. In such an emergency those places might be defended, but not victoriously. In such a case, Sinkiang would be a direct north gate to the mountains, and there would not be a day of rest or sleep.

Thus, there was little question in regard to Sinkiang support for the Chinese National Government's resistance to Japan—especially after signature of the Sino-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression in August, 1937. In October, 1938, an All-Sinkiang Congress in Tihwa pointed out that Japanese machinations in Inner Mongolia had also been unsuccessfully aimed at Sinkiang. The Congress pledged not only ten airplanes for the Chinese Air Force, but also that Sinkiang would oppose "Japanese imperialism" and keep open an overland route for Chinese international communications.

The "Anglo-Americans"

Just to keep the record, it is well to know also that the New Sinkiang's open opposition to "imperialism" has not forgotten the Western Hemisphere. After the outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939, the editorials of the *Sinkiang Daily News* referred not only to the Germans, Italians, and Japanese but also to the "Anglo-Americans" as members respectively of "imperialist" axes. This editorial line, in print before Germany attacked Soviet Russia in June, 1941, and before China formally entered into war against Germany, Italy, and Japan, resembled that followed by the Soviet Russian and Communist press in general.

An "Anti-imperialist Balance"

This, then, is what "Anti-imperialism" has meant to the New Sinkiang. The questions involved have not been simple. One might suggest, however, that at least up to 1942 the New Sinkiang was for the most part trying to promote her own self-interest by "balancing" the "weights" of political affinity to China and economic kinship to Sovietism on an "Anti-imperialist scale." The spread of Axis aggression, since the attack on Soviet Russia and the bombing of Pearl Harbor, undoubtedly affected this. It made the problems of the Sino-Russian "balance" temporarily less pressing than the question of whether the preponderance of international "weight" was to be finally on the United Nations or the Axis side of the larger, world military, "scale." This may even prove to be the main factor which has facilitated new Chinese, British, and American activity in the province. A unique opportunity seems incidentally to have been offered the United Nations with whom the province is now co-operating. Theirs is now the chance to demonstrate in practice and on the spot whether they, too, are or are not "Anti-imperialistic" in the Sinkiang sense.

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V

KINSHIP TO SOVIETISM

Some observers have mistakenly interpreted Sinkiang adherence to "Anti-imperialism" as evidence that this Chinese province had fallen under Soviet Russian domination. Their view may even have seemed superficially substantiated by the way the New Sinkiang openly admitted her "Kinship to Sovietism." Why did the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai do this?

"The Soviet Russia of today is not the same as the old Russian Tsar," says Tu Chung-yüan, in giving a partial explanation. "She does not have aggressive designs . . ." Chao Lieh, another Chinese writer, echoes this sentiment in an August, 1941, *Kuei-lin Ta Kung Pao* feature article, but gives more stress, first to foreign trade and, second, to Soviet help in Sinkiang reconstruction. He adds, also, that a certain kinship necessarily has been forged between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia due to their contiguous frontiers.

There has, indeed, been "Kinship to Sovietism" in Sinkiang. By some strange quirk in Sinkiang history, originally "aggressive" processes affecting the province have brought in their wake progressive

648 and even "radical" ideas as well as material advances for the populace. These changes came for a time almost in spite of what Chinese from China Proper, and probably others from abroad, could say or do; and they may largely be explained by a gradual drift in Sinkiang, dating from Tsarist days, toward close economic relations with Russia. Yet this evolution has not prevented the merging of the Sinkiang political program with that of Nationalist China.

The Difficulties of Early Soviet-Sinkiang Relations

It has been mentioned that, when Republican Chinese overthrew the Manchu Dynasty in 1911-1912, Sinkiang administration became the responsibility of Yang Tseng-hsin. In at least one sense the advent of his regime was fortunate. Yang's firm seizure of autocratic powers prevented political disintegration in the province, which, nominally at least, remained Chinese and did not fall into alien hands. Otherwise the old life of Sinkiang might have ended earlier in an even worse internal scramble than that of 1931—possibly Sinkiang might even have become openly a part of the Tsarist Empire. As events turned out, Yang watched the borders of his province closely and maintained cordial but not servile relations with Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, however, created a new situation.

Unrest within Russia had manifested itself in Turkestan as early as the Kirgiz insurrection of 1916, and by the next year the Sinkiang-[439] Russian border was severely disturbed. Gabitov indicates that the first reaction was a swiftly increasing surplus of wool. This piled up on the Russian side of the frontier, because of a lack of transport facilities to send it on to Russian and third-party markets. By 1918 the over-supply had halted much of the Sinkiang trade with Russia, and by 1920 that trade had ceased almost completely. Chinese probably were secretly relieved that revolution had upset the Tsarist tendency toward expansion in the direction of Sinkiang, but Governor Yang at first pursued strictly a policy of watchfulness. He virtually closed the Sinkiang-Russian frontier; Nazaroff, a Russian "white" who tried to escape from Russian Turkestan to Kashgar, has given a clear account of the difficulties encountered by anyone attempting to cross into

Chinese territory. By 1920 the formerly strong Russian colony in Kashgar had dwindled to only twenty-three persons.

So far as relations with the rest of China and with Russia were concerned, Governor Yang's position soon became so powerful that he could afford to dictate. Therefore it is not surprising that the terms of the following agreement which he is said to have concluded with Soviet authorities in 1920 are harsh:

> 1. Offices for commerce and foreign affairs will be established respectively in Russian Turkestan and in Chinese Turkestan;
>
> 2. China will have two of these offices, in the Province of Semirechia and at Verkhneudinsk; and in virtue of the principle of equality and reciprocity, Russia will have two—at I-li and at I-ning;
>
> 3. The Russian offices will inform their agents who conduct trade between I-li and Russia that they will be subject to the regulations of the general tax of Sinkiang and to the tariff of the Chinese Maritime Customs;
>
> 4. All the imports and exports must go by way of Nikang [? sic]; merchandise which takes any other route will be considered contraband and will be subject to seizure;
>
> 5. All commercial litigation between the agents of the two countries will be adjudicated by the local tribunal;
>
> 6. The agents of both countries must show their passports in passing the frontier. Questions relative to civil and military (Russian) refugees will be settled amicably.
>
> 7. The Russian representatives declare that the general amnesty decreed by the Government at Tashkent for reasons of humanity is inviolable, and that in consequence all Russian civil or military refugees in Chinese territory will be permitted to re-enter their country without fear of molestation. China engages to return them to their homes to take up once again peaceful occupations.
>
> 8. Russia will be authorized by the Government at I-li to attach an agent to the Office of Commerce and Foreign Affairs and two or three attachés charged specially with treatment of the questions relative to repatriation of the civil and military refugees; this mission will end as soon as the task is completed. The question of sequestration or confiscation of all private goods appertaining to Chinese will be regulated amicably.
>
> 9. The Russian representatives declare that, since they have not the power to treat on questions of this order themselves—until the Government at Tashkent has set up a Commission to study the question—it

648 is best that each claim be made the subject of friendly and direct arrangements between both governments. The Russian representatives nevertheless agree to bring before the Government at Tashkent a measure in accordance with Chinese claims.

> The above stipulations, rendered in the Chinese and in the Russian languages, have been approved by the representatives of both parties each of whom is keeping a signed copy.

The most conspicuous points of this document are its local character, the new limitations on the type and extent of Russian representation in Sinkiang, the restriction of trade to one route, and the provisions stipulating return to Russia of refugees in China. Negotiations apparently were conducted between authorities of Sinkiang and Russian Turkestan, not between the Government of China and the Government of Soviet Russia. Instead of the former Tsarist right to seven consular establishments in Sinkiang, by the agreement Soviet authorities are only alloted offices for commerce and foreign affairs at Sui-ting (I-li) and nearby Ning-yüan (I-ning). Only trade via North Sinkiang is apparently provided for, and none via South Sinkiang. Finally the refugee problem, one which the White Russian-Bolshevik differences had been making difficult for Sinkiang authorities, is thrown back on the Soviets. The agreement does, however, open the way to a resumption of trade—of potential benefit to both sides. Moreover, irrespective of the restrictions in the treaty Russian agents appear to have transacted business in Sinkiang shortly afterwards from T'a Ch'eng (Chuguchak).

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439 In 1921 Soviet authorities made a good beginning toward recouping the former Tsarist commercial position, only to lose the trust of Chinese tradesmen a year or so later. For instance, the Siberian foreign trade organization, Sibvneshtorg, opened offices at Semipalatinsk and sent an agent to T'a Ch'eng. According to Gabitov, 8,500 head of large cattle and around 169,000 sheep were successfully contracted for. The last payment on the contract was made by December of the same year, only two months after the last delivery of the cattle. This placed Sibvneshtorg on a strong basis in Sinkiang, and even livestock on credit became available to it rapidly. But in 1922 the Semipalatinsk division of Sibvneshtorg went under the control of what was then

called Kirkrai, whose name indicates a "Kirgiz regional" organization. 648
Apparently weaker in resources and interested in local and 439
temporary advantage more than long-range commerce, Kirkrai soon undermined this sound beginning.

In the fall of that same year the T'a Ch'eng representative of the local Soviet foreign trade agency, Kirvneshtorg (presumably a foreign trade subsidiary of Kirkrai), entered into five contracts with Sinkiang Chinese to purchase livestock. The price was one ruble twenty kopeks banked silver a pood, live weight, for both cattle and sheep. The account was carefully detailed and compensation was to be made in a barter-like fashion thus:

40% in manufactured goods (mostly cotton)
25% in silver
18% in iron and iron manufactures
7% in green tea (brick)
7% in various crockery
2% in sewing thread
1% in glass

The cattle were taken from the market and pastured for the winter in accordance with the agreements; but the Kirvneshtorg payments were held up long after the cattle were delivered. In fact several traders from China were not paid for their livestock until June, 1924; and then many of them received payment only because they themselves traveled all the way to Moscow to get it.

"Similar dealings," wrote Gabitov in 1925, ". . . undermined every trust in Kirvneshtorg . . ." There were other Soviet attempts to revive the trade between 1922 and 1924, but they had little success.

Trade Shifts and Advocated Reforms

While Soviet economic relations were thus muddling along in the 439
north, the Soviet Government "was entirely unrepresented" in South Sinkiang. Considerable anti-Soviet political agitation even emanated from there. This, in turn, was accompanied by a striking shift in trade. A considerable amount was diverted from the Kashgar-Osh

safe to say that Russia will quickly regain her former place here in commercial relations. For, under such circumstances, English and Japanese competition with Russian goods should be exceedingly difficult." 439

A New Diplomatic Gain

Opportunity for Soviet Russia to regain standing in Sinkiang at last came with the opening of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union in May, 1924. Not only did the Soviet Government soon reopen consulates and establish a consulate-general in the province, but commercial relations became greatly improved. 648

The opening of the first Soviet consulate in Sinkiang, that at T'a Ch'eng (Chuguchak), took place in December, 1924. The red flag was raised in the presence of a number of persons, including the Chinese administrator of the circuit and the Soviet consul. Some months later another Soviet consulate was opened at Sharasume (Ch'eng-hua), and a Soviet consulate-general established at Tihwa (Urumchi). By August, 1925, a Soviet consul had also taken up residence at Kashgar. China on her side utilized the new friendly relations to establish a consulate-general at Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan, and consulates at Tashkent, Andizhan, Zaisan, and Alma-Ata.

Though these events were a part of the increasing Chinese-Russian cordiality from 1924 to 1926, they were to have special meaning for Sinkiang-Soviet relations. For by August, 1927, bloody conflict had broken out between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists in Central China. This quickly put a strain on the friendship that had for such a short time existed between China and the U.S.S.R. Yet Sinkiang authorities, irrespective of Central China policy, appear to have desired to keep close ties with Russia. How strong those ties had become is suggested in the following commitment assertedly made on December 28, 1927, to the editor of a Semipalatinsk newspaper:

> The dark reaction in Central China has taken on frightful proportions in the unprecedented manifestations against Chinese workers and against the representatives and representations of the friendly republic of the U.S.S.R. This fact is grievous to us, for we are the official representatives of the Chinese Republic. In order to make known precisely

> the true situation we judge it our duty to explain that the Consulate of Semipalatinsk has nothing in common with Central China and is not able, consequently, to take upon itself the responsibility for events which have occurred recently in Central China. This consulate is dependent upon *Western China* which does not wish, in any case, to sever its friendship with the U.S.S.R.
>
> It is true that we are supposed to be dependent also on the Government of Peking, to the degree where the acts and instructions of the latter will not be directed against the interests of *Western China*. In the opposite case, we do not consider ourselves obliged to remain obedient further to the Government of Peking, particularly in the case where its acts are able to involve a rupture of diplomatic relations between *Western China* and the friendly republic of the U.S.S.R., relations with whom are so dear and are so necessary for us, from the point of view not only of commerce but also of politics. We testify once more that the friendship of the two republics is esteemed and appreciated equally on the two sides; we find an example of this in the fact that from the first days of the recent events in Central China, the local authorities expressed their faith and friendship for us and placed an armed guard near the consulate in order to defend us against provocations of isolated individuals. The indissolubility and solidarity of the friendship between *Western China* and the U.S.S.R. is equally confirmed by the fact that we have in the U.S.S.R. five Chinese consulates from *Western China* . . . and that the U.S.S.R. possesses five consulates in *Western China* . . . in keeping with most friendly and most pacific relations. These mutual relations and the friendship between *Western China* and the U.S.S.R. should be eternal and immortal.

This document was cited in the official Soviet newspaper, *Izvestiia*, on January 8, 1928. It appeared over names which have been identified in translation as those of the Chinese Consul-General at Semipalatinsk, Lu Chan-pin, and the Secretary of the Consulate, Tien Shen-chi.

In 1927 China's Revolution had not yet brought about complete unity, and seats of so-called Chinese national government existed in both Central China and North China (Peking). In that regard, this unique declaration states: first, that Sinkiang ("Western China") assertedly had "nothing in common with Central China" in 1927 and, in case of a conflict of interest, did not even feel obliged "to remain obedient" to the "Government of Peking"; second, that Sinkiang in

1927 did "not wish, in any case, to sever its friendship with the U.S.S.R."; and third, that the Chinese Consulate-General at Semipalatinsk and the "five" other Chinese Consulates in the U.S.S.R. (apparently a reference to those in Russian Turkestan at Semipalatinsk, Tashkent, Andizhan, Zaissan, and Alma-Ata) were in 1927 all "dependent upon" or "from" "Western China." Since this representation was published in *Izvestiia* and seems to have been signed by the Consul-General and the Secretary of the Chinese Consulate-General at Semipalatinsk, it may with good reason be considered official. Those who have criticized Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the New Sinkiang for "Kinship to Sovietism" may well be referred to this declaration as a most outstanding bit of evidence that such kinship has been a broad historical tendency and has not been "conceived' merely since 1933.

The "Seven-Seven" Affair and Chin Shu-jen

Yet seven months later—on July 7, 1928—Sinkiang Governor Yang Tseng-hsin was assassinated. Sinkiang remembers this date as the "Seven-Seven" Affair and has given it a place in the history of provincial emancipation comparable in importance to that of the later "Four-Twelve" Affair.

Blame for Yang's murder has been placed on Fan Yao-nan, a brilliant young man who was then Sinkiang Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. With many of the details lacking, it is of little moment here to speculate too much on the internal politics involved. But the fact that the crime was committed at a time so proximate (1) to the Semipalatinsk declaration on "Western China" (Sinkiang) foreign policy and (2) to the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet demonstrations at Nanking, ought not to be ignored. All was not well in 1928 so far as Tihwa-Nationalist attitude toward Soviet Russia was concerned.

Dr. Sven Hedin testifies that Yang's successor, Chin Shu-jen, attempted in the early years of his brief regime (as Yang Tseng-hsin for a time had done before him) to close off outside access to Sinkiang. But a combination of factors, including popular dislike of Chin himself and the incidence of the Moslem revolt of 1930 and 1931, so

G48 weakened his position that he in turn also fell back on Soviet Russia for aid.

In October, 1931, when the Tung-kan rebel Ma Chung-ying had successfully captured Barkol (Chen-hsi) and Ha-mi, Chin signed a new agreement with the Soviets. By it he permitted the opening of Soviet trade agencies in Tihwa, T'a Ch'eng, Sui-ting, and Kashgar and of outlying offices in Aqsu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan. By the same document he also permitted unrestricted movement in Sinkiang for Soviet trade representatives, provided for reduced custom duties on Soviet goods, and initiated new Sinkiang-Soviet telegraph and radio privileges. Sinkiang is supposed to have received in return only (1) a limited right for two-way transit of goods of Chinese origin across Siberia from Sinkiang to Eastern China and back, and (2) an intimation that the Soviet Government would send specialists to train the Chinese of Sinkiang in the fields of electrification, communications, rural economy, and animal husbandry. For signing this treaty without authorization and for not reporting it to Nationalist China's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Chin Shu-jen was later sentenced to imprisonment in Nanking.

The new agreement did not save the situation for Chin, nor did it end Sinkiang civil war. As we know Chin fled from Tihwa and left his one time "underling," Sheng Shih-ts'ai, to pacify the Sinkiang people. Sheng soon found his military difficulties increasing so much that he, too, at last called upon Soviet Russian troops to aid him in suppressing the rebellion. It is known that Soviet Russian personnel and military aid were sent him; more than one "neutral" eye-witness has testified that such actually happened.

Why Soviet Aid to Sheng?

It is not difficult to understand why Soviet Russia should have been interested enough in Sinkiang events to give Sheng Shih-ts'ai substantial help in suppressing provincial revolt. Owen Lattimore was a sound prophet for the time when he wrote for publication in 1930 that ". . . Chinese control of Chinese Turkestan, though maintained with admirable ability, is only maintained as it were from month to month . . . A struggle for the succession to power . . . would precipitate Russian control, if not formal Russian rule." 648

Re-establishment of formal Soviet political relations with Sinkiang under Yang Tseng-hsin had given Soviet foreign trade interests a grand new opportunity; and completion of the Turksib Railway, on the Soviet side of the frontier, in 1930 climaxed this. The new railway could bring Moscow's latest products to the doors of Sinkiang in but a few days, and therefore Soviet trade could successfully overcome all competition—including that from the Chinese and British. By 1930 Sinkiang was already falling economically into the hands of her Soviet neighbor; and the Ha-mi insurrection left Chin Shu-jen too weak to resist the trend.

When civil war came, it threw the province not only into military 648 and political, but even into financial, chaos. Sinkiang money was then 652 principally fiat paper currency, with little value once public confidence had been lost; and the civil war indeed destroyed public confidence in it. To a certain extent the evil might have been alleviated by shipment of real goods out of the province and by deposit of the foreign or Nationalist Chinese currency receipts in foreign banks or other banks elsewhere in China. But, since Soviet Russia had gained a near monopoly on Sinkiang trade, outside currency could be obtained for Sinkiang inhabitants practically only by Soviet sufferance. Through her control of Sinkiang trade Soviet Russia had gained a hold on Sinkiang finances as well.

Nor did Soviet Russia have reason to consider her favored position in 648 Sinkiang lightly. Between 1923/24 and 1930 inclusive, Sinkiang annual 439 exports into the U.S.S.R. had risen from 3,015,000 to 16,033,000 rubles; and annual imports into Sinkiang from the U.S.S.R. had leaped from 418,000 to 16,027,000 rubles. This meant a rise in the total annual trade from 3,433,000 to 32,060,000 rubles. Moreover, up to that date, in tonnage as well as in value of visible items of trade, Soviet Russia had continually received more from Sinkiang than she had returned. That situation even continued from 1931 to 1937 inclusive, so far as recorded bulk is concerned, though it altered at times in respect to recorded value.

It was not merely the rubles that could be realized from what Sin- 648

648 kiang had or would buy—not merely the wool, the cotton, sheep guts, livestock, and horses that came across the border—that made Sinkiang so valuable to the Soviet Union. Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 had upset the whole strategic orientation of Northeast Asia; and a new, dynamic Soviet interest in Sinkiang development was a logical counter. A new aggressive force had thrust herself upon the Asiatic continent and, from the Soviet point of view, had endangered not only the Soviet Maritime Province and Mongolia but the whole Russian strategic position in Northeastern and Central Asia. For Manchuria is but a part, the easternmost sector, of a vast and interrelated Inner Asian living space which includes Mongolia and Turkestan and which quickly reacts in each of its distinct parts to political changes in any other part. Specifically, from Manchuria there is in normal times relatively easy access to the caravan routes which cross into Sinkiang from Outer and Inner Mongolia. Should Japan master or influence those, Russia would be completely outflanked in Asia. Already by 1933 Japanese designs on Jehol and Inner Mongolia had been revealed, and they were thought to have been reflected in the Sinkiang war. Had China herself been able to consolidate Sinkiang strongly in opposition to Japanese intrigues, perhaps Soviet concern would have been less. But the flight of Chin Shu-jen in 1933 left instead a Sinkiang political chaos which Soviet Russia could ignore only at her own peril.

648 .439 The specific technique by which Soviet aid was given Sheng Shih-ts'ai has not been adequately revealed. But without an attempt at too complicated an analysis, it can be indicated by a glance at the record of Soviet-Sinkiang commerce since 1923. The steady increase by bulk in total Soviet import-export trade with Sinkiang from 1923/24 continued till 1931 and 1932, when sharp drops were registered. After 1933 on trade again rose. The bulk rise in 1933, practically all of it, represents Sinkiang shipments to Soviet Russia; that in 1934 mostly Soviet shipments to Sinkiang. The trade figures after that show a steady rise by bulk on both sides. By 1936 and 1937 total import-export trade had jumped to over 60,000,000 rubles in value and to over 50,000 tons in bulk—in sharp contrast with the record of around 3,000,000 rubles and 13,000 tons in the year 1923/24.

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There may be no positive proof gained, but it is nevertheless worth while to point out: (1) that 1931 and 1932 were the years of the initial great strain of the civil war and years when Soviet-Sinkiang trade might therefore be strongly hit; (2) that in 1933 Sheng Shih-ts'ai together with his Manchurian and Russian aides had already begun to regain control of the trade route from Tihwa to T'a Ch'eng on the Russian border and so might be able to utilize that route once again; (3) that 1934 was the crucial year for the province and that during that year considerable Soviet aid came to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who as a consequence was able to repulse his arch-rival, Ma Chung-ying; and (4) that Sinkiang political "unity" is said to have come in 1936, by which time a new prosperity in Soviet-Sinkiang trade relations had become obvious. The temporal relationship thus shows a rough correlation in the shifts of Sinkiang politics and war to trade in the same period.

Exact information on the nature of Soviet aid to Sheng Shih-ts'ai and of Soviet participation in Sinkiang affairs has up to now been quite successfully kept from most public knowledge in the Occident. But, in describing Soviet-Sinkiang relations, Chinese stress Sheng Shih-ts'ai's desire to "revive" Sinkiang through provincial reconstruction. Since his plans required backing in the form of capital and talent, it is said, he turned at first to Soviet Russia.

As a matter of fact, he probably had almost nowhere else to turn in the 1930's; besides he was in debt for Soviet help in suppressing the insurrection. And by 1933 trade with Soviet Russia had grown to be so important that to turn elsewhere might have seemed contrary to the economic interests of his province.

The Soviet Position: A Second Chinese View

Up to this point, the argument fits in with the explanation previously given for Sinkiang's concern over possible Soviet Russian "imperialism" in her region. Yet, whereas Chiang Chün-chang has carried it on from this stage to hint that Soviet Russia as well as Tsarist Russia has been an "aggressor" in Sinkiang, Tu Chung-yüan insists, instead, that "Kinship to Sovietism" has been anything but insidious. Tu admits that in Sinkiang specialists in animal husbandry, doctors in hospitals, phar-

648 macists of the provincial pharmacy, and instructors for the provincial Military Officers Academy and for the provincial Air Force have come from Soviet Russia. But, he inquires, does that mean Sinkiang has gone "Red"? Did not Soviet Russia, at the beginning of her national reconstruction, get assistance "from thousands upon tens of thousands" of "capitalist" experts? Yet wouldn't it be difficult to say Soviet Russia is "White"? According to Tu, there has never been Soviet political control in Sinkiang. If Soviet Russia had "controlled" Sinkiang politically, would she have tolerated the White Russians who still remained there? Have not the Three People's Principles textbooks of Sinkiang been identical with those elsewhere in Nationalist China? Are not the military and administrative authority of Sinkiang still in the hands of China?

"Kinship to Sovietism" and Chinese Nationalism

668 It appears that up to Sheng Shih-ts'ai's accession to power, Sinkiang's concern with the Chinese National Revolution and its *San Min Chu-i* (The "Three People's Principles" of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood) was not too serious. Sinkiang was geographically and economically a great distance from most other Chinese provinces, her leaders were devoted almost exclusively to selfish acquisition of wealth, and the Chinese Republic's then existing national political structure was not mature in Sinkiang. Since 1933, however, the year of the "Four-Twelve" Affair, Sheng Shih-ts'ai has altered this. As politics have taken on national stature elsewhere in China, Sheng Shih-ts'ai's background and interests have carried Chinese political organization and support of the Three People's Principles in a new way into the far Northwest. Remembering Japan's invasion of his Manchurian homeland in 1931, Sheng Shih-ts'ai has also warmly supported China's resistance to the aggressor; and having seen the needs of his own administrative region, he has particularly devoted himself to its reconstruction. Thus his work has fitted neatly into both the basic revolutionary program of the Three People's Principles and the wartime program of *K'ang-chan Chien-kuo* or "Resistance and Reconstruction." True, Sinkiang's Six Great Policies of Anti-imperialism, Kinship to Sovietism,

Racial Equality, Clean Government, Peace, and Reconstruction are unique. But they are not so strange to the ideals of China that they do not keep within the bounds of Nationalist principles, of Chinese political unity, of successful resistance to Japan, and of freedom from Soviet Russian domination. 668

This view is further supported by a brief glance at the manner in which Sinkiang's interprovincial and international record has evolved since 1934.

Sinkiang and World Affairs, 1934-1943

It was largely Soviet help which enabled Sheng Shih-ts'ai to gain mastery of Sinkiang, but in 1934 Chinese authorities from Nanking still had been able to attempt negotiation of the civil war and formation of a compromise administration. Since Soviet troops had operated with the White Russian forces already in Sinkiang, it is obvious that their restoration of order had been a "coalition measure" and not an attempt at immediate Soviet annexation. Soviet military aid is, in fact, said to have been withdrawn as soon as order began to appear though "Kinship to Sovietism" remained important in Sinkiang affairs. By 1936 Sheng Shih-ts'ai had established a "unified" government in all Sinkiang. 648

Outbreak of open Sino-Japanese hostilities in July, 1937, made Sinkiang an obvious region for Chinese-Soviet compromise. The treaty signed by both Governments in August, 1937, guaranteed there would be no Russian aggression against China; and a through overland truck and air route, between eastern China and Soviet Russia, through Sinkiang, was thereby made practicable. Sinkiang's three-year plan of reconstruction was instituted with Soviet advices in the same year. By the fall of 1938, when China had been forced to retreat from Hankow into the west, Sinkiang's new truck highways provided assurance that China would not be internationally isolated in her Northwest. At that time Tihwa even telegraphed a resolution to that effect, pledging that the province would keep open China's international communication lines, would intensify efforts to help fulfill the national Resistance and Reconstruction program, and would work with the rest of China to-

648 ward ultimate victory over Japan. Other Chinese negotiations culminated in signature of a new trade agreement with Soviet Russia on June 16, 1939. By it, though not expressly mentioned in the text, the use of Sinkiang's international communication lines was underwritten.

But Russia's Treaty of Non-aggression with Nazi Germany in August, 1939, introduced a new guardedness into Sino-Russian relations. The march of Soviet armies into Poland, Finland, and the Baltic countries after the opening of European war gave rise for a while to a fear that Russia might at the same time be considering initiation of a "forward" policy against China through Sinkiang. This fear was evidenced in late 1939 by a noticeable falling off of the truck traffic that had already begun to pass between Russia and China along the Sinkiang-Kansu motor road. China concentrated exceptionally heavy numbers of soldiers in the northwest provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, and Ch'inghai. This was a wartime precautionary measure, but many of the troops were only ostensibly training for the Sino-Japanese war front to the northeast and east. Final ratification of the Sino-Russian trade agreement was, moreover, delayed until early 1940.

Sinkiang, through her policies supporting both Soviet Russia's actions in the west and China's resistance to Japan in the east, however, became more important than before in the role of a kind of Chungking-Moscow "middleman." At this time the *Sinkiang Daily News* was interpreting the policies of both of the benefactors of the province as aspects of a "Eurasian" front for "peace" and "anti-imperialism." It was also following the then current Soviet line of deriding the so-called "imperialist axes" in the world. This attitude neared its high point at the close of 1940 and early in 1941. When signature of the Tripartite German-Italian-Japanese Alliance was announced on September 27, 1940, the *Sinkiang Daily News* commented to the effect that the contradictions between the "two imperialist forces" of the German-Japanese-Italian Axis and the "Anglo-Americans" would soon bring an open clash between them while an armed peace would persist on the Eurasian "peace" front.

Yet, as throughout the war, Sheng Shih-ts'ai evidenced continued support of the Chinese Nationalist Government. On December 8, 1940, he joined other Chinese leaders in condemning the Wang Ching-wei Chinese puppet regime which had recently been recognized by Japan. At the turn of 1941 also, when differences between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang over the New Fourth Army seemed to have approached a breaking point, he reiterated his position. He told a *Ta Kung Pao* newspaper correspondent (1) that Sinkiang was devoting her whole strength to transport work and reconstruction in order to hasten Chinese victory; and (2) that all parties and cliques in China should continue in their united resistance to Japan. 648

Whether or not this was an attempt to maintain a "balance" between Sinkiang's political affinity to China and her economic kinship to Sovietism, it was soon to be proved insufficient. For Soviet Russia and Japan signed a non-aggression agreement on April 15, 1941; and by an accompanying joint declaration Soviet Russia formally recognized "Manchoukuo" in return for Japanese recognition of the Soviet-sponsored "Republic of Outer Mongolia." The new agreement and declaration were sound business for Soviet Russia, who thus became more free to face the Nazi attack when it came on June 22, 1941. Somewhat differently they offered Japan more freedom for activities in Southeast Asia and Pearl Harbor, both of which she attacked on December 7, 1941.

But the easing of Soviet-Japanese tension over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia did not erase the basic contradictions on which the Asiatic policies of the two countries had been based. For the inner Asian flank of Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia was left formally unaccounted for. In these zones either power might possibly attack the interests of China (and less directly the interests of each other) without violation of any public agreement. This, in turn, made Sinkiang more desperately concerned than ever with the strength of Chinese defenses on her east, in West Suiyüan and Ningsia (Inner Mongolia), not to mention the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, and Kansu. The Soviet-Japanese accord postponed any final decision in the area, but at the same time it made possible the Intensification of Japanese intrigues on the less protected Sinkiang frontier farther inland.

This, with other factors, has now drawn Sinkiang closer than ever

648 to the fold of Nationalist China and has even helped effect a significant shift—perhaps temporarily—away from Soviet Russia. Sinkiang's anxiety concerning the recently exposed areas on her eastern borders was matched in 1942 by Nationalist Chinese interest in wartime development of precisely the same region. Such interest, instigated by the Japanese threat to Southwest China from Burma and Western Yünnan and possibly backed by ample monetary credit from the United States, has brought a new and stirring Nationalist activity in all Northwest China including Sinkiang. At present, therefore, there appears to be (1) the closest expression to date of Sinkiang-Nationalist co-operation in internal Chinese affairs; and (2) at least a temporary substitution of Nationalist Chinese influence in the Sinkiang area for that of Soviet Russia. It may still be too early to say conclusively whether this change has or has not been accomplished without serious international differences. Press dispatches of October and November, 1943, in connection with Russian "withdrawal" from Sinkiang suggest the shift has been carried out "without unpleasant incidents of any kind," "peacefully, with the minimum of possible friction." Yet more recent (though scanty) dispatches (issued under Ulan Bator and Chungking datelines) state that both at the close of last year as well as in March of this year, small armed clashes took place on the Sinkiang-Mongolian frontier. During the incidents in question, it is alleged, Soviet as well as Chinese airplanes went into action when a question arose as to Chinese treatment of Kazakh nomads in the Altai area. These incidents do not, however, necessarily warrant hasty assumption that a change in Sinkiang policy has come which will be permanent; neither need they prove that the whole structure of "Kinship to Sovietism" in the New Sinkiang is in the process of destruction. The unfolding pattern is, instead, another clear demonstration that "Kinship to Sovietism" has not meant Soviet Russian political domination over Sinkiang, which has on the contrary retained and strengthened her political ties with the Chinese National Government.

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642 nor the National Government wants Sinkiang and her officialdom to be other than Chinese in name.

648 The Chinese National Government may not, it is true, always have been able to do what it liked in Sinkiang since Sheng Shih-ts'ai achieved power. It appears, from Chinese testimony, that Sheng has in the past negotiated with foreign powers without conforming to customary national procedure, and that his administration has often excluded Chinese of other provinces from Sinkiang territory and has found ways at times to circumvent—if not necessarily to disobey—National Government regulations.

This situation gave a certain credence to distasteful accusations in regard to Soviet Russian influence in the province. After China and Soviet Russia signed their Non-aggression Agreement in 1937 Tokyo quarters fanned rumors that China had been forced to give up Sinkiang as a concession to Soviet Russia. Since then—and especially at the turn of 1939 and 1940 when Russia was advancing her armies into Poland, Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, and Latvia—like sources often hinted at the "invasion" of Sinkiang by Soviet troops.

I have no first-hand evidence by which I can prove that such reports are false, but I believe in their falsity. I saw many Soviet Russian "volunteer" troops in Lan-chou, Kansu (adjacent to Sinkiang Province), when I was in China in 1939 and 1940, and there could have been more such troops in Sinkiang. But in late 1939, on the other hand, I also visited Sining, Ch'inghai, which is west of Lan-chou and between Kansu and Sinkiang, and I did not see Soviet Russian troops there. After weighing available evidence, I do not believe that Soviet Russian troops have been in "occupation" of Sinkiang or have been "controlling" it during the years since Sheng Shih-ts'ai summoned their aid to put down Sinkiang rebellion. I do not even believe that they were "occupying" it before the widely publicized reports of October, 1943, came forth proclaiming the "withdrawal" of Soviet Russia from Sinkiang. It is admitted that there have been many Soviet advisers in Sinkiang in a number of capacities, civilian and military, in that period; and among them there may have been Soviet "volunteer" soldiers and aviation pilots. But there is not justification for saying that such "volunteers" and advisers ever made Sinkiang a Soviet dependency. 648

Indeed the evidence seems to demonstrate that, far from being a Soviet Russian "puppet," Sheng Shih-ts'ai has been one of the most far-sighted, enlightened, and independent military leaders of modern China. The Chinese colonial record in Sinkiang was not very praiseworthy up to Sheng's appearance on the scene. He was able to assay the needs of the situation and the resources at his command; he was also competent enough to make constructive use of opportunities offered him. The Six Great Policies and especially the program of Sinkiang reconstruction which Sheng Shih-ts'ai fashioned out of the rough clay of the Moslem revolt of the 1930's indicate that he has had at heart the interests of both Sinkiang and China. That he has been able to turn these interests into a positive program which did not completely sacrifice China's title to the province but which brought to Sinkiang instead much of the best qualities of both China and of neighboring Soviet Russia is truly an amazing achievement, too long unappreciated by the outside world.

It was inevitable that Sheng Shih-ts'ai's New Sinkiang should have been influenced by Soviet Russian ideas, personnel, and materials. Developments in neighboring Soviet areas had so drawn the attention and admiration of Sinkiang people by 1933 that a feeble Chinese version of an outmoded military or economic imperialism not only might have fallen flat but might have flung the province—politically as well as economically—into Soviet Russia's perhaps embarrassed lap.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai is no puppet and the New Sinkiang is no political 642 dependency of Soviet Russia. Sinkiang instead has incorporated Chinese ideas of loose political authority with the Soviet creed of cultural and economic autonomy. From the two has come a unique Chinese frontier political economy. From them also the basically non-Han Chinese people of Sinkiang have gained new opportunities of livelihood, and by the combination much of the old bitterness between Han and non-Han has been removed.

X

WAR REOPENS SINKIANG

648 SHENG SHIH-TS'AI'S TECHNIQUE, which favored guidance and help from Soviet Russia, had at first required as strict and selective control as possible over all other contact with Sinkiang from the outside. This in the main kept knowledge of what was happening in Sinkiang from the rest of China as well as from the rest of the world. The province, for most purposes, became autonomous and isolated, and with Soviet help Sheng Shih-ts'ai kept it so.

648 Open warfare between China and Japan in 1937, however, made it
468 necessary for Sheng to allow a limited relaxation of his policy. He permitted Soviet military supplies to come into Eastern China and allowed Chinese wool, skins, tea, and bristles to get out in repayment to Soviet Russia over tightly controlled truck highways running through his province. By 1939 the outbreak of European war also made it advisable and possible to open Chinese-Russian air communications via Sinkiang. But a large measure of the provincial seclusion was strictly maintained. A rigid watch was kept over what strangers went in and out of the province, and strict penalties were invoked by government authorities on trespass of transit privileges.

648 Now, however, the policy of extreme Sinkiang seclusion has at last been discarded. By the spring of 1942, Japanese pressure on Yünnan Province had forced Chinese attention to the Northwest, and especially to Sinkiang. Soviet Russia, in contrast, was less able to provide the personnel and resources that had been earlier available. Since there is doubt that Sinkiang can longer count on Soviet Russia's direct help, she has turned for assistance to the Chinese National Government and to other United Nations powers.

Nationalist China has already acted dynamically to replace the aid which Soviet Russia gave to Tihwa for almost a decade. In so doing she has initiated a sweeping program of reconstruction in the Chinese Northwest, has emphasized new ties with India and the Middle East, and has shown new co-operation with the United States and the United

Kingdom. This can presage heavy shipment of United Nations goods to China and the Chinese war fronts at last by a revitalized "back door" to Asia.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek himself was dramatically responsible for starting Sinkiang back into world prominence. In February, 1942, two months after Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he flew to India and conferred there with British officialdom. His epochal journey took him on February 13 to the Northwest Frontier of India, where he and British companions inspected part of an old Northwest India-Sinkiang transport route. He took the occasion, moreover, to address mountain tribesmen who guard its strategic passes and still pay token tribute to Chinese suzerainty. Almost simultaneously General Chu Shao-liang, military governor of key areas in the Chinese Northwest and a trusted friend of the Generalissimo, traveled to the Sinkiang capital to engage in conversations with Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Shortly thereafter the Chinese National Government appointed a British-educated Chinese, Chaucer H. Wu (Wu Chai-hsiang) to the post of Sinkiang Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The Chungking appointment signalized, first, that control of Sinkiang foreign relations had, probably for the first time since 1927, returned openly to Nationalist authorities in China; second, that predominant Soviet ascendancy in Sinkiang foreign relations might be on the way out.

Chinese announced in July of 1942 that six hundred economic and engineering experts had gathered at Lan-chou, capital of Kansu Province, in connection with proposed development projects for the Chinese Northwest, and that Moslem General Ma Pu-ch'ing had been appointed Pacification Commissioner of the hitherto neglected Tsaidam Marches of Western Ch'inghai, through which it is feasible to lay out one or more routes from South Sinkiang into Kansu. Lan-chou is a key terminus on the Sinkiang-Kansu motor road of Northwest China, and General Ma has long been famous among Chinese for his successful road construction work in Shensi and Kansu provinces. These reports might, therefore, even at that early date have sufficiently hinted at Nationalist China's intentions. Visits subsequently made to Sinkiang by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Minister of Economic Affairs

648 Wong Wen-hao undoubtedly were occasions which helped Chungking and Tihwa to seal their new bargain. On September 16, 1942, it was announced that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek himself had just returned to Chungking after a month's inspection of the Chinese Northwest, and the next day came word that $10,000,000 CNC was being allocated annually for reconstruction projects in the latter region.

167 In the fall of 1943, after almost a month of conferences between Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking, a great pilgrimage toward Chinese Central Asia began. By October 23, fifteen hundred Chinese settlers, refugees from the famine area of Honan, had arrived at Tihwa to engage in land reclamation, over four thousand more had reached the town of Ch'i-t'ai and many additional thousands were expected to migrate to such Sinkiang cities as Tihwa and Kashgar. It was reported that the Sinkiang provincial government was to make a loan of $5,000 Chinese currency available to the settlers, and each family was to receive over fifteen acres of land. "Provisions, seeds, cows, farmhouses and all necessary farm implements," together with an outright subsidy of $2,500 CNC for "each family" were also to be theirs. Is it any wonder that the hard-pushed Chinese peasant, weak from the barest of sustenance, has straightened up with new hope at the promise of land, tools, and capital in Sinkiang!

"Sinkiang today," a Chinese writer has stated, "is like California before 1849 and Altai is like Alaska before 1867." Not only can the land be made to produce more food, but the mineral wealth is relatively untouched. It has been said that wars make nations, and it may well be that the Chinese in days to come will feel positively indebted for the restlessness of necessity which Japan's aggression has aroused in the melting pot of Asia. For thousands of picked men out of the fifty millions who fled from Eastern China to Szechwan and Yünnan in 1938 and 1939, once more have picked up possessions and have poured across the mountains and plains—this time north and westward into Sinkiang. Over the gravel-mud roads of Shensi and Kansu, across the turbid Yellow River, west of the River, and then through the Jade Gate to Central Asia they went, taking their bedding, their baskets, treasured family heirlooms, needed household utensils, their wives and sons and hopes. The man on foot, the riksha, the rubber-tired cart, a 167 camel of the Gobi, a General Motors or a Russian Ziss truck—all these have been China's "covered wagon." The throng of people has been jolly, too; jammed in with youth, and gasoline drums, and the *ch'i-lai* of the Chinese marching song. Behind this push into China's vast Northwest has been largely a determination to build a land hard with metal and tough with industrial sinew. But there has been also the lure of adventure, good living, age-old lore, and rich cultural promise.

Into the land of the Wei-wu-erh to which Sheng Shih-ts'ai has brought his Six Great Policies and the understanding and justifiable pride among races that they have taught, the Chinese today once again has come. This time he has come not merely as in antiquity but also as a producer—a farmer, a laborer, a technician, a leader united with the leaders of many other races. As a Chinese he has been among the first to perceive that superlative amounts of ideas, energy, men, and machinery are needed in a hurry in Sinkiang and that part of all this may come from any one or more of a number of neighboring areas—India, Afghanistan, Soviet Turkestan, Siberia, and Mongolia—as well as from China proper. Ultimately the matériel and technical initiative for much of it, he knows, must flow from the United States and Britain, as in the past decade much has come from Soviet Russia. Pioneers of American and English, as well as of Asiatic, background may be expected to hear this call of the Chinese Far West. Through them, and others, Sinkiang promises to be transformed into a grand new frontier area of progress.

That there has been serious American interest in these Sinkiang de- 648 velopments was revealed on April 19, 1943, with the temporary appointment of Mr. Oliver Edmund Clubb as United States Consul to Tihwa. Mr. Clubb's assignment, the later arrival in the Sinkiang capital of a British colleague, and reports from usually reliable sources in October, 1943, that "Russians" have been "leaving Sinkiang Province in large numbers" and "dismantling and removing Russian-built plants," that the roads of the province have been "dotted" with "cars hauling out Russian equipment" and that a "Russian garrison" was leaving "by truck, in small units"—these suggest that Chinese aid and influence

648 in the province may already be replacing that which the Soviets have apparently decided not to continue. Should such a change in Sinkiang affairs be in the process of accomplishment with friendly understanding on the part of the four great powers of China, Soviet Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, it might prove to be an important diplomatic achievement in Sino-Russian relations.

XI

GATEWAY TO ASIA

000 It is well, indeed, for the United Nations that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai have been able to arrange the reopening of Sinkiang. For Japan's blockade of China extends in an arc from the northernmost tip of Manchuria southward around the coast and up into Burma and western Yünnan Province. Except for the northern tip of Burma, the remaining land gaps, the terrain not yet caught in the Japanese blockade pincers, are on the Chinese inland frontier of Tibet, Sinkiang, and Mongolia.

The physical difficulties of sending matériel into China across upper Burma are not at all insurmountable, and this is now being demonstrated by the Assam-China air transport service, which is now the main source of foreign supply and carrying more than the Burma Road used to. Construction of the Ledo Road, too, indicates the belief that land supply can be pushed along mountain trails of Indian Assam and over the Burma-Yünnan ranges—some of the loftiest in the world. But traffic run across this terrain meets exceptional difficulties. It passes on the edges of bristling war fronts, confronts danger from Japanese guns, can carry only a limited volume of goods, and must defy day-to-day uncertainty. When a successful military campaign reopens the Burma Road, it may again become one of China's "lifelines." But too much should not be immediately hoped for from even that direction in view of adjacent Japanese armies and of the uncertainties of the sup-

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

CHAPTER IV

THE MOUNTAIN ROAD TO CATHAY

THE name Tashqurghan means in Turki " stone fort ", 101
and the place is probably identical with the *λίθινος
πύργος* of which Ptolemy speaks as having been the
extreme western emporium of Serikē (China). At that time
it was called by the Chinese Hopanto and was the capital
of the frontier district of that name.[1] Now once more it is
the headquarters of the Chinese Amban of Pu-li or Sariqol,
who rules a long strip of country along the eastern rim of
the Pamir plateau. Sariqol was made into an administrative 631
district at the beginning of the present century, when it came
into prominence from the Chinese point of view owing to the
occupation of the neighbouring Pamirs by Russia. For 648
years, indeed, the Tsar's Government kept a detachment of
infantry at Tashqurghan, regardless of the fact that it was 712
Chinese territory; the solid mud-brick fort built by them is
still in good repair though it has been empty since its evacuation
in 1920 by the last remnants of the former Cossack
garrison of the Pamirs. Ethnically, the district is interesting 162
as being populated in about equal proportions by two contrasting
races. These are, firstly, the Tajiks, who are remarkably
pure specimens of the original *Homo alpinus* stock and have
inhabitated this remote corner of High Asia since the dawn of
history; secondly, the Kirghiz. These latter belong to the
tribe called by the Russians Kara-Kazak; they are the
southernmost branch of the great Kirghiz race, and they can
only live as far south as the Pamirs, the immense elevation of
which makes up for the low latitude and produces a climate
as rigorous as that of the Steppes.

Two entirely different routes, each about ten marches in 487
length, connect Tashqurghan with Kashgar. The one usually
followed in summer is the eastern or Chichiklik route which,

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[1] Stein, " Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan," pp. 71–2.

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

439 Hissar, Karghalik and elsewhere. Besides these there are colonies of Muhammadan British subjects in nearly all the districts, some of them purely agricultural immigrants from Northern Kashmir and Chitral, others (and these among the wealthiest in the land) merchants engaged in the Indian trade. Many of the latter have married Turki wives, own land and houses, and have a considerable stake in the country. •648 All these people¹ cling tenaciously to their British nationality and their right to the protection of the Consular court, which 692 under the existing arrangement exercises extra-territorial jurisdiction over them. This is not the place to discuss the ins and outs of the extra-territorial system in general or the details of its application to Kashgaria. Suffice it to say that the Consul-General is kept very busy maintaining order among the British subjects of the various districts, settling their civil disputes, trying cases brought against them by Chinese subjects, helping them to obtain redress in the Chinese courts and generally watching over their interests. Although theoretically the Consul-General deals only with the Taoyin, the representative of the Governor of the province, in practice very few cases, and those only the most important ones of an "international" nature, are heard at Kashgar. The Consul-General works informally with the District Magistrates, either directly or through the British agents ("Aqsaqals") in the various towns. As the majority of the British subjects live from five to twenty marches from Kashgar, it can readily be understood that the most effective and expeditious method of dealing with their cases is regularly to visit the districts in which they reside and settle matters on the spot, either with the District Magistrates or among the British subjects themselves as the case may be. In fact, it was only by travelling once a year down each of the two main roads, Yarkand-Khotan-Keriya and Maralbashi-Aksu-Kucha, with halts varying from one to fifteen days at each district headquarters and with an occasional extra visit to the chief centre of the Indian trade, Yarkand, that I found it possible to keep in touch with the Indian colonies and (what is no less important) on friendly personal terms with the 484 Chinese magistrates. Nearly half of the two and a quarter years we were in Kashgaria was thus spent on tour, and D. and I covered, apart from holiday jaunts to the hills, some 3,400 miles, almost entirely on horseback with our baggage in Peking carts or on the back of pack-ponies. There was

1 [INDIAN MERCHANTS -- Analyst]

202 the telegrams from Misgar in 11–13 days. Hunza men carry the bags on foot or horseback as far as Tashqurghan, Consulate couriers the rest of the distance. Except in early spring, when the mails are sometimes held up for a week or two by snow on the passes and the telegraph line over the Burzil is broken by the same agency, the service is remarkably regular. Accidents do happen, but are fortunately rare; in 1921 a Hunza courier with his mail-bag fell off the path near Ata'abad and was dashed to pieces, and another was lost in the snow on the Mintaka Pass in the spring of 1923. Needless to say, these men are well paid, and the Kashgaris on the Tashqurghan section, who do the double journey by the Gez route once a month all the year round, have in addition comfortable married quarters in the Consulate "village," a coveted privilege.

205 Legation correspondence and other mails from China Proper, on the other hand, came by the Chinese post, which was regular and remarkably speedy, considering the vast distances involved. Letters took two months to reach Kashgar from Peking, and parcels (which came by cart) five to six months. Except for two private couriers whom we maintained for our heavy correspondence with Yarkand, we depended entirely on the Chinese post within the borders of Sinkiang. Our letters reached Keriya, for example, in ten days, though the distance is well over 400 miles, including 150 miles of sandy desert. The service between railhead at Pingtang and Keriya, viâ Kansu, Hami, Maralbashi and Yarkand, some 3,000 miles, is by far the longest courier-borne postal service in the world. Its efficiency is all the more creditable in view of the enormous difficulties with which the Department has to contend. The head of the Postal Department in Sinkiang during our time was an Italian and is always a European official of the Chinese Board of Communications; and the Chinese Postmasters whom we met at Kashgar were all men of up-to-date Western education with a good knowledge of English.

"Society" at Kashgar consisted of the Chinese official
647 world, the Swedish Mission, the Russian colony and the
British Consulate-General. The Chinese officials of whom
648 we saw most were the Taoyin, usually known by the honorific
title of Tao Tai; his Foreign Affairs Secretary, who spoke
English; the Magistrates of the Old and New Cities, which
are the headquarters of separate districts though only six
miles apart; the Commandant of the Old City garrison; the
648 Postmaster (another English-speaker), the Master of the Mint,

•648 [797] and one or two others. The Swedish Church Mission has branches at both the old and the new towns, as well as at Yarkand and Yangi Hissar. They were short-handed during our time owing to the Russian road being closed and transit viâ India both difficult and expensive, and there were only three ladies and two men at the Old City Mission. We had some very good friends among the Swedes; most of them spoke English, and we came to regard them almost as our fellow-countrymen.

Before the Revolution of 1917 the Russians were very strongly represented at Kashgar. The Consul-General was usually a diplomat of high rank with an escort of a hundred Cossacks and a very considerable retinue. Owing to this and to the relative proximity of the Transcaspian centres of Russian culture, the Tsarist Consulate-General was the preponderating element in Kashgar society. By 1920, however, it had died a natural death and the Russian colony had dwindled to twenty-three, of whom seven were children. The former Trade Agreement between Russia and the Sinkiang Government having been abrogated in 1922 and no new agreement having yet been concluded with Moscow, the Soviet Government was entirely unrepresented in southern Sinkiang during our time, though this was by no means the case north of the Tien Shan.[1] Moreover, the whole Russo-Chinese frontier from the Pamirs to Aqsu was closed by the Chinese, who allowed no Russians of the new régime to enter Kashgaria, so that the surviving colony consisted almost entirely of pre-Revolution residents who either could not or would not return to their own country. Like the Chinese, hardly any of them spoke any language but their own, a fact which added considerably to the complications of official entertaining. Indeed, had it not been for two of the Russians, who spoke English and Turki respectively and acted as interpreters, intercourse would have been impossible, for neither D. nor I could speak a word of Russian.

600 In spite of the language difficulty, the official and foreign community met frequently and on the most friendly terms. We all "did our bit" in the matter of entertaining, including the chief Chinese officials, who were most hospitable, and keenly appreciated European hospitality in return, although it must have seemed strange and barbarous to them. Some

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[1] A Trade Agreement has since been concluded between the Soviet Union and the Governor of Sinkiang; and a Russian Consul (without escort) has been in residence at Kashgar since July 1925.

culturist and his beds of dahlias and chrysanthemums were a sight to behold; altogether, I found the gardens of Toqquz Bulak worthy of their reputation. One of the other guests, the Tungling or Commandant of the infantry, was of a type quite new to me. Tall, stooping, cadaverous, with bushes of hair sticking out all over his face, he looked remarkably un-Chinese and odd in his Celestial costume. When he addressed me in perfect Turki I was still further puzzled, and at the first opportunity I asked him who he was. He told me that he was a "Wangzada[1]" or direct descendant of the native princes of Kucha, called in Chinese Wangs or "dukes." It was the Wangs of Kucha, he told me with obvious pride, who had been mainly instrumental in destroying the power of the Chinese in Southern Sinkiang in 1863-4 when the Tungans revolted in Kansu; Yakub Beg had come afterwards and had turned the Wangs out when they were weakened by their struggle with the Chinese. When the Celestials returned in 1876 and regained the province from Yakub Beg they took over the lands of the former ruling family, but granted them "political pensions" (as we should call them in India) in lieu of their lost dominions and offered them posts in the Army and Civil Service. Several of the younger Wangzadas, including my friend's father, accepted service under the Chinese Government, which entailed adoption of Chinese customs and dress as well as language; on his death many years ago his son had inherited the pension, 200 taels a month, and the command of a regiment of infantry. It was interesting to me, as a member of the Indian Political Department, to have an opportunity of comparing the methods of the Chinese and Indian Governments in their treatment of deposed native ruling families.

In spite of his curious appearance, "rather like a cross between a Skye terrier and one of the Minor Prophets" as I irreverently described him in a letter home, the Tungling was a well-bred and intelligent old gentleman, and I enjoyed my talk with him. I heard afterwards that he was held in great respect by the Turki population, who always called him "Khojam." The commandant of the Cavalry was a man of a very different type. He was a Chinaman, but a bad specimen of his race, sensual and repulsive. He showed a certain *naïveté*, however, which caused me no little amusement. By

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[1] *Zāda* is a Persian suffix meaning "born from," cf. *shahzāda* (pronounced *shahzda*) "prince."

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personnel adequately to garrison and administer their holdings. Under 648
such conditions, as the American White Paper on China suggests, their
occupation "meant a loss rather than a gain."[24] This situation eventually 668
was the beginning of their doom. Inner political necessity, their ambi- 728
tion, and the Russians' diplomatic and military maneuvering had conspired to bring it about.

The Russians emerged from the negotiations over Manchuria better C
off than when they went in. Indirectly they benefited by every advan- 5
tage they had permitted the Chinese Communists to obtain. Their direct 648
advantages were no less striking. They were in control of Dairen and Port Arthur and of the greater part of the vital Chinese Changchun Railway. They had established considerable economic interests. They did not have the form but they had much of the substance of power in Manchuria, and they used it to reinforce their position further as time moved on. In 1947 they created an "independent" Kwantung Administration in Dairen. In July 1949 they signed a trade pact with the Manchurian People's Democratic Authorities. The pattern of Soviet control became quite clear. Manchuria was destined to become a part of the Russian "safety belt," as Outer Mongolia had been for many years. Sinkiang was the only gap in the "belt" left, and the Soviet Union set out to turn it also into a satellite.

This goal could not be achieved, however, through an "interpretation" of the treaty of 1945, which had served the purpose for Manchuria. The Russians had committed themselves in 1945 to noninterference in China's internal affairs and therefore to staying out of Sinkiang and its involved politics. The treaty provided no opening through which the Russians could enter. They had to use indirect and subversive methods, which had already been employed both before and during World War II in the attempt to prepare Sinkiang for its satellite role.

In the recent past, generally speaking, the loyalty of Sinkiang to China or the Soviet Union has depended largely upon the person who happened to be governor of the province. From about 1932 to 1942 this was Sheng Shin-ts'ai. He had gained control under Soviet guidance and maintained a regime of virtual autonomy oriented toward the Soviet Union. But times were bad in 1942, when Germany invaded Russia, and few supplies came to Sheng from across the border. The voice of the Chinese government began to sound persuasive and, apparently, became irresistible when Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek in person flew to Urumchi to

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C oS 648 change Sheng's loyalty. Sheng reaffirmed his loyalty to the Chinese government. Russian advisers, trade agencies, and troops were withdrawn from the province. Relations with the Soviet Union were interrupted. In 1944 Sheng was recalled to Chungking, upon Russian demand, it was said, and promoted to a nominally high position. Chinese national troops were reinforced in Sinkiang, Soviet sympathizers were purged, and the central government regained control.[25]

C S 648 669 But the government's success was not to last very long. Also in 1944 the Soviet Union resumed interest in Sinkiang and – perhaps by coincidence, more probably not – at the same time a revolt broke out in the Ili area against the Chinese government. Within one year the rebels conquered the country down to the Manas River and declared the three northwestern districts of Kulja, Chuguchak, and Altai the independent "Eastern Turkestan People's Republic." The remaining two-thirds of the province stayed under central Chinese control. The rebels had justified grievances, but without the moral and perhaps other support of the Soviet Union it is not likely that they would have gone so far.[26]

General Chang Chih-chung was sent to negotiate with the rebels. He did so, the Russian consuls at Kulja and Urumchi serving as intermediaries, a circumstance which lent credibility to Chinese claims that the revolt was Russian-engineered. In 1946 an agreement was reached in which some slight concessions toward autonomy of the Ili group were made This was followed from the central government by a few mild attempts at improvements in the administration and occasional conciliatory gestures. But the after-effects of the corrupt, despotic, and mismanaged administration of Sheng remained too pronounced, and the number of Chinese and pro-Chinese officials too great to please the rebels. The Chinese reforms under the slogan "Peace, Unity, Democracy" carried no conviction. The rebels demanded independence and engaged in strong anti-Chinese propaganda.*

The rebel-controlled and the Chinese-controlled parts of the province remained divided into watertight compartments. There were no direct relations between the rebel territory and China. On the other hand, the rebel area had close relations with the Soviet Union. Sinkiang minerals

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* A few years after Sinkiang had become Communist-controlled, this line was changed. The people were then told that their struggle had formed "part of the general movement of the revolution of the Chinese people" and that nationalism was "unjustified" under a Communist regime.

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flowed freely to the west. All communications with the outside world went through Russian channels.

By the spring of 1949 a pro-Russian trend developed in the Chinese-controlled area as well. The Ili group used it immediately by pretending to veer toward the Chinese government and suggesting closer cooperation with the provincial government. The approach that took place between the rebels and the Chinese turned out to favor the Communists. For a few months later, in September, Sinkiang went over to them.

This was only one of several developments which permitted the gradual expansion of Russian influence and control over the province. There were also international complications which arose from numerous border incidents between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. In every incident the Chinese government considered the Russians involved and sent its protests to them as well as to the government of Outer Mongolia. Naturally the Russians never admitted any part, though they confirmed that the Outer Mongolians had Russian-trained pilots and Russian-made planes with markings "very similar" to those of the Russians.

The Russian explanations of the incidents varied. Sometimes they claimed the territory involved was not Chinese at all; or they claimed that the incidents had been provoked by the American consul; or they maintained that the Chinese had provoked them because they "liked what was going on in Greece" and wanted American aid. No settlement was ever reached, and until Sinkiang became Communist, the incidents continued, all, somehow, tending to favor the Soviet Union.

The Chinese government had been aware of this trend and tried to stop it. Simultaneously with its protests and angry outbursts, it tried to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union by which the Russians might be satisfied in return for withholding their support from the Chinese Communists or other groups friendly to Russia. Taking up a suggestion by the Soviet Union of early 1947, the Chinese early in 1949 began to negotiate treaties for trade, mining rights, and air communications. They hoped to kill two birds with one stone: by increasing but specifying Russian rights, they hoped to limit Russian penetration into Sinkiang and to strengthen their own hand against the Chinese Communists.

The reported Chinese plan was to give Russia a three-way monopoly: a monopoly on trade in Sinkiang's raw materials, in return for the supply of finished goods; a monopoly on mining rights, to be exploited by enterprises run jointly by Russians and Chinese; and a monopoly on civil

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648 aviation in the province. These proposals were not as radically new as
669 might appear. In many respects they merely confirmed and legalized a situation which already existed in fact.

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Since 1939 the Russians had had a monopoly on air traffic in Sinkiang (with the exception of a direct line, Urumchi-Shanghai), and their planes landed in several places controlled by the Ili rebel group. The Chinese National Assembly, in an attempt to put pressure on the Soviet Union, had called upon the government to cancel the 1939 agreement. The government announced its intention of doing so. But when the negotiations were terminated, an agreement emerged in which Russian privileges were extended for another five years, instead of the twenty-four asked for by the Russians. The government had not even succeeded in making the Hami-Ata line a less Russian and more Chinese affair.

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In mining and trading the Russians already had a monopoly in the "Eastern Turkestan People's Republic" and wanted to extend it to all of Sinkiang. The Chinese objected on general principles. At the same time they wavered and were considering what concessions ought to be made to reach their political purpose of satisfying the Russians. The indecision reflected the split within the cabinet over the insoluble problem of how far Russia ought to be satisfied in order that it might stop supporting the Chinese Communists. No treaty was ever signed with the National Government. The Communist government later concluded agreements with the Soviet Union through which the Russians obtained in Sinkiang what they wanted.[27]

The Chinese government's position was indeed an unenviable one. Its attempt to stop the double-barreled attack by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists by appeasing the one in the hope of weakening the other was obviously a choice among evils. The policy had its opponents inside the cabinet and failed to find favor with large sections of the public. Yet with occasional rescues by Chiang K'ai-shek, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh succeeded in maintaining himself and his policy in power against all attacks until early 1949. It was a policy in which the Chinese government relied on good relations with the United States to counteract bad relations with the Soviet Union. Depending upon the response from Moscow and Washington at any given moment, of course, relations with both had their ups and downs. The basic theme of this policy, as Wang described it, was close cooperation "forever" with the United States and "moderation" and strict enforcement of treaties with the Soviet Union.[28]

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489 Only since 1930 have some automobile high-
496 ways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation
648 with Soviet Russia, are building the first Inner Asiatic railway,
668 linking Alma-Ata with Lan-chou. This railway will, without
175 doubt, speed up the Sinification of the frontier areas, and
[491] above all add industrialization to agriculture and pastoral
nomadism.

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As far as Chinhai was concerned, the Western Mongols
631 (the Oirats) were also locally ruled by dzasaks, the leaders
563 of banners. Unlike the banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia
657 and Sinkiang, however, they did not combine banners to form
175 leagues or to elect one of their tribal leaders as the captain-
general of the league. The Chinese governor- with his seat in
Sining - functioned as captain-general. In regard to the
nomadic Tibetans, the Chinese government appointed chief-
tains as dzasak-lamas and gave them the rights and the
privileges which this office involves. The sedentary Tibetans
were ruled by t'u-ssus, also appointees of the Peking govern-
ment. By and large, this governmental pattern existed until
S N the Communists came into power.

563 The form of governing non-Chinese peoples changed in the
657 course of time in various ways, but one thing never changed:
175 the aim of the Peking government to rule, to suppress, to
exploit, and to sinify them.

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631 Unlike the eighteen provinces in China proper, the province
635 of Sinkiang (after 1884) and the Eastern Three Provinces, (after
175 1907) the areas comprising Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turk-
estan, although occupying more space than China proper, were
S administrated by a quite different type of governmental system.
631 Political subdivisions of the Chinese Empire such as Mongolia,
657 Chinese Turkestan and Tibet were usually referred to as de-
175 pendencies. This is however an inaccurate translation of
the Chinese term "fan," which really means "the barbarian
647 west." Since the cultural, ethnic and historical background in
these areas was very different from the rest of the Empire,
these regions required, and in practice had, a very particular
type of governmental control. All these frontier territories
were administered by the "Department of Dependencies" in
Peking. This department was subdivided into the following
bureaus:

a. Inner Mongolian bureau, that administered frontier boundaries, titles of nobility, appointment of officials, military affairs, league conferences, and finally organization of banner units of Inner Mongolia.

b. "Reception bureau" for Inner Mongolia nobility, that was responsible for the payments and allowances to the Inner Mongolian aristocracy.

c. Eastern Turkestan bureau, that was in charge of Moslem affairs in Eastern Turkestan.

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631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge
of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian
S N inhabitants in general.

175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking,
the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
S N minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
175 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
657 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
563 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784,
669 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times
they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bäk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

S N II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode
175 of Economy of the Minorities.

631 Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic con-
619 glomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and
always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
S N political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
175 again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
631 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the
668 Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
178 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-
619 Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road,
648 Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's
cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bäk's policy

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175 towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion
631 created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian
668 Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that
178 created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet
619 through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the
648 four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small
degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one
administrative unit.

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563 The Eastern Turks:

241 The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is
based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational
complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through
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563 the organized use of water. The family organization among the
596 Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain
level of productivity can only be reached through collective
labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason
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[312] the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern
[241] is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount
of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational
systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water
is therefore provided for their land.

The Internal structure of the family system is not based
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upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed
[622] by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself
[634] whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by
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Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists.
563 A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed
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[441] by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form
"guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

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563 Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

614 Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition
of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the
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Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted
563 in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among
233 these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose
361 most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition
[177] to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists
[668] insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent
winter camp site, since this facilitates better political
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control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site
still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz
[622] and Kazakhs are ruled by "beks," or "manaps" (elders)
responsible to the Chinese officials.

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563 The Mongols: general remarks.

[233] Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The
[594] basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

N *175 to the Venetian merchant, Marco Polo.

487 S 175 487 During the centuries when China faced the land frontier of the Northwest and the Silk Road was the main channel of China's intercourse with the outside world, the target of China's imperialistic expansion, when strong, was the domination of the petty states of Central Asia. The principal strategic pass that must be held to prevent invading armies from pouring in and ravaging China, in periods of weakness and division, was Yü-men, the Jade Gate, in northwestern China.

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B. Recurring Cycles of Nomadic Eruptions

As the advance and recession of Chinese power in Turkestan reflected the vigor and the decline of Chinese dynasties,(a feature of Chinese history discussed in the historical section of the General Handbook), so were the outbursts and withdrawals of the nomads the manifestations of their activity and passivity. The juxtaposition and interaction of the Chinese scheme of advance and withdrawal with the nomadic scheme shaped the dynamics and course of history of Northwest China. Together with Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang forms a broad semicircular belt, which marks the marginal zone between China and the steppes and is the amphitheater for the vast age-long struggle between the sedentary and nomadic peoples.

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1. Earliest invasions

N *175 648 S 175 648 The alternate thrust of the nomads into this marginal zone, at times even penetrating into the heartland of China, and their retraction into the steppes, have been a recurring phenomenon in the history of Central Asia. With tidal regularity, the nomads have surged forth when China was weak and divided, only to ebb when China was strong and united. As far back as the eighth century B.C., when China was beginning to disintegrate into warring states, there were invasions of China by the north and northwestern peoples called Ti and Jung. In Central Asia there was the expansion of the Scythians. From the third to the first century B.C., the confederacy of nomads led by the Hsiung-nu or Huns were active in China's Northwest. During this same period Central Asia was overrun first by the Greeks of Alexander's army, then by the Yüeh-chih and, further east, by the Sakas and Wu-sun. The defense measures of the Ch'in dynasty and the military advance of the Chinese during the Han dynasty in the first century B.C. and the first century A.D., held the Huns in check and finally succeeded in splitting up the Hun confederation.

2. Turkic incursions

From the fourth to the seventh centuries, with China weak and divided, the border peoples from China's northern and northwestern frontiers breached China's defenses. First in dribbles and then in raging torrents they occupied the northwest and poured

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*175 into China to establish militaristic states in North China. The
648 aggregation of invaders included the Huns, the Hsien-pi, the Juan-
S juan, the Toba, and the Tibetans. But the dominant group to
175 emerge was the Turks, who eventually ruled an extensive terri-
648 tory stretching from Mongolia to the Urals. Once more China, reunited under the Sui dynasty, was able to hold off the nomads. Under the T'ang dynasty the Chinese were able to advance into the domain of the nomads and to destroy the Turkish federation.

By the ninth century, as China declined in power, the nomadic peoples on the northern rim of the Chinese empire came into their own again. The situation appeared to be a repetition of what had happened at least twice before. The decline of the Chou had been followed by the disintegration of China into warring states (cycle one); the collapse of Han had ushered in the Three Kingdoms and the North and South Dynasties (cycle two). Now, with the fall of T'ang, there came the chaotic Five Dynasties and the division of China again into the north and south (cycle three). In each successive stage, the extent of nomadic power was greater than in the previous one. In the first period of division, both northern and southern states were primarily Chinese; in the second stage of division, the northern states were non-Chinese while the southern states were Chinese; but in the third stage, at first the northern states were alien and the southern state (Sung) Chinese, but later the northern invaders (Mongols) succeeded in conquering all of China.

3. Mongol expansion

In the period following the fall of Tang, peoples from Manchuria, Khitans and Juchens, as well as peoples from Turkestan, such as the Sha-t'o (or Chöl) Turks, poured into China. In the Northwest, the Western Turks and their offshoots, the Qarluqs the the Uighurs, were active. Later, some of the Khitans, ousted from North China, also established themselves in Turkestan. Here too, the Arabs, who had penetrated Central Asia in the 7th and 8th centuries, were influential. But the most powerful were the Mongols who, having united the tribes of Mongolia into a vast confederation of nomadic people in a series of sanguinary wars, in the 13th century embarked on a career of conquest that was to include all of Asia and part of Europe.

The Chinese, in their resurgence under the Ming dynasty, did not recover Turkestan. Central Asia remained in the grip of the later Mongols, from the Timurid dynasty in Persia, through the descendants of the Chagatai princes in Turkestan, to the Oirats in Northwestern China, the last of whom by the mid fifteenth century, were bold enough to make forays into China. The 17th century saw the rise to power of the Oirats who dominated vast areas of Mongolia and Turkestan. Not until the middle of the eighteenth century was the power of the Oirat confederacy broken and China,

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*175 under the Ch'ing emperors, reasserted its sway in Turkestan.

648 4. Pattern of nomadic expansion and contraction

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175 Wave after wave of nomadic peoples have made their appear-
ances and then faded away, leaving the imprint of their stay on
648 the palimpsest of Turkestan. The pattern of their entry, their ascendency, and their exit have been similar. Each outburst and withdrawal of the nomads showed but variations on the major theme. The Huns, the Turks, and the Mongols, to mention a few of the more powerful of the plethora of nomadic peoples, all had their geneses in the same region, an area of Mongolia south of Lake Baikal. The process of their rise to power followed parallel lines. First, there was a bitter internecine struggle from which one group emerged triumphant. Second, the nomadic tribes were unified into a strong coalition under the leadership of the dominant group. Third, they expanded outward from the steppes into neighboring regions, especially into the marginal zone of modern Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. Then they consolidated these areas into bases of operation for the fourth stage, the invasion and, when successful, the conquest of the opulent agrarian lands. At the peak of their strength, these nomadic invaders would establish a strong, militant empire, under an absolutist government, to control the motley subject peoples under their domination.

But once they reached the peak of their power, the downgrade began. The paucity of their numerical strength made it difficult for them to hold large territories. The tradition of intertribal contest instilled the spirit of independence in the minds of the satraps appointed to rule portions of the far-flung empires. The failure to resolve the incompatibility between pastoral and agrarian economy, and the resentment and rebellious tendency of the subject peoples whom the conquerers were only able to overawe by military strength, were all factors which brought about the
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S disintegration and decline of the empires of the nomads.

175 5. Theories concerning nomadic eruptions

121 What accounted for the sudden irresistible ferocity of nomad
eruptions and what accounted for the docility of their withdrawal?
648 A number of very ingenious theorires have been advanced, as answers to this intriguing question, but so far these are still in
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S the realm of assumptions.

175 Many scholars have regarded the influence of climate as a
121 possible cause of the high tide and ebb of nomadic activities.
648 Superimposed on the progressive dessication of Central Asia
132 resulting from the withdrawal of glaciers, were the minor cyclic
114 fluctuations of alternating dry and moist spells. A climatologist (C.E.P. Brooks) spoke of the "classical rainfall period of 640
182 years," and a geographer (Raymond Wheeler) believed in a major alternation of dry and cold every 510 years. Ellsworth Huntington,

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175 a proponent of the theory of climatic alternations, called the
121 phenomenon "the pulse of Asia."

648 The most important of the multiple influences is believed to
132 be that of the economic effects of climatic changes. When the
114 climate is warm and moist, the land of the nomads is fertile
182 enough to support the nomads and their herds, but when the climate becomes drier and colder, the rivers and lakes shrink and the pasturage is reduced. This cuts down the food supply and forces the nomads to rampage into the land of their neighbors. Speaking of the thirteenth century, Arnold Toynbee declared that the "paroxysm of aridity coincided in date with the demoniac eruption of the Mongols, and it will be seen that the physiographical recoil towards humidity likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols." (A Study of History, vol. III, p. 439).

Although the outbursts and recessions of the nomads were periodic, the rigid periodization was too mechanical and many scholars have discredited climate as the sole factor. Huntington suggests that four factors may have impelled the huge migration of the nomadic peoples, namely: climate, the inherent quality of the people especially as manifested by the leaders, the pull exerted by the wealth and the opportunities of the agricultural lands, and the push exerted by over-population. (Mainsprings of Civilization, p. 568).

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S A period of peace and prosperity would allow the population of
the nomads to increase. However, in the desolate steppes, food
[233] was dependent upon flocks of sheep and herds of cattle and horses,
[262] and the people, unlike their sedentary neighbors, did not have the tradition nor the facilities for food storage. Any sudden change in climate which caused a reduction of pasturage and water supply would create a "time of troubles" and compel the nomadic people to migrate in search of food and pasturage.

When the nomads were experiencing a "time of troubles," the lush riches and the military weakness of the settled peoples would tempt border tribes to encroach upon the agrarian regions. Distress and discontent at home and the lure of wealth abroad furnish the push and the pull of Toynbee's theories. When the leavening of bold leadership and ideas were add[illegible] the nomads often were induced to burst out from the steppes of Asia and to set the world in commotion.

Other scholars entirely discount the influence of climate and seek the explanation for the advance and withdrawal of the nomads in social and political conditions. Owen Lattimore, who has given much thought to this question, (cf. Inner Asian Frontiers, passim),
N lists a number of reasons other than climate, for the eruption of
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175 the nomads. There were, for example, technological factors like
121 the invention of the powerful compound bow and the technique of
648 mounted archery which gave the nomads an edge over their enemies.
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The Chinese had to adopt the nomad bow and the technique of mounted archery before they could meet the nomads on equal terms.

Another factor, according to Lattimore, was the pastoral economy of the nomads which led to migration. Horses and cattle cannot graze on fields that have been cropped by sheep and goats. Therefore, the nomads whose livelihood depended upon their herds and flocks, must continually seek new pastures. The claims to pasturelands and the right of movement led to wars. The continuous wars stimulated the rise of leaders, hard-headed men who survived the hurly-burly of warfare and politics of the steppes and deserts. Finally, a supreme leader emerged who would then weld the various groups into a grand confederation strong enough to encroach upon the neighboring regions for land, for the profits of trade, and for revenue and tribute from the conquered peoples.

According to Lattimore, the nomads who invaded the marginal zone between the steppes and the settled lands, were not pure nomads but were semi-settled. Their wars of conquest were not only for pastures for their herds and flocks but for land, for the riches of the cities, and for the proceeds of commerce. Moreover, the cycles of their invasion and retreat began only a few centuries before the Christian era when they split from the settled peoples on China's northwestern frontier and when they acquired the technology of nomadic warfare. The true nomads on the steppes evolved from the mixed nomads, not vice versa.

The migrations which led to conquest over a wide area, such as those carried out by the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols, normally did not begin with the true nomads but with the mixed nomads, and were caused by (1) a group breaking away from the mixed nomads in order to become true nomads; or (2) a group breaking away from the true nomads in order to revert back to mixed nomadism. The Huns, Turks, and Mongols had fixed bases of operation and their conquests were for land.

Under these circumstances, according to Lattimore, the cycles of nomadic expansion and withdrawal each went through the following process:

1. The maintenance of large armies of mounted warriors to conquer land for the profit of trade and revenue from subject peoples;
2. A dichotomy of nomad society. The nomadic warriors who went forth to conquer and who were left to garrison conquered territories had control of the sources of wealth but declined militarily. The warriors who stayed in the steppes as the military reserve continued to be warlike but gradually became impoverished;
3. A split within the nomad state between those in the conquered areas and those in the steppes, leading to decline and and withdrawal.

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6. Summary

In summary, the workings of the historical process represented

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in these tides of nomadic eruptions can hardly be explained by one set of factors, useful as it may be as a contribution to our understanding of this process. Moreover, each set in turn led into a rather involved pattern. Geography and the highly specialized economies of the nomads, particularly when they had reached the stage of pure nomadism, induced them to seek a more stable base for their evolving power urge than could be found in the steppe lands of Mongolia, from which most of the nomadic conquests emerged. It induced them to push first into the oasis situation of Turkestan with its mixed, richer, more stable but, geographically speaking, more fragmented economy. This aspect helped form the pattern of relationships of the group, which was on its way to conquest of other nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in Central Asia. However, only from the foundation of this economic basis could an effort at conquest of neighboring civilizations be sustained.

The social pattern of development leading a warrior leader to integrate his clan, his tribe, his people, and finally, a confederation of peoples, into a conquest force is interlinked with the previous one. This expansion led to a relative shrinkage of the group that had been carrier of the power urge and more and more force had to be substituted for the self-consciousness of the participants and their community of purpose. In the course of the social development towards conquest and empire building, the initial group gained a feeling of mission but lost its surroundings geographically, economically, and socially. As a rule this change also led to a change in the pattern of emerging leadership: the warrior leader chosen by his own people had to make room for the heir of a diversified empire.

This development again was linked with the development of a relationship to neighboring agricultural societies, particularly China, a relationship that has been understood under the concept of marginality by Krader (The Cultural and Historical Position of the Mongols, Asia Major 3, 1952, 169-183). Economically speaking, this relationship is always one of interdependence. From the Chinese side the natural and necessary exchange of produce was conceived under an evolving series of patterns. In periods of Chinese power ascendancy the nomadic raid pattern was transformed into trade, then into tribute, and then, if necessary, into conquest. However, in periods when a nomadic empire building situation coincided with a decline of Chinese power, the nomads would shake off conquest, resort to raids and to conquest in their turn.

Whatever may have been the causes of the periodic eruption of the nomads, whether they were due to climatic changes or due to concentration and the disintegration of nomadic society, the pattern remained. With clockwork regularity different groups of

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105 175 648 182 nomads have descended on the marginal zones, such as Turkestan and Inner Mongolia, conquering and absorbing some peoples and pushing others, in a sort of chain reaction, until the reverberations were felt from China Proper in the east to Russia in the west. The history of China's great Northwest cannot be clearly delineated without tracing in broad sweep the see-saw of power between China and the nomadic peoples.

C. Early History to 1644

1. Chou Dynasty

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(101) In antiquity the Northwest region of China was known as the province of Yung, one of the nine provinces of ancient China. For a long time, it was a region inhabited by peoples whom the Chinese called "barbarians," the Ti in the north and the Jung in the west. The founder of the Chou Dynasty, King Wen (circa 12th century B.C.) was himself a "western barbarian." His fief in the Wei River Valley in Shensi, an area which in the early years of Chinese civilization was fertile and fruitful, provided his son, King Wu, with the men and resources for the campaign to gain control over China. Later, as the barbarians of the Northwest became strong, they forced the Chou court to transfer its capital from the Wei River Valley to Honan.

2. Ch'in Dynasty

The region of Shensi, centering around the Wei River Valley, became the fief of the Marquis (later Duke) of Ch'in. The bountiful resources of the region, enhanced further by the development of irrigation, the militant nature of the people who were part Hun, and the administrative and social reforms initiated by Legalist ministers enabled Ch'in to rise to power, to triumph over the other feudal states in 221 B.C., to conquer the empire and establish the first centralized government over China. Ch'ang-an (now Sian), the erstwhile capital of the Chou kings, became the national capital of a mighty empire from this time on, down through the Han, Sui and T'ang Dynasties.

Under the Ch'in state and later the Ch'in empire, the Chinese began to extend their power up the Kansu Corridor and into the regions of the modern provinces of Ninghsia and Chinghai. In the north, they completed the Great Wall to fend off the northern barbarians and to protect their flanks as they advanced westward. The advances made during the Ch'in Dynasty, which fell in 209 B.C., prepared the way for the great expansion of the Chinese into Turkestan during the Han period.

3. Han Dynasty

With the consolidation of Chinese unity a new power arose among the barbarians of the Northwest. This was the confederation of nomadic tribes formed under the leadership of the Hsiung-nu or Huns. During the civil war which overthrew the Ch'in

175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was Yüan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of Yüan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of Yüan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

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1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

159 635 669 The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt, but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

159 175 635 575 668 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

159 635 175 648 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

159 635 175 185 631 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen.[1] Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

000 Imperial Russian government.

159 The revolution in Russia presented fresh problems to Yang's
635 administration. In 1917, hordes of Kazakhs who were residents of
175 Russian Turkestan, fled from conscription and poured into Sinkiang.
648 At one time, it was estimated that there were 200,000 Kazakh
167 refugees in the province, of whom about 100,000 were in the vicinity of Ili and 70,000 in Tarbagatai. Yang used his good offices to persuade the Soviet Government to pardon them and to permit these Kazakhs to return home. Following the Kazakhs, large numbers of White Russian emigres entered Sinkiang between the years 1918 and 1921. Yang drove out the more truculent ones, disarmed the others and gave them asylum in Sinkiang. Many of them enlisted in his forces.

159 The Soviet domination of Outer Mongolia resulted in the complete
635 repudiation of Chinese authority by all the Mongols except those in
175 the inner regions of the border provinces who were more accessible
648 to Chinese influence.

These new developments impelled Yang Tseng-hsin to adopt a campaign to promote dissension among his nomadic subjects. To accomplish this first he withdrew from the Mongols their rights to all the nomad lands granted them under the Manchu dynasty. Under these rights the Kazakhs had been required to pay grazing fees to the Mongols for use of the land. Then he withheld arms from the Mongols and supplied them to the Kazakhs, thus insuring the continuation of hostilities between the two peoples. These measures, coupled perhaps with the enmity which often exists between peoples of different faith and tradition, were sufficient to prevent the Sinkiang Mongols from joining with their kinsmen beyond the Altai. Under the pressure of Kazakh raids that penetrated even to the north of the Altai range, the Mongols of Sinkiang retreated farther into the province. Communication between them and Outer Mongolia came to an end.

175 The revival of a spirit of independence among the Mongols was
648 characterized generally by a lack of native leaders or of outstanding personalities of any sort. Nevertheless, there was one individual whose ambitions were associated with this spirit and who enjoyed a brief success as a Mongol leader. This was Dambijantsin or Ja Lama. Ja Lama, a Russian Kalmuck by birth, appeared in Western Mongolia in the early twentieth century. With his propaganda for the revival of the Mongol federation, he succeeded in attracting a following. As early as the late nineteenth century, travelers in Outer Mongolia had heard reports of Ja Lama. He claimed to be the grandson of Amursana, the last great Oirat chieftain, and he foretold the liberation of the Mongols from the Chinese by the action of forces that would gather in Siberia. Some such legend seems to have been current among the Oirats at that time. The Russian traveler, Roborovski, heard rumors that Amursana himself would return to unite the Western Mongols. Whether he created the legend or merely

175 648 took advantage of it, Ja Lama assumed the role of liberator. He was influential in swinging Western Mongol support from the Sinkiang government to Outer Mongolia. His apparent objectives were the conquest of Sinkiang and part of Tibet, and a union of all the Western Mongols to form a new Western Mongolian state. In 1912 he led a successful attack on the town of Kobdo. He assumed religious and princely titles and served briefly as military governor of the region. In 1914 he was arrested and deported by the Russians, whose negotiations for a Chinese-Mongolian treaty were being disturbed by his aggressive activities. Eventually he returned to eastern Sinkiang. There he again rallied a group of Mongol adherents and built a fortification. He was hunted down and killed by assassins from the Urga(Outer Mongolian) government, which apparently feared the consequences of a new Western Mongolian union.

The destruction of Ja Lama and his "organization", and the policy of the Sinkiang government in dealing with the Mongols, both contributed to the permanent detachment of the Kobdo district from Western Mongolia. The actual separation dates from the latter half of the eighteenth century and the Manchu conquest of the Northwest. In 1754 the Imperial government set up the Kobdo region as an administrative district under the administration of Outer Mongolia. When Ja Lama attacked and captured the city of Kobdo and established himself as governor of the district, it was Russian power that expelled him and forced the return of Kobdo to Outer Mongolia. Finally when Ja Lama established himself in eastern Sinkiang and attracted a new following of Western Mongols, he again threatened the detachment of Kobdo. It was the Urga government that sent men to kill him and thereby insure Outer Mongolia's retention of Kobdo. The Mongols of the Kobdo district were, and probably still are, descendants of Oirats whose attachment to Outer Mongolia was merely a military and political convenience for the Manchu administration. Ja Lama's temporary success and the actions taken against him by the Russian and Outer Mongolian governments probably reflected a real feeling of "Oiratism" among the Mongols of Kobdo.

175 Before the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Western Mongol tribal territories were administered by princes who enjoyed virtual autonomy under the provincial government. This arrangement was continued with some modification under the Republic. The government extended its control over the princes and consequently over the Mongols themselves. The league and banner system probably remained in effect until the establishment of regional autonomy in Sinkiang, although the administrative units did not correspond strictly to tribal divisions and, in some cases, even included groups of unrelated peoples. There were three leagues and two special groups which were constituted as follows:

The Unen Susuktu League consisted of ten banners of Torguts, 175 widely distributed and separated from each other by non-Mongol peoples. These Torguts were located in the Tienshan Range above the oasis of Karashahr, on the northern slopes of the Tienshan, and on the southern slopes of the Altai.

The Bato Setkhiltu League was composed of three banners of Khoshuts who lived on the Yulduz plateau in the heart of the central Tien Shan.

The Ching Setkhiltu League, which included three banners of Khoshuts and seven of Urianghai, was located in the Chuguchak-Altai area in northern Sinkiang.

The Chahars in the Borotala Valley, and the Oirat in the valleys of the Tekes and Kash rivers in the Ili region were not included in the leagues.

However, the Chahars and Urianghai are not true Western Mongols. The former were transplanted from Chahar by the Manchus after the conquest of Dzungaria in the eighteenth century; the latter are descendants of tribes who originally lived in what is now Tannu Tuva.

175 Through Yang Tseng-hsin's efforts, Sinkiang remained neutral
159 in the civil war that raged in China in 1926-27. His troops kept out
635 the forces of the "Christian General" Feng Yü-hsiang. On his own
648 initiative, he negotiated a new treaty with the Soviet government permitting Soviet consulates to operate in Sinkiang even after the National Government broke off relations with Soviet Russia in 1927. With the establishment of the National Government at Nanking, Yang wired his acknowledgement of, and allegiance to, the new government, which confirmed his position as governor.

2. Governor Chin Shu-jen

175 Yang Tseng-hsin came from the southwestern province of Yunnan
159 and during his rule many men from Yunnan had followed him to Sinkiang.
635 In 1928, a fellow Yunnan official, allegedly with the connivance
[682] of the Chinese Communists and the Russians, murdered Yang at
[661] a banquet in his honor. The military commander Chin Shu-jen, who was believed to be implicated in the assassination plot, immediately suppressed the revolt and put the ringleaders to death. He then maneuvered himself into the position of governor.

Under Chin, the government of Sinkiang virtually disintegrated. Corruption was rife. Chin himself set the example for rapacity. He ruled in open defiance of the National Government at Nanking to the extent of concluding, on his own initiative and without the cognizance
[648] of Nanking, a new agreement with Soviet Russia in 1931. The agreement permitted Soviet authorities to establish eight commercial agencies in Sinkiang and to have complete control over telegraph and radio communications, thus increasing Soviet influence in the province.
175 The deterioration of economic conditions, heightened by spiralling
159 inflation and the exploitation by Chin's minions, oppression, and
635 inequities, led to widespread discontent. The situation was ripe for
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rebellion.

The rebellion began at Qomul (Hami), where at the death of the old prince, the Chinese had taken over the region and divided it into three administrative districts under the rule of Chinese magistrates. Then, with the influx of refugees from Kansu, Chin ousted the Uighurs from one of the three districts to provide land for the refugees. To make things worse, the Uighurs had to pay taxes while the Chinese refugees were exempted for three years. Finally, when a tax-collector forced a pretty Uighur girl to marry him against her will, the Uighurs rose in anger and killed the tax collectors and the refugees.

When Chin sent troops to put down the rebellion, the Uighur rebels sought the aid of Ma Chung-ying, a young Chinese Moslem (Dungan) officer from Kansu. Entering Sinkiang in 1932 with 400 men, his [648] force was soon swelled by local recruits. The Japanese, seeking an opportunity to intervene in Sinkiang, were believed to have given him guidance and moral support, if not actually funds and military equipment. B[illegible] (Chen-hsi) and Qomul (Hami), as well as large areas of eastern Sinkiang, fell to the arms of the young conqueror. However, his attack on Urumchi was beaten back by a young Manchurian officer, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whom Chin Shu-jen had brought to Sinkiang to take command of the army.

[648] Sheng's defenders were later reinforced by Manchurian troops, who had been interned in Soviet Siberia and who were repatriated and sent to Sinkiang. They were called the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army.

With the arming and augmenting of both the provincial government army and the rebel forces, the civil war increased in ferocity and intensity. There was a heavy slaughter of the Han Chinese, the Chinese Moslems, and the Uighurs. Meanwhile, the Russian mercenaries stationed at Urumchi, whose pay had been in arrears, also revolted. In the pandemonium, Chin fled the city and found refuge in Russia. Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to the fore to take control over the army and the civil government.

3. Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai

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Although frustrated in his assaults on Urumchi in 1932 and again in 1934, Ma Chung-ying was able to expand his power from Qomul (Hami) westward to Kashgar, hemming in Urumchi from all sides. In his marches back and forth across Sinkiang he left wide swaths of pillage and rapine, death and desolation in his wake. His far-ranging depredations were the signal for other bands of insurgents to rise. The Chinese military commander of Ili raised the banner of independence. In the Tarim Basin, the local Han Chinese and Chinese Moslem residents had banded together into an Eastern Turkestan Army to defend themselves against the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. In November, 1933, a group of Burut chiefs, assisted by returned-students from Turkey, seized control of the Eastern Turkestan Army and established an Eastern Turkestan Republic at Kashgar. In their newly-drafted constitution, they stated that the structure of their government would be based on the Koran, and all decrees and laws

175 also would be based on the Koran. Emissaries were sent to seek
159 aid and support from Moslems in Afghanistan and India where the
635 Pan-Islamic Movement was then in full swing. Telegrams were
669 sent to the Nationalist Government of China and to the League of
Nations requesting recognition of their state. Not only did they fail to obtain support and recognition from abroad, but they were also repudiated by their own people. Once in power, they embarked on a terroristic program of persecuting the Han Chinese and the Chinese Moslems who were the mainstays of the Eastern Turkestan Army. Then, too, they were weakened by internal dissensions and by the struggles of the leaders for power, until one by one they were killed. The Eastern Turkestan Republic was finally dissolved when Ma Chung-ying attacked Kashgar in June, 1934.

Meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai reached an agreement with the
• [648] Soviet authorities whereby he received planes, trucks, armored cars, machine-guns and ammunition. While Soviet troops operated in the region of the Altai Mountains, Sheng's forces marched north and succeeded in routing the insurgents at Ili. Again he led his army south against Ma Chung-ying. His possession of superior armaments turned the scales in the battle of Urumchi. Ma Chung-ying fled,
[506] harried by Sheng's warplanes, which bombed and strafed the rebel columns at Turfan and Korla. He went to Kashgar in April, 1934. Four months later, again forced to evacuate Kashgar, he crossed the border into Russian Turkestan and was never heard of again.

The civil war in Sinkiang had lasted for four years of wholesale destruction and bloodshed. Weary of strife and disorder, the people were ready to accept Sheng Shih-ts'ai's proclamation of a new and stable government and his promises for a new era in Sinkiang. When he first came to power in 1933, he announced an eight-point policy that had gained him considerable support. The eight points were: 1. racial equality, 2. religious freedom, 3. immediate and equitable distribution of farm relief, 4. financial reform, 5. administrative reform to clean the government, 6. extension of education, 7. promotion of self-government, and 8. judicial reform.

Under the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Uighurs and Kazakhs were appointed to high posts in their own district governments. The non-Chinese nationalities were encouraged to use their own languages and to organize their own schools. The number of students in schools increased from 3,000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and many non-Chinese students were sent abroad to study in Soviet Russia. The Sinkiang Daily was published in seven languages, and cultural associations were established for the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Dungans (Chinese Moslems), Tartars, Russians, and Chinese.

When he finally had suppressed the rebellions and firmly established the authority of his government, Sheng Shih-ts'ai announced his Six Great Policies for New Sinkiang: 1. anti-imperialism, 2. kinship with Soviet Russia, 3. racial equality, 4. honest government,

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175 5. peace, and 6. reconstruction. After the years of tyranny and
159 misrule, the government which Sheng created in Sinkiang in com-
635 parison was enlightened and progressive, although, because of the
669 characteristics and background of the region, it was autocratic.

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IV. The Rise of the Communists

*175 While Sheng Shih-ts'ai was consolidating his power in Sinkiang,
events were taking a dramatic turn at the other end of the vast
*668 territory which comprises China's Northwest. The nucleus of the
669 first Communist guerilla bands appeared at Paoan in northern Shensi
in 1931. By the following year, when they came under the overall direction of the Political Department of the Chinese Communist Party headquarters at Yulin, they controlled eleven counties. The poverty of the region made the people receptive to Communist propaganda. In 1935, the Red Army, which had been driven out of Kiangsi, reached northern Shensi after a long and circuitous trek through southwestern China. Here they were under attack by government troops until December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek, who was visiting Sian, was detained by Manchurian troops stationed in the area. Under the terms that the Nationalist Government accepted to secure the release of Chiang, the policy shifted from fighting the Communists to outright opposition to Japan. With the pressure on them removed, the Chinese Communists immediately began to expand in all directions. In the months that followed they occupied 24 counties (18 in northern Shensi, 5 in Kansu and one in Ninghsia). They controlled a population of two million in what was known as the Shen-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.

Their headquarters at Yenan, in northern Shensi became the Mecca of the Chinese Communists and fellow-travellers. From here tentacles of Communist strength stretched out to North China, Inner Mongolia, and to Sinkiang where some of the Communist agents found service in the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. During World War II, the Communists were unable to penetrate southern Shensi, where the government had stationed an army. The Communists also made little headway in Ninghsia, in the regions held by the Chinese Moslem general, Ma Hung-k'uei, and in Chinghai, held by another Chinese Moslem general, Ma Pu-fang. In both these provinces, the Moslem population repudiated Communism and resisted Communist forces.

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The Nationalist Government's preoccupation with the war
175 against Japan permitted Sheng Shih-ts'ai to govern Sinkiang as a
159 virtually independent ruler. For seven years, until 1940, he main-
648 tained his policy of kinship and orientation to the Soviet Union rather
[635] than to China and his nominal superior, the Nationalist Government.

After 1941, when German armies overran and occupied eastern Russia, and the Soviet government, engaged in a violent struggle for survival, could not continue to send him supplies, he broke his ties

175 with Russia and sought to return to the fold of China. The National
159 Government had been waiting for this opportunity. Immediately it
648 dispatched officials to Sinkiang to take over the administration from
[167] Sheng's underlings; Nationalist troops under Chu Shao-liang and
Ma Pu-fang were sent to overawe Sheng's army; and another tide of
Chinese colonists invaded Sinkiang and were settled in the vicinity of
Urumchi.

Under these circumstances, Sheng Shih-ts'ai tried to shift back to Soviet Russia. Moreover, by this time, Russian forces had rolled the German invaders back from Leningrad and Stalingrad and were steadily advancing. In 1944, Sheng ordered the arrest of Chinese Nationalist officials and also of students and teachers from China Proper. His coup failed and the National Government removed Sheng from the governorship of Sinkiang and transferred him to Chungking to the sinecure position of Minister of Agriculture. This was the end of the colorful career of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. A trusted Nationalist official, Wu Chung-hsin, was appointed as governor of Sinkiang.

One of the many problems that Wu Chung-hsin inherited from
175 Sheng Shih-ts'ai was that of the Kazakhs in Ili. In 1940 Sheng had
159 arrested 70 Kazakh delegates from the Altai region who had come to
669 protest his high-handed treatment of their people. When news of the
[563] arrest reached the Kazakhs, they revolted en masse, led by one of
their chieftains, Osman Batur. After sporadic fighting between the rebels and provincial troops, Sheng agreed to negotiate and to release the prisoners. However, before they were released, a number of them were executed. Incensed by this act of treachery, the Kazakhs in the Altai region revolted again. They put up a strong resistance but were finally overwhelmed by Sheng's forces. Osman Batur fled.

When Sheng turned against the Russians and attempted a rapprochement with China, Osman Batur organized the Altai-Kazakh Restoration Society. With arms from Outer Mongolia and the tacit support of Soviet Russia, he attacked and captured Ching-ho, Ta-cheng (Chuguchak) and A-shan (Altai). He was besieging Wu-su in 1944 when the new governor, Wu Chung-hsin, decided to negotiate. In the settlement of this uprising, which has been called the "Ining (Kulja) Incident", the Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops from Kulja and to grant the Kazakhs semi-autonomy in the territory they held which included Kuldja, Ta-cheng and A-shan. The new Eastern Turkestan Republic was established at Kulja. It had a government headed by a council of three, a Kazakh, a Uighur, and a White Russian. One of the leaders, Akhmejan Kasimi, was placed in charge of administration and finance; another of the leaders, Osman Batur, headed the army, which at one time was reported to number 40,000 men.

175 By November, 1945, the Ili rebellion had spread to the Tarim
669 Basin and insurgent forces surrounded Yarkand, Khargalik, and Kho-
[648] tan. At that time it was denied that Soviet Russia gave any military

175 669 648 assistance to the Ili rebels. Later, however, when the Chinese Communists came to power, there were profuse statements thanking the Soviet Government for its unstinted aid and support. Soviet support to the Ili rebels was more apparent on the diplomatic plane. The Soviet consul-general at Urumchi was openly friendly to the rebels. He gave them every encouragement, while he played his game as intermediary between Kazakh insurgents and the Chinese authorities.

175 669 The negotiations between the Ili regime and the Chinese government delegates headed by Chang Chih-chung lasted from October, 1945, to June, 1946. The insurgents were willing to abandon their independence if the Chinese government would grant them autonomy. The Chinese negotiators were willing to permit the Ili regime to retain its armed forces as a peace preservation corps if the Chinese could have top military command and full authority in Sinkiang's diplomatic affairs.

Finally a settlement was reached in the summer of 1946. An agreement was signed providing for a reconciliation between the Chinese authorities and the rebel leaders. Attached to the agreement were two codicils concerning the reform of the provincial government and reorganization of the armed forces. The terms of the settlement also contained provisions for the election of district officials by adult suffrage and for the formation of a provincial government composed of men, some of whom were appointed by the Chinese government and some nominated by the provincial delegates. The use of the Uighur and Kazakh languages was permitted in schools and in the army. To implement the agreement, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as governor. Burkhan Shahidi, a Uighur, and Akhmejan Kasimi, a Kazakh, were appointed vice-chairmen of the provincial administration. A determined effort was made to improve the government and to give the local people a greater voice in political affairs.

175 668 669 578 563 However, realization of these agreements, which would have given the non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang a large measure of self-government, was delayed and hamstrung by distrust and hostility on both sides. The military commanders and the diehard Kuomintang party members were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives to the native leaders; the extremist native leaders were impatient and uncompromising. In February, 1947, the more contentious elements, led by Akhmejan Kasimi, issued a statement, known as the Kulja Declaration. It denounced the supremacy of one nationality (the Chinese) over the other nationalities of Sinkiang, and called for the unification of all the races of Sinkiang under a native government. Adopting a moderate attitude, Chang Chih-chung issued a statement declaring that, while Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic government, the pattern of the government should be based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen rather than on Soviet ideas.

175 563 578 [635] The pressure on Chang Chih-chung from both sides became so intense that in May, 1947, he resigned and was succeeded by a Uighur, Maksud(Masud) Sabri. Maksud's appointment accentuated the clash of interest between rival factions in Sinkiang. The Uighur people generally supported him since he was one of them although he had spent many years of his life abroad. However, some of the more articulate popular groups denounced him vociferously and a majority of the members in the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing his nomination. In July, shortly after confirmation of his appointment, the Kulja delegation, headed by vice-chairman Akmejan Kasimi, withdrew. However, in a statement from Kulja (released in November) they denied that they had any intention of seceding from China and declared that they would return if their demands, including the removal of Maksud, were met. Since to dismiss Maksud so soon after his appointment in order to please the Kazakhs, would alienate the Uighurs, the National Government procrastinated and a deadlock resulted.

175 578 648 Meanwhile the Kulja faction itself was split by dissensions. Osman Batur defected. He and his men were incorporated into the Nationalist Army and stationed at Pei-ta-shan (Baitik Bogdo) close to the border of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, claiming this region as its own, invaded in 1948 and penetrated a hundred miles into Chinese territory until they were checked by Osman Batur who was acclaimed as a hero throughout China. The dispute finally reached the United Nations without a satisfactory settlement.

175 578 669 668 [635] By December, 1948, matters in Sinkiang had reached such an impasse that Maksud Sabri was removed and the governorship of Sinkiang was given to Burkhan Shahidi, another Uighur, who was vice-chairman of the provincial government and a middle-of-the-roader. During the first part of 1949 the Communist advance in China itself turned the attention of the National Government away from Sinkiang. In September, Saifuddin Azizi, a leader of the Kulja coalition, went to the Communist capital as a delegate to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and he brought word of the submission of the Ili faction to the Chinese Communists. Chang Chih-chung, whom the National Government sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists, also surrended and exerted his influence to persuade the officials in Sinkiang to join the Communist bandwagon. By the end of September, when Communist troops under Wang Chen pushed through the Kansu Corridor, the governor of Sinkiang, Burkhan, and the military commander, T'ao Chih-yueh, in separate telegrams, offered their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Government. A few days later, Communist troops reached and occupied Urumchi.

S N 316 [648] Sinkiang. The discovery of uranium and some other fissionable materials has been reported there. While rumors that Sinkiang is being built up into an ataomic arsenal for Russia remain to be confirmed, nevertheless it seems to be of particular strategic importance in the building up of a joint Sino-Soviet Inner Asian fortress.

S N 315 [648] Under a previous Sin-Soviet agreement concluded in 1937, the U.S.S.R. carried out prospecting and drilling in regard to petroleum exploitation. Fields were discovered in several localities, and a refinery was built at the Wu-su field, which, completed in 1940, had a daily capacity of a thousand barrels. This refinery was closed, however, in 1943. The largest field discovered to date, some forty miles in length, is located at An-chi-hai. No estimate of reserves is available at present, but on the basis of known fields and producing wells, Sinkiang has China's most extensive and abundant reserves, far outstripping those of Shensi, Kansu and Szechwan. Moreover, the oil from Sinkiang bores is reportedly of better quality than that found in other provinces in the Northwest.

S 315 316 648 Before the Sino-Soviet Agreement of Moscow on March 27, 1950, the mineral exploitation of Sinkiang was carried out sporadically and on a very small scale, with inefficient local mining methods predominating. Under the terms of the 1950 Moscow Agreements, a joint Sino-Russian petroleum company was formed with Russian-supplied technicians and equipment to undertake prospecting, surveying, working, and refining or petroleum and gas. Two other similar corporations were also organized to explore and exploit the non-ferrous and rare metals. By agreement the products of the corporation were to be divided equally between China and the U.S.S.R., as well as running expenses and profits. Leadership of the corporations was to be assumed by representatives of the two contracting parties in rotation for periods of three years and the corporations were to be staffed by an equal number of citizens from each of the two countries. The agreements were supposed to be valid for thirty years. (China Weekly Review, July 1, 1950, p. 82). It has been reported that all three Sino-Soviet joint corporations have been transferred to Chinese ownership, although with Russian advisers, since the beginning of 1955. At the same time, the Peking Government, together with Sinkiang authorities, sent out three large survey teams to search for new mineral deposits.

N 135 Northwest China has a great variety of minerals, only a few of which have been even partially developed. In addition to the rich oil fields of both Kansu, Sinkiang, and possibly Shensi, and the abundant coal deposits of these three provinces, other recently discovered minerals are as follows: rich copper deposits

N 315 new oil plants at Tu-shan-tzu in Sinkiang. Undoubtedly, the
S exploitation of the Yü-men oil field of Kansu has been consid-
[315] erably increased in the last two years. At a conference on pet-
N roleum research, called in May, 1954, by the Ministry of
315 Fuel, Popoff, a Russian professor, laid great emphasis on the
648 development of Yü-men oil fields, where Russians have been
177 working side by side with German, Czech, and Rumanian oil
experts (KM Oct. 1, 1954). Towards the end of 1953 the Russian
Atlas (sic!) was experimenting there on an improved method
of oil exploitation which was to be introduced in 1954 (PD
Feb. 9, and June 23, 1954).

N Special emphasis on oil prospecting and drilling are given
315 by the Communist Government. Throughout the nation, geological
654 surveying and prospecting plans since 1953 have been the most
inttensive in China's history. Total Government investment
in surveying in the Northwest in 1953 was nearly seven times
more than the previous year. Twice as many oil wells were
planned to be sunk in 1953 as compared to 1952, while work
on other mineral reserves topped previous years' quota by
thirty-three percent.

The bureau in charge of prospecting and surveying mineral reserves in the Northwest trained nearly 2,000 workers in drilling, surveying, drawing, and analysis in 1953. (Geological Report, China Monthly Review, May, 1953).

N The first drilling for oil was made some sixty years ago
315 at Yen-chang in northern Shensi province. During the Anti-
Japanese war, China spent large sums to equip the China
National Petroleum Corporation's field at Yü-men in Kansu.
At present, the major production is at Shih-you-ho near
Yü-men in the most northwestern part of Kansu at the foot of
N the Nan-shan. There the possible oil-bearing formations ex-
[133] tend 700 miles, with a width of some tens of miles. Seepages
are known in four localities, but only a few anticlines have
N been developed. Drilling started in 1939, and the yield amounts
[433] to several thousand barrels a day. The oil has a fifteen percent
S paraffin base. Prospects in Sinkiang appear even more pro-
mising, with oil on both sides of the Tien-shan Mountain Range.
315 Drilling at Wu-su, west of Urumchi and in the northern foot-
[648] hills of Tien-shan began in 1935, under Soviet direction. Its
[433] current yield is only a few hundred barrels a day. However, some
new fields have been discovered and new wells drilled in other
parts of the province.

N Recently, both oil-extracting and refining industries have
315 been growing rapidly. Refining facilities in northwest China
S with its five oil regions distributed in north Shensi, West
[315] Kansu, central Kansu, and Ho-hsi corridor and Sinkiang have
been substantially extended. Petroleum development is one of

315 petroleum resources are between the last two stations extending in a north-south direction with a length of forty miles; the petroleum is yellow and easy to refine. The oil from Sinkiang is reportedly of better quality than that found in other provinces in the Northwest of China. One of the main centers of petroleum exploitation is at Tu-shan-tzu, five miles south east of Wu-su, on the Western Highway of Urumchi; there exist wells over 2,275 meters in depth.

The intermittent Tertiary oil sands are said to lie between
[133] a light green shale above, and the sandstone below. No record
of the drilled stratographic sections is available. The Sinkiang
[648] provincial authorities employed two Russian drilling experts,
and in 1935 they began to test the field with modern drilling
rigs. Some time later the Russians took over the project and
after 1939 increased their efforts to develop a producing field
safe from enemy action. In 1942, only three or four of the
seventeen known wells drilled were producing, and only one was
flowing, the others being pubped. Yield was said to be ten to
[433] thirty tons per well per day. Other wells were being drilled,
but it is not known how many were completed. In 1943 there
[648] was some disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese Gov-
ernments and the Russians left the field. In August, 1944, an
[433] American oil man visited the field and reported that the Chin-
ese had uncapped six producing wells and were producing about
fifty tons of crude oil a day. The wet gas was wasted as there
was no equipment for saving it. The oil is thought to have a
paraffin base, similar to that of Kansu. Sample distillation
gives nineteen percent gasoline, twenty-three percent kerosene,
and the remainder, black oil and residue.

At Tu-shan-tzu in Wu-su, there are more than thirty oil wells being drilled. There is a fairly good refinery which makes it the best oil-producing center of Sinkiang. In addition to gasoline and kerosene, it produces lubricating oil for airplanes.

At Taklak small oil wells are drilled by the natives along the Kun Alik Range to the south east of Taklak in Wen-su, northwest of Aksu. The natives work on a small scale during the Spring, Summer, and Autumn. At Hung-kou and An-chiu, southeast of Wu-chia, oil wells were drilled in the late 1940's, but no oil is produced in Hung-kou, although the natives extract some paraffin wax from the oil sands. However, oil is obtained from the well in An-chiu, but the output was only two to three gallons a day in 1949-50. (See Table III.)[1]

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654 Oil prospecting teams were sent to Sinkiang by the Northwest Geology Bureau under the Ministry of Geology in early 1955. They went to the Turfan and Dzungaria Basins (as well as Tsaidam of Chinghai province) to locate oil bearing structures,

[1] [See p. 129--Analyst]

S 316 worked at Kitai (Ku-cheng), Sui-lai, Kucha and Aksu. Table IV shows the general distribution of coal reserves and their production.

c. Reported Fissionable Materials

It has been reported that fissionable materials such as S uranium and thorium are produced in Sinkiang province. [648] It is even rumored that the province is being built up into an atomic arsenal for Soviet Russia and Communist China, although no definite information is available. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, for present means of communication and transportation are below the minimum that would be required for running the complicated machinery necessary for atomic plants. Nevertheless it is pointed out that "... in the city of Arason (A-shan), Ili county, an abundant amount of wolfram and uranium is mined. In Conca (Ku-ch'eng), Urumchi country, uranium is mined. It is reported that in a concealed mine at Ulugcat city on the Russian border of Kasgar (Kashgar), thousands of persons were occupied with mining. Copper, gold, and oil were obtained from the Ulugchat area, and the concealed mining activities show that there are also mined some strategic minerals. (Bughra, Mehmet Emin: Doghu Turkestan, pp. 84-85).

N 377 d. Hydroelectric Power:

Except for the thermoelectric plants of Sian, Lanchow, and Urumchi, no hydroelectric power is known to be in existence in the four provinces of Northwest China. It was reported the S Urumchi power plant can produce forty percent more electricity [377] than the sum total produced in Sinkiang province prior to the recommission of the plant in December, 1953. While this, on the one hand, indicates the inensified production of electricity production in the provincial capitals, like Urumchi, it shows on the other the limited development of electric power plants S in the region of the whole Northwest. A power generator was [377] recently installed in Urumchi, and another at Ulapo in the province of Sinkiang. (KM Sept. 15, 1955). However, a gigantic scheme of water power development is planned along the mid-Yellow River course.

N 377 653 According to Li Jui, a member of the Yellow River planning commission, a plan to tame and exploit the Yellow River, by building forty-six dams from the Lung-yang gorge above Kuei-teh in eastern Chinghai and San-men (in west Honan) gorge below Tung-kuan of eastern Shensi for hydroelectric development and irrigation, was passed by the National People's Congress on July 30, 1955. (Li Jui: China's Sorrow will be no more - the Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, People's China, August 6, 1955, pp. 9-15). The actual work of the plan to harness the Yellow River was started in 1954. The plans call for two large hydro-power stations to be built, one at Liu-chia

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N civilization. The former provinces of Ninghsia, Chinghai,
*175 and Sinkiang are China's frontier dependencies. While Ninghsia
635 was part of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang is the homeland of
S 175 the Turkic peoples, Chinghai forms a transitional area between
635 the Tibetans and Mongols on the southwest and northeast
as well as between the Chinese and Uighurs in the southeast and northwest repsectively. Although these borderlands were first brought under China's political control during the Han Dynasty at the beginning of the Christian Era, their political ties to China were not consolidated until recently.

S In order to check Tzarist Russia's aggression towards
175 Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) after her occupation of the Ili
• 648 valley, China sent an expedition under General Tso
635 Tsung-t'ang in 1871 to reconquer the region and to make it a province
under the name of Sinkiang (literally "New Dominion") in 1881.

N In view of Russia's continued southward encroachment from
*175 Siberia upon Outer Mongolia and Britain's from India northward
648 to Tibet during the Chinese Revolution at the end of the Manchu
635 Dynasty in 1910-1912, China carved Ninghsia out of Inner Mongolia
and Chinghai out of greater Tibet, thereby creating two special districts with Yin-chuan and Hsi-ning as their centers under the provincial administration of Kansu in 1913. By 1928, they were made into two separate provinces. However, quite unexpectedly, following the formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy, the province of Ninghsia was abolished and has been added to Kansu province in 1955. (In May 1956 the Alashan and Edsingol regions have been detached from Kansu province and incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.
S Precise boundary demarcations are not yet known.) Although
N the political control over these frontier dependencies of
635 Sinkiang, Chinhai, and Ninghsia has been strengthened gradually
162 by the subsequent changes of their administrative status in
relation to China, they still remain as "pale" areas in the distribution of Chinese population and culture. That is, the inhabitants of these borderlands are essentially ethnic minority peoples such as Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, Monguors, Khirgiz, Kazakhs, etc. They are non-han Chinese peoples with an increasing touch of Chinese cultural influence and an increasing number of Chinese elements among the various native groups.

S The annexation of these frontier territories to China has
N brought about an artificial connection between the Chinese and
635 the non-Han Chinese minority peoples, both nomads and settlers.
186 Until now, the natives do not seem to have been influenced
[563] much by administrative unity. Not much sympathy is exchanged
between the Chinese and Lamaist Tibetan or Mongol; even less

S N 635 186 between the Moslems and the Lamaists.

As a result of the aforesaid complexity of its geographic basis as well as its intricate historical and political background, the Northwest's population problems are as complicated as its intermingling ethnic composition. S 635 648 For many years , the extreme northwestern province of Sinkiang suffered from continual conflict between China and Russia, although with the introduction of the Communist regime, the conflict seems at least temporarily resolved.

N 47 361 178 The development of industrialization in present day China is concentrated in the Northwest. New towns have been emerging in barren mountains and in deserts, such as Shih-yu-ho (near Yü-men), Tu-shan-tzu, (south of Wu-su) and Shih-ho-tzu on the western highway of Urumchi between the towns of Manas (Sui-lai) and Ulan-Wusu. The first two sprang up because of the drilling of promising oil wells in the Chi-lien and Tien-shan mountains.

N 647 816 The China Academy of Sciences announced in December, 1955, that in 1956 a number of new research divisions will be established in the Northwest: a Petroleum Research Bureau in Lanchow of Kansu, an Agro-biology Bureau in Wu-kung, Shensi, an Archaeological Research Bureau in Sian, a Geo-physical Research Bureau and a Veterinary Research Bureau. (Jen-min jih-pao Dec. 16, 1955, NCNA. May 11, 1956).

N 816 185 435 [648] Last November, the Northwest Branch of the China Academy of Sciences held a meeting at which, with the assistance of the Russian Korshekov an ambitious plan was formulated for the economic development of the Northwest in the coming fifteen years, with emphasis on survey of natural resources, study of petroleum and rare metals, exploitation of non-ferrous metals, agronomy, soil science and animal husbandry. N [873] In these discussions, the professors of three schools of higher education, the Northwest University, the Northwest Industrial College, and the Northwest Agricultural College, took an active part. (Kuang-ming jih-pao Dec. 13, 1955; NCNA. May 11, 1956).

N 161 B. General Distribution and Regional Characteristics.

The Northwest Region has an average density of 28.6 persons per square mile, as compared with the average density of 160 per square miles for the whole country. It has the smallest number in population among all the major regions of China, as the following shows:

Major Regions	Population (1953 Census)
North China	55,749,000
Northeast China	41,732,000
East China	162,682,000
Central and South China	176,331,000

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B. Population Problems

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1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

Of the many problems in regard to the population of Northwest China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems and the Chinese, together with its international complications, is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia - both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the 1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley, sest of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial, political and economic demands in the provinces, i.e., free trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

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Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and China. (See Foreign Relations).

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2. The Uighur Autonomy

Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

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A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction program and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands, are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border areas. (See: Labor).

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"Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang, the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955). Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955, seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

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631 political and military reasons. After the last British Consulate
131 of Kashgar was closed, the curtain has become even more
668 impenetrable there than in any other part of China. Not even
172 Chinese are allowed to travel into Sinkiang without special
[648] permits.

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F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation

The Northwest Region has been long regarded by the Chinese as one of the major outlet areas for China's overpopulation. Once the plans to conserve water and soil are completed - especially along the Yellow River in Shensi and Kansu - arable land will be considerably extended. But water and soil conservancy will involve a lot of problems before the land is actually made productive - not to mention that its sustaining capacity is limited. Therefore the Northwest as an outlet for China's overpopulation is tentative and should only be regarded as a partial and temporary solution.

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1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy

According to plan the irrigated area in the mid-Yellow River Basin will grow from 12,717,000 acres at present to some 19,105,000 acres. Agricultural output in the irrigated area will more than double. Annual grain output will increase by 6,741,000 long tons and cotton by 590,000 long gons. The loess regions with their barren mountains and desolate gullies covering 143,000 square miles, will become a land of plenty. Most of the land for irrigation development under the project will be in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. ("China's Sorrow" Will Be No More - The Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, by Li Jui, People's China, August 6, 1955, p. 9-15).

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311 The area of arable land in Sinkiang has also been extended,
185 but it is not easy to ascertain by how much or by what means. In 1953 it had reached twenty million mou, 4,100,000 more than in 1949 (PD. August 28, 1955); in 1954 more than 5,000,000 mou above 1949, i.e. a total of 21 million mou (KM. September 15, 1955; by 1955 22 million mou (PD. October 31, 1955).

According to the above figures, the increase between 1949 and 1955 would be six million mou. But there appear some discrepancies with other information The difficulty is that the 1950 data for the extension of arable land in Sinkiang was not 16 million but 18.195 million mou (Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, p. 25, 1950). Thus if the present data are reliable, the 1949-55 increase would be three million mou instead of six million, of which 1,100,000 mou are due to the labor of the Army Agrarian Production Troops.

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433 According to official reports, in 1953, 1.6 million tons of food stuffs were produced in Sinkiang (PD. August 28, 1955). About the production in 1954, it is known that there was an

433 increase of 11.5 percent in the combined areas of Inner Mongolian, Sinkiang, and T'ung Autonomous Area in Kweichow. (KM. October 4, 1955). Supposing the increase in Sinkiang was ten percent which owing to the heavy natural disasters in 1954 is probably too high an estimate, it would mean 1.76 million tons of food stuffs in 1954, i.e. about 430 catties per head. In this context, a report which claimed that food production is 747 catty per head was published (KM. September 15, 1955).

311 312 185 Soil conservation is just as important as water conservation in land reclamation in arid and semi-arid areas. Human survival in Sinkiang for over 2,000 years has been involved in a continual fight against the aridity of the climate and the central Asiatic agricultural alkali, salt-saturated soil. Every year's floods convert even hitherto fertile lands into alkali, sterile soil. There are "Kariz" wells which are connected by underground canals, reaching a total length of 2,500 km. between Hami and Turfan only. This is evidently a means of combating the impermeability of the soil, which makes surface irrigation harmful.

503 653 According to 1954 Government Reports, 50,000 long or short canals with a total length of 30,000 km. have been repaired by the Army and by the people. (PD. August 28, 1955). In an October 1955 report: 1,600 canals are under repair and also 1,500 wells have been added (PD. October 21, 1955).

311 312 185 Large scale irrigation and water conservancy work are at present in the state of planning only: survey works are going on at the Manas and Urumchi Rivers and at the Turfan Basin for the future building of larger irrigation works and hydraulic power stations. (PD. October 31, 1955). But to fight against alkali soil will remain a continuous problem in land reclamation in Sinkiang as well as elsewhere in the arid and semi-arid Northwest of China. It was reported in 1955 that 300,000 mou of alkali land were reclaimed around Chigalik Lake in the northeast Hami area, and southwest Aksu. Rice has been planted in the former too, and cotton in the latter area. How long will the newly reclaimed land reclaim productive under the ever-increasing accumulation of alkali in the soil is still a problem which remains to be solved.

2. Soldier Colonization

433 648 167 466 Although no data concerning the exact number of Chinese soldiers in Sinkiang are available, the figures must be enormous - judged by the gigantic work undertaken by Chinese soldiers under the name of "Production and Construction Troops of the Sinkiang Military Area." One million one hundred thousand mou (166,000 acres) of the three million mou extended arable land during the period 1949-55 are due to the labor of the Army

433 Agrarian Production Troops. More than 40,000 mou are
• 648 using machines bought from Soviet Russia. The Army Agrarian
167 Production Troops themselves produced 31,000 tons of winter
466 wheat crop on 440,000 mou (124 catty per mou) in the spring
of 1955. They are expected to produce 23,500 tons of cotton on 150,000 mou (310 catty per mou) in the same year. (PD. October 9, 1955). Eighty thousand out of the 150,000 mou cotton are at the Manas River (PD. June 29, and October 1, 1955). Forty-five percent of the total agricultural work of the Army troops is now being done by machines. (Report of Tao Shih-yueh, Cf. CNA. No. 103, p. 2 or PD. September 27, 1955). In 1954 the total cotton cultivating area in Sinkiang was 800,000 mou. In 1955 it was supposed to be increased to 1,160,000 mou (PD. March 9, 1955).

The working troops of the Army are also developing virgin soil with the help of 184 tractors. The development of 600,000 mou south of Tien-shan chain of mountains was planned for 1955. It was reported in May and June 1955 that the troops had already broken up 20,000 mou of virgin land. Around Urumchi, one tractor works ten mou in an hour.

The Army is also taking part in the industrial development of Sinkiang and since 1950 has been constructing a textile mill, and iron and steel plant, a cement works, a power generator factory and coal mines. (PD. April 4, 1952; KM March 3, 1954; PD March 13, October 30, 1954 and July 14, 1955: KM September 16, 1955; and PD September 27, 1955).

"It would seem strange that the regular Army should engage in all these works. The production and construction troops which undertake the most arduous labor in inhuman, primitive conditions, undoubtedly consist of that multitude condemned to corrective labor in the border areas, of whom the Ministry of Public Security spoke of as people who will never come back from the border areas." (Cf. CNA Nos. 53 and 56.)

167 In addition to the exile of corrective laborers, a great number
466 of youngsters, boys and girls (apart from thousands of Party
cadres and several hundred thousands of soldiers) even from
177 Junior Middle Schools are also being transferred to Sinkiang. In
one single group 540 such youngsters traveled from Nanking (PD. August 26, 1955). The idea probably is that these youngsters going at an early age to Sinkiang will be more easily acclimatized.

3. A Resume of Possibilities and Their Limitations.

433 It has been estimated that the planned annual increase of 6.2
million long tons of grain can at most support another two million people at the present low standard of living of an average Chinese peasant. At least three million mou of irrigated land have been added in Sinkiang from 1949-55. It is said that in Sinkiang 110,000,000 mou could be added to the present 22,000,000.

563 2. Physical characteristics
142 Racially they are described as Europoids of the Dinaric sub-
[144] division. They have long, small faces with prominent and convex
noses, and their skulls in most cases show occipital bulges.
Their bodies are slender. Their hair is brown or black, but, in
a few cases, also blonde. Their eyes are usually brown, but not
as dark as the eyes of the neighbouring Kirghiz.

3. History and economic activities

563 The Tajiks have lived in this area for over two thousand years.
Their predecessors were the Iranian people who spoke the Saka
language. Between the Tajiks and the Turks an excellent relation-
[186] ship prevails, but there is an old animosity between the Tajiks and
the Chinese.

[241] Due partly to their skilled irrigation system, the Tajiks cultivate oats, vegetables and barley with great success.

B. The Russians

The Russians living in Sinkiang can be divided into three groups.
The first group consists of those merchants who maintained trade
with the cities of Sinkiang for more than a hundred years and who
usually lived in Chuguchak, Kuldja, Kashgar and Urumchi. The
[167] second group consists of refugees who fled Russia after 1918 and
became technical laborers, chauffeurs, electricians, miners, road
constructors and so on. The third group consists of those Russians
563 whom the Soviets sent to Sinkiang for political reasons. They main-
648 tained Soviet Consulates in all the major cities of Sinkiang and had
a very numerous staff. Soviet propaganda had a remarkable influence between 1920 and 1949. According to recent reports of Turkish refugees, the Russians still have military detachments in
Sinkiang.

563 538 177 668 [214] produced in Peking. A report from Peking on January 3, 1955, states that "some 200 books in more than 1.64 million copies were put out in 1954 in Peking in the languages of the minority peoples. They were published by the Nationality Publishing House for use among the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh and Korean peoples. These books include works on revolutionary theory, novels, and translations of Soviet literature. This total does not include books published by the many printing houses of the various minority areas." (Peking, NCNA, January 5, 1955, 1607 GMT-W.)

175 532 D. Artistic Expression

The period prior to the introduction of Islam produced the great works of art in Eastern Turkestan. The Shamanistic, Buddhist and Nestorian civilizations which were dominant in Eastern Turkestan in this period encouraged the religious expression through the mediums of painting and sculpture.

175 532 172 Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, European scholars went to Eastern Turkestan to explore the ruined cities which had long been buried under the sands, and which contained many of the pre-Islamic artistic treasures. It is through the efforts of these scholars that we have most of our present information on the subject. Among the best known of these explorers, who carried out extensive expeditions in Sinkiang, were Sir Aurel Stein, Professor Albert Grünwedel and Albert von le Coq of the National Ethnological Museum in Berlin and Paul Pelliot.

[648] Although the Chinese Government was quite tolerant at first and allowed these archaeological works and expeditions to take place, it later became concerned with the fact that so many cases full of artistic treasures were being shipped out of the country. From then on, the Chinese Government tried to put as many official difficulties in the way of these explorers as they could, and discouraged further efforts in this direction.

532 172 The important artistic discoveries were made at the following sites: near Khotan, the past capital of an ancient kingdom, at the oasis of Dandan Oilik, and at Rawak where a Buddhist shrine was found, and also in the twin oases of Turfan and Karakhoja, which proved to be extremely rich in artistic remains.

Most of the remaining structures which were fully or partially preserved are of an obviously religious character. They are usually shrines, temples, burial monuments, or various parts of monastic establishments. Most of them are products of Buddhist religious expression. Some buildings display the remains of Nestorian Christian and Manichaean murals. Manuscripts were discovered in these sites which confirmed the [538] simultaneous existence of these religions in the area for several centuries.

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795 civil marriage, marriage and divorce ceased to be an important
798 function administered by the qadi.
668 Thousands of religious scholars and intellectuals, denounced
177 as counter-revolutionaries, were arrested. The people's courts
tried some thirty thousand Moslems, sentencing some to death
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[648] and others to life imprisonment. Soviet forces were reported to
have joined the Chinese Communist troops in suppressing the
[669] anti-Communist uprisings, in which it is estimated that 130,000
Moslems were slaughtered, 260,000 sentenced to forced labor
and 150,000 fled from Sinkiang. [Figures based on Hikmah (Indonesian weekly), July 23, 1955, in Missionary Bulletin, January 1954, and report of Mochtar Gazali, member of the Executive Council of the Federation of Indonesian Moslem Labor, in Missionary Bulletin, July 1958.]

But the persecutions have failed to wipe out opposition from large segments of the Moslem population. As late as the spring of 1956, it was still charged that "counter-revolutionaries" were hiding in religious circles and "under the cloak of religion they carried out various kinds of destructive activities." (Report of Su Chen-yung, vice director of the Bureau of Public Security, Kansu People's Government, in Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956.)

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795 B. Lamaism
792 As was the case with Islam, the present regime has also
*668 tried to placate Lamaism as a device to attract the loyalties of
177 the Lamaistic peoples, the Mongols and the Tibetans. Famous
Lama temples were kept in a good state of repair, Lamaist priests and dignitaries received subvention and a certain restraint was shown toward interfering with strictly religious practices (for details see IMAR Handbook, Religion). More particularly, the two highest priests of Tibetan Lamaism, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, both 'teen-agers, by the way, were kept at Peking for long periods of time and shown around at international gatherings.

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795 Attitudes toward Lamaism as a religion and an institution
792 differ somewhat in the Mongolian and the Tibetan contexts. Gen-
*563 erally speaking, it can be said that among the Mongols the in-
*668 fluence of Lamaism was on the wane. Even among those Mon-
177 gols who stuck to their traditions and maintained loyalty to their
princes, there was a tendency to break loose gradually from the leading-strings of the Lamaseries. Already in pre-Communist times, progressive Mongols supported this movement. The Regent of the Alashan Mongols, for instance, had made it a rule to submit Lama novices to compulsory secular education and military training in order to educate them out of Lamaism. No reports are available on how Mongolian Lamas have reacted to

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Forced labor in the strict sense, or "corrective" labor, has however also been amply used. Conscript labor solved several of the problems connected with the labor situation in the Northwest. "Free" or induced labor had to be given certain incentives, such as higher wages and better living conditions in order to overcome non-economic barriers to labor mibility, such as language barriers, differences of customs and living standards, differences of climate, etc. For skilled and semi-skilled labor these incentives might prove a worthwhile investment; for unskilled labor, however, a cheaper labor supply was desirable. Conscript labor would also overcome the problem of labor discipline, which is prone to be particularly serious among laborers working far from home. Specifically conscript labor could be employed at a level of subsistence far below the minimum to be paid to a recruited or induced labor force; it could be employed in dangerous work without the necessity of using costly safeguards against accidents; and it had the advantage of perfect mobility and could be moved around without regard to family and other social ties. In the following, some reports, mostly collected in summer 1955 among Turkestani refugees are given to throw some light on the extent of conscript labor used in the Northwest.

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From a refugee in a colony in Yugoslavia, called Yengi Khotan "New Khotan":

In 1950 at an open People's court session in Cherchen, former Kuomintang officials, influential merchants and landowners were tried, sentenced and dispossessed of their property. They were transported to Charklik (Chin.: Cho-chiang) from where they proceeded in a southeastern direction where a new auto highway was being constructed. The prisoners were formed into working units which were led by Soviet soldiers of the Seventh Regiment. Halim estimates that at least six to ten thousand prisoners were working between Charklik and Timurlik. Each three hundred men was headed by a Russian corporal or sergeant. He said that the real masters of the area were the Russians, and he repeatedly emphasized that the latter treated even the Chinese Communist officials with no respect. Furthermore, he saw several mining projects in this area, especially gold mines. When he was transferred to the area of Tash-Kurghan (Turk.: Stone tomb) in 1953, he managed to flee to the Wakhan area of Afghanistan.

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Reports, published in Turk-i-stan, Arabian edition, March 1955, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, give a limited account of the railway construction between Turfan and Hami. It states that since May, 1953, about 80,000 prisoners have worked there. The main body of prisoners consisted of Chinese, but there were also thousands of New-Uighurs, Kazakhs, Mongols and

464 Tibetans. The prisoners were organized in military fashion,
466 i.e., squads, platoons, companies, battalions and regiments,
697 led by Chinese of the so-called Transport Army Corps. The
499 prisoners had to work twelve hours a day. They were
668 rigidly guarded by means of machine gun towers. Due to
177 undernourishment, overwork and rough weather conditions
the death ratio was about thirty to fifty men a day. The
equipment was of Russian origin and handled by Russian
"specialists."

According to the same source about 180,000 were employed
in levelling the terrain and building the embankment for
the railway tracks on the route between Kulja-Wusu-Urumchi
and Turfan. The prisoners were mainly Chinese but heavily
intermingled with minority groups, either condemned in-
surgents, court-martialled soldiers or people who were
tried by People's Courts for being "kulaks," saboteurs,
"capitalistic spies" or former independent tribal leaders.
Entire Tibetan tribes of the Sinkiang-Tibetan border area,
who repeatedly revolted between 1950 and 1953 were finally
captured and brought to the Bogda-Ula (mountain range with
elevation up to 17,000 feet) where the passes and tunnels for
a railway were constructed. The Communists first used
Chinese prisoners but the death rate was extremely high
because the Chinese, who were sent mainly from China
proper, could not become accustomed to the rough climate
of the T'ien-shan mountain range. The construction took
[648] place under the supervision of the 18th cavalry regiment of the
9th Soviet Cavalry division. Technicians and "specialists"
are mainly Soviets. Administrators are Chinese Communists.
At the same time Chinese military units are trained by Russians
in regard to embankment constructions.

In the coal and petroleum area of Wusu, Urumchi and Kurla about 35,000 prisoners worked, reinforced by Soviet and Chinese engineers and technicians. Dozens of mountain roads were built by pioneer units of the People's Transport Army Corps which do all the dynamiting and bridge building, while prisoners do routine work.

464 Two Turkic refugees, now living in Germany, reported that
466 they were working for an irrigation building co-op in Mazartagh
697 on the Khotan River. Those co-ops usually receive fifty to a
668 hundred prisoners as handymen, who are guarded by a few
177 Chinese soldiers, who are stationed at the co-op.

464 Another Turkic refugee who was sentenced to ten years
466 (1950) for underpaying his employees in his fur trade enterprise
315 was sent to the oil field near Yü-men in Kansu. His sentence
697 was reduced to two years when he saved a bulldozer at the risk
668 of his life when an oil shaft blew up. He said about 18,000
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466 prisoners work on the oil fields. When he returned to his home town
315 Keriya in 1953 he had to go through Soviet control posts at the
297 Sinkiang-Kansu border towns of Hsinhsingsia and Kushui.
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197 After his flight, the former Aksakal of Kizilbulak (northeast
[648] of Aksu) Abdul Azizi Hajji wrote an article in the Turkish
newspaper Ulus, July 15, 1955, relating how all cities along
the line Kashgar, Aksu, Karashahr, Urumchi, Turfan, Hami,
Kulja, Ili, Chuguchak, including the Tarbagatai region, are
occupied by at least four Soviet dividions, two of which
definitely have been identified as tank dividions, equipped
with T34 models.

466 A copy of the well-informed newspaper Al-Mizir (Cairo)
464 of May 19, 1955, says that the total number of prisoners who
697 are used as forced labor amounts to 380,000 in Sinkiang
alone.

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 Suppression of external expression of nationalism appears to be an acceptance of the present regime, but it certainly is not to be regarded as constituting the fulfillment of the national dreams of the Turkic people in Sinkiang. The great number of Eastern [167] Turki refugees from Sinkiang testify to the fact that they consider the new regime as much more oppressive than the former Nationalist administration. During the former Chinese Imperial and Republican rule of Sinkiang, no similar mass flight of Turks occurred. The number of refugees alone indicates deep discontent.

563 C. The Traditional Animosity between the Turks and Chinese

578 669 186 The animosity of the Turks to the Chinese is one of the traditional attitudes which became evident in the many Moslem rebellions against the Chinese administration in Sinkiang. The Turks regard the Chinese not only as their oppressors (Turk: gaddar) but also as infidels (Turk: kafir), who have not received the true knowledge about God. While being politically and militarily stronger and superior to the Turks, the Chinese are regarded as inferior by the Turks in culture and faith. Loyalty to the Chinese regime is not strong and is maintained by force and political pressure. We have seen the Moslem reaction to Chinese rule in the past - during the 1860's and the 1930's when large-scale rebellions took place against the existing regime. One may even take into consideration [648] the events that took place in Western Turkestan during World War II. Many of the Western Turkestanian battalions which constituted a part of the Red Army defected to the German Army. They later were organized into special units and joined the fighting against Soviet Russia. At the present, the occurrence of such an event seems unlikely in Sinkiang, and there has been no indication of an organized large-scale rebellion, or any spirited attempts to oppose the existing regime. It is likely, however, that it would be extremely difficult to trust the Turks fully as Chinese patriots. They could not be used effectively as soldiers, since their true loyalty lies with Turkic nationalism in an Islamic framework.

121 D. The Conflict of Islamic and Communist Ideologies

779 Before considering Islam in relation to other ideologies it is necessary to remember that Islam is not to be regarded as a religion only, but also as a social and political philosophy, forming a set pattern for the religious, social and political living of all Moslems. Any political ideology which attempts to enter the domain os Islam has not only to cope with a religious doctrine, but to compete with the ideas of Islam in the realm of politics.

Another important basic conception to keep in mind is the division of the world in Islam into two domains, the first of which is constituted of the believers, who have submitted to Islam - Dar

121 779 al-Islam (The Realm of Islam), and the second constituted of those who have not received the word of Allah and Muhammed and fall in the non-believers category Dar al-Harb (The Realm of War). It is expressed duty for all Moslems to try and extend the domain of Islam (by means including the holy war), until it encompasses all of the domain of war. A new ideology would not be considered only as competing with Islamic ideology but also considered as being totally unacceptable, since it is a product of the domain of war. These basic concepts, which have often proved to be [668] barriers in the progress of Islamic civilization, also set strong obstacles in the way of the spread of Communist ideology, or its acceptance.

779 668 177 There are other barriers in the way of Communism which are set forth in the principles of the Koran and Sunnah forming the foundations of the Moslem religion. The first of these is the principle of the unity of God "There is no God but Allah." This article of faith has been the rallying point of all Moslems. Communism strongly rejects not only the concept of the unity of God, but the whole concept of God itself, leaving no place for such a supernatural entity. The second important principle of Islam is that of recognition of Muhammed as the Prophet of God (Turk: Peygamber al-Allah), the last and the greatest of God's messengers, which, of course, finds no equivalent in Communism. Nor does the third principle of the acceptance of the Koran as the revealed word of Allah transmitted by his prophet receive acknowledgement in Communist doctrine. Other principles of Islam, including life after death, divine justice with rewards for the righteous and punishment for the sinners, are strongly rejected by Communist ideology as having no valid basis. Communism does have its creeds and beliefs, but there is no correspondence between them and those of the Islamic religion (see section Religion).

While the ideologies of Communism and Islam could never be reconciled, the Communist practice has been that of allowing a place for some religion in its midst. Particularly interested in gaining the favors of the Moslem World, the Communist official policy toward the adherents of Islam both in China and in the Soviet Union has been one of tolerance. Eventually, however, if the Communists aspire to win the complete allegiance of their Moslem citizens, they will, by force or through indoctrination, have to substitute Communist principles for those of Islam. The two doctrines cover too much of the same ground, and because of their incompatibility could not possibly survive together.

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E. Attitude toward Foreigners

The foreigners in Sinkiang are not as varied an international crowd as those inhabiting the coastal cities of China. Because of

/Turks of Sinkiang/

648 the geographic location of Sinkiang, the lack of adequate transpor-
177 tation facilities, and recently because of the added political com-
plications, foreigners are limited to Chinese, Russians, Turkic
and Iranian peoples from Soviet Central Asia, Mongols, Afghans,
and Indians. Only a few Europeans (Türk: Frenkler) have visited
Sinkiang (with the exception of Russians in recent times), and
even fewer of them have remained there for any length of time.
[799] A few European missionaries (most noted among them were the
Swedish missionaries in Kashgar), British consular officers,
Russian Communist diplomatic representatives and White Russian
emigrees constituted the foreign colony in Kashgar, prior to the
Communist regime. Today the missionaries and British consular
staff members are no longer in Sinkiang.

The attitude of the Turkiç people to the Western foreigners has, in general, been quite hospitable and friendly, since they did not constitute a sizable minority and had no apparent intentions which threatened the freedom and way of life of the inhabitants (with the exception of the Soviet Consulate members who engaged in espionage and intrigue in the province). People like C.P.Skrine (who served as the British consul in Kashgar) and Owen Lattimore, give the impression that the people, and particularly the nomadic ones, were hospitable and friendly and regarded the Europeans with a great deal of curiosity and interest. Misafirperverlik 'hospitality' is generously observed by all Turks, by nomadic Turks more so than by the sedentary.

The attitude toward the better-known neighbors is somewhat
different. The Chinese, who both do and do not fall under the
category of foreigners in Sinkiang, are regarded with great ani-
mosity, as mentioned above. The opposition of the native to both
the Chinese colonizers and the administration has been extremely
strong. The Russian Communists are not regarded with much
more love, since the Eastern Turkis feel deeply involved in the
fate of their Turkic brothers in Western Turkestan. The great
[167] waves of West Turkic refugees [mostly Kirghiz and Kazakh] to
East Turkestan in 1[illegible]7 and 1944 have kept the Eastern Turks
informed on the situation.

Friendly trade relations are usually the basis for the relation-
[439] ships with the Mongols, Indians and Afghans. Although they do
not mix quite freely with the Eastern Turks, they are in general
accepted and not regarded with animosity by the Turks.

181 F. The Concept of 'Individualism' (Turk: ferdiyetcilik)

The sedentary Turks of Sinkiang are in general highly independ-
ent and individualistic people. This individualism finds its expres-
sion in the daily ways and habits of the Turkic people. The
[626] pressure to conform to a set of ideas and a set pattern of behavior
is slight. The laxity in observance of the religious customs, in

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

N I. Historical Background

631 Political life in China's Northwest, a region which in area com-
prises one-third of China but with a population that comes to less
than six per cent of China's population, is complicated by the dis-
similitudes of the geographical components and diversity of its pop-
N ulation. Joined by the narrow neck of Kansu province, it is virtually
two widely divergent regions. Historically, the problem and basic
*[175] cause of conflict have been the attempts of the eastern or Chinese
*[563] end of the vast region to dominate the western or non-Chinese end,
[578] and the resistance and struggle for autonomy of the non-Chinese
peoples in the west against the domination of the Chinese in the east.

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635 East of the narrow passage of Kansu is Shensi and southern
Kansu, a region densely populated by Chinese, forming an integral
[162] part of China and subject to all the political vicissitudes of China.
This region was the base of strong dynasties in the past not only for
N the conquest of China but also for the extension of power to the west.
635 The Chinese Communists, who had a nucleus in this region since
*175 1931, considerably expanded their control since 1935 when they
*668 established their Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region with head-
quarters at Yenan. From 1935 to 1947 this region was the center
of the Communist revolution, and the laboratory of Communist ex-
periments in government and in the mobilization of the people.
After 1949, when the Communists moved their capital to Peiping,
the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region became one of their
many "old liberation areas," and their base for their domination
of the Northwest. The headquarters of the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council (later the Northwest Administrative Council)
as well as the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the
CCP were located at Sian.

S Westward, beyond the Kansu Corridor is Sinkiang, a huge
635 dominion which, in accessibility and in economic ties is more
closely oriented to Soviet Central Asia than to China. During the
• 648 past century, the province had been the amphitheater for a three-
way tug-o'war among China, Russia and Britain, and for a time
in the 1930's, this was further complicated by the machinations
of the Japanese. The conglomeration of the inhabitants of Chinese
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635 Turkestan, three-quarters of whom are Uighurs, a Moslem Turkic
563 people, are split along racial, regional, religious, cultural and
political lines and disunited by historical and traditional antipathy,
present wide differences of interests and aspiration. Even in their
opposition to Chinese domination and in their striving for self-
N rule, which they share in common, they rarely presented a united
* 563 front. The history of the Northwest is thus a prolix story of at-
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648 tempts of the Chinese to assert their political dominance and the

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attempts of the native peoples to throw off the Chinese yoke and to set up their own government, a story of intrigue and bloodshed, set against the backdrop of international rivalry.

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In the past thirty years, superimposed on the political and international complex of Sinkiang were the new ideas that have added fuel to the discords and discontent in Sinkiang. Generally, the more important of the new ideologies injected into the political life of Sinkiang were the following:

1. Policy of assimilation, generally denounced by its enemies as the Great Hanism (Ta-Han chu-i), in which the border peoples were regarded as descendants of an ancient Great Chinese race and should be reabsorbed into the Chinese race. This concept was pushed by the Kuomintang extremists.
2. Program of cultural diversity and cultural autonomy. This idea was pushed by men such as Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chang Chih-chung, as an alternative to the policy of compulsory assimilation.
3. Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism, promoted by the native people, especially by the Uighurs and their Kazakh allies, stressed the fact that the majority of people of Sinkiang speak Turkic language and belong to the Moslem faith. The exponents of this concept belong to many shades of political opinion, from the moderates such as Maksud Sabri, Burkhan Shahidi, and Mehmet Emin Bughra, to the more radical faction which included Akhmejan Kasimi, Saifuddin Azizi, and the members of the Kulja coalition.
4. Territorial and cultural autonomy under the principle of federalism based on ideas derived from the Soviet policy towards the minority nationalities. This policy was actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists and served to inflame the native peoples as well as to embarrass the Nationalist authorities.

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These divergent views, in substance, were the expressions of nationalism on the part of the Chinese and on the part of the native peoples of Chinese Turkestan, especially among the educated classes. As in many other parts of the Orient, the game of poli-

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tics was not a popular one. The people, downtrodden and persecuted, desired only to be left alone, and they rose in revolt only when tyranny and injustice became intolerable, and they would then follow the cue of their leaders in wholesale uprisings. In the wars of the Oirats against the Ch'ing government two hundred years ago, the leaders were the tribal chieftains; and in the rebellion of the Khojas and the Dungan rebellion in the last century, the leaders were religious prelates. But in republican times, there were few of the hereditary tribal princes or religious leaders taking a part. Instead, the leaders were drawn from the ranks of the bandits, officers in the Chinese army, or young intellectuals who had studied in China or abroad. On the part of the Chinese, the men in political life in the Northwest were either local civil and military officials, or officials sent out by the central government.

669 and Democracy and began to make overtures to the Chinese Com-
175 munists. In September, 1949, Akhmejan Kasimi was killed in a
631 plane crash en route to attend the Chinese People's Political Con-
635 sultative Conference convened by the Chinese Communists.
554 Saifuddin, who was already friendly to the Communists and who
may have been an undercover Communist agent, became the head
of the Sinkiang League, bringing it formally into the Communist
fold and using it to assist the Communist takeover of northern
Sinkiang.

Even with the submission of civil and military dignitaries of
175 both factions, the situation in Sinkiang was delicate, due to the
631 strong growth of Soviet Russian influence in the political vacuum
635 following the withdrawal of Nationalist power. Actual authority
648 rested in the hands of the Soviet consul-general at Urumchi, the
669 Soviet consul at Kulja, and the secretary-general of the Turkestan
branch of the Communist Party. The district of Ili was reported
to be wholly Russianized, and by April, 1949, according to Urumchi
police records, 6,200 natives changed their nationality to become
Soviet citizens. (Mehmet Emin Bughra, Doghr Turkestan, (Eastern Turkestan), pp. 83-4, and interview with Isa Yussuf Aliptakin, in NYT, March 23, 1951). The Chinese Communists were obliged to proceed with caution in their advance on and occupation of Sinkiang.

II. United Front Work, 1. Political Leaders and Factions

175 The fact that the provincial leaders of the Northwest peacefully
668 submitted to the Chinese Communists, bringing the areas under
669 their control along with them and thus sparing the Communists of
the effort and cost of a military campaign, posed for the Communist leaders acute problems of absorption and disposition of the local officials. As a reward for their defection to the Communist cause, even though it was, for some of them, at the eleventh hour, they had to be retained in office. However, it was also necessary to reward the Communist officials, who had been working in the underground, as well as the officers of the Communist army, and at the same time, it was necessary to establish control by the Communists over the local functionaries.

175 The Communists, long anticipating this problem, had a ready-
668 made solution. This was the United Front, when applied to every-
one in general, and the "democratic coalition" when applied to different factions working together for the Communist government.

"The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-a-vis the Northwest," stated Wang Chen (commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub bureau of the CCP), were "first, to establish people's provincial governments made up of democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nation-

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*175 Northwest Federation of Trade Unions: The chairman is Chia
*668 T'o-fu, a member of the Financial and Economic Commission in
[467] the Central People's Government and vice chairman of the Finan-
cial and Economic Commission in the Northwest Military and
554 Administrative Council. An influential figure is Chao Chan-hui,
director of the Department of Labor in the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council and a member of the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions.

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*175 Federation of Democratic Women: The dominating personality
in the Northwest is Chang Tzu-fang, onetime director of the feder-
*668 ation in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and after 1949
554 a member of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, she was a member of three commissions. Ma Wen-jui, chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and director of the Organizational Department of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, was also director of the Commission of Women's Work. Thus, intimately and inescapably entwined with Communist activities, the Northwest Federation of Democratic Women saw a tremendous expansion of its member-
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[175] ship. In Sinkiang, by the summer of 1951, it had branches in 47
of the 78 counties and in five of the ten administrative districts,
[668] and 190,000 women members took part in the propaganda campaign
to resist America and aid Korea.

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*175 Federation of Literary and Art Workers: By September, 1950,
7,000 literary and art workers in the Northwest were mobilized
*668 to take part in propaganda activities, and 30,000 writers and
[467] artists joined the Reformation Congress of Literary and Artistic
Workers in the Northwest to establish the United Front.

New Democratic Youth League (renamed the Communist Youth League in 1955): This is an auxiliary of the Communist Party the function of which was to mobilize the youth. In the Northwest it was guided by Lo I, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League and of the China Democratic Youth Federation, and a member of at least two commissions in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.
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An example of the expansion of the New Democratic Youth League
[175] in the Northwest may be seen in Sinkiang, where, by spring of 1953,
there were 1,015 branches with over 20,000 elite youth members.
[668] Half of the labor models in the Urumchi Saw Mill in 1952 were New
Democratic Youth League members, and it was reported that the New Democratic Youth League members "have become efficient assistants of the (Communist) Party in carrying out patriotic movements in factories and villages." (NCNA May 4, 1953).

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*175 Sino-Soviet Friendship Association: By the end of 1951, there
*668 were 1,314 branch associations and 417 sub-branch associations
648 in 157 of the 274 counties in the four Northwest provinces. Over

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N 60,000 of its total membership of 336,610 in the Northwest were
*175 from the city of Sian. Hsi Chung-hsün is president of the Sino-
*668 Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, and Chang Chih-chung,
648 Chia T'o-fu, Chang Chia-fu, and Burkhan are the vice-presidents.
S Since 1951, the membership of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
175 Association throughout China has vastly multiplied, as the
668 following figures show: three million in 1950, 17 million in 1951,
● 648 23 million in 1952, and 58 million at the end of January, 1953.
The membership of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, therefore, must have increased proportionately.

One of the strongest centers of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the Ili Administrative District, where, by fall of 1951, there were 36,814 members in 11 county branches (out of the 12 counties), and in 16 branches of the government. According to Te-li-ha-te, head of the Department of Organization of the Ili branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the people of Ili, Altai (Ashan) and Chughuchak (Tacheng) had cherished the friendship of the Soviet Union since their revolt of 1944-45, and as their political consciousness was higher than elsewhere in the Northwest, they took the lead in the founding of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in 1949.

One of the chief responsibilities of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the conduct of propaganda. Its propaganda objectives were not only to propagate the gospel of the advance technology in Soviet Russia and the "very great assistance received from the Soviet Cultural Associations for Foreign Countries," but also to combat popular opposition to Soviet Russia. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Sinkiang might have fared better if many of the people were not deterred from joining by a whispering campaign warning them that if they joined the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association they would forfeit their right of worship of their religion. (Sian Ch'un-chung jih-pao, November 7, 1951).

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B. Elevation of Political Consciousness

*175 Aside from propaganda, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association
*668 in the Northwest also initiated an ideological remoulding campaign
S in 1951 aimed at 2,500 teachers selected from eleven nationalities.
175 This campaign was one of the many drives, one following or overlapping
668 another, which were correlated to the work of mobilizing
and organizing the people. The more important of the popular drives were the Land Reform, the Resist-America and Aid Korea Movement and the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries.

By the summer of 1952, the so called land reform was completed in 97 per cent of all the agricultural hsiang (administrative villages) in the then five provinces of the Northwest. The membership in farmers' associations constituted 30-40 per cent of the

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175 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racial-
668 ism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the...
563 Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in
631 opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

N 3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total
*175 of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or
592 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'ün-chung
162 jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized
S peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
175 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only
592 the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the
162 whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the
77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

N The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in
[474] the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations
[476] and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statis-
tics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses
are computed from percentages given of the total).

S 4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet
175 Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a
648 foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950, to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts arrived to set up machine works, power plants,and to assist the Chinese in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview with Burkhan, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the visit of Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October, 1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

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Chinese-owned companies. Although Soviet and Eastern European experts were retained as salaried technicians, the move was made to appear that Soviet Russia was withdrawing from Sinkiang in favor of Communist China.

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In addition to these conditions, there was a whole plethora of other factors which made the Communist authorities reluctant to grant regional autonomy to the people of Sinkiang. However, as they had in repeated pronouncements promised autonomy to the non-Chinese inhabitants of this province, they found that they could not procrastinate any longer, and in the late summer of 1953 they finally agreed to the establishment of the first autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang, but on an experimental basis. The three experimental autonomous governments were: one for the Sibo on the hsiang level, one for the Chinese Moslems on the county level, and one for the Mongols on the district (ch'ü)level. In December, 1953, Saifuddin urged "that a good job must be done to guarantee that the various national autonomies in the province may be established." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 6, 1954).

The experiments proved successful and by May, 1954, the green light was given for the establishment of autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang for other concentrations of national minorities in the province. There were thirty-three autonomous areas below the level of district in Sinkiang in August (NCNA, August 7, 1954). However, in proportion to its population of non-Chinese people, Sinkiang was still behind. During the same period, the number of autonomous areas in Kansu had increased to 86 (NCNA April 9, 1955).

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C. The General Election of 1953-54

In 1953, the people of Northwest China, as elsewhere in China, were for the first time permitted to cast their votes for the election of their representatives. In February, the Central People's Government in Peking passed the Election Law which provided for suffrage for adults over 18 years of age with the exclusion of all those whom the Communist authorities had classified as landlords, counter-revolutionaries, and lunatics and those who were deprived of the right to vote or to run for election. The certified voters vote only once, at the lowest or basic levels, and by a show of hands (art. 55). The system is pyramidal. The representatives chosen by the people at the basic election elect their representatives to people's congresses of a higher level, and these in turn elect representatives for peoples of still higher level, and so on up, through the levels of county and district people's congresses to municipal and provincial congresses, and through the level of municipal and provincial congresses to the National People's Congress. Only at high levels was the balloting secret. The candidates running for election were Communist or men approved by the

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PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Introduction

A. Historical Administration of Area

N 1. Ch'ing Dynasty

*175 During the Ch'ing dynasty, Shensi and Kansu were two of the
635 eighteen provinces which formed China proper. The police
625 system and the problems of public order and safety were simi-
184 lar to those of the other provinces. (See Section on Public Order
and Safety in General Handbook.) However, in the Chinghai area,
the maintenance of order was mainly entrusted to the native local
S chiefs. In Sinkiang, a network of military garrisons under the rule
175 of Manchu military officers was established. Its main purpose was
701 to suppress possible rebellions by the minority groups. The daily
669 administration and maintenance of order among the minorities at
the lower local level, however, here also rested with the minority
chiefs and local leaders. The efficiency of this system is illus-
trated by the record of the riots. Periodically, at intervals of
roughly thirty to fifty years, a major rebellion broke out. Numer-
N ous small riots occurred between the big conflicts. As a whole,
*175 however, the Ch'ing dynasty's maintenance of public order in the
625 northwest was considered to be successful.

2. Post 1911

When the revolution came in 1911, the situations varied in the different provinces. The weakness of the central government in Peking helped further the development of local forces. In Shensi, Kansu (and Ninghsia) and Ch'inghai, there were various warlords who occupied and dominated a certain portion of the land at various times. The purpose of the police forces under the warlords was to maintain their dominant position. Their police forces were efficient or less so, depending on the personalities of the leaders. Often they were backward and cruel, but usually they followed the traditional pattern of the Chinese bureaucracy. Most of the warlords adopted the "closed-door" policy. Outsiders, especially those viewed as potential trouble-makers, were not too free to travel around. This simplified police work since the local population was comparatively less educated and, except for the Moslems, more submissive than the outsiders.

S In Sinkiang, the situation was complicated by two factors.
175 First, it was exposed to foreign agitation, particularly from Russia
625 and Great Britain. Second, it had a mixed population with the
• [648] Chinese in the minority. Therefore, the purpose and mission of
[563] the police forces in Sinkiang were traditionally difficult. Main-
taining the leader's power involved dealing with foreign influences
and with the various local peoples. These constant challenges made
the police forces in Sinkiang more alert and efficient than in other

FOREIGN RELATIONS

I. Strategic Importance of Sinkiang

175 648 439 [487] Sinkiang has been one of the most strategic areas of China in imperial and modern times. Ever since the area first came under Chinese control during the Han period (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), it has been for China a key position for the control of central Asia. The two caravan routes to the north and south of the Tien-shan range linked China with the steppes of western Turkestan and with Europe and the Near East. The control of the oasis cities along these caravan routes gave China not only a dominant position in the trade, but also a check over the states of central Asia that profited from this trade. In the times of the empire the Chinese control over tribal groups in central Asia was strongest when the corridor of trade was safely in Chinese hands.

175 648 Full Chinese control over Eastern Turkestan was maintained, however, only over limited periods in imperial history. In the period of division and chaos that followed the Han period, Turkestan was lost to China and became a contested area between rival tribal states. Chinese control was reasserted in T'ang times by a Chinese dynasty which itself was partly of Central Asian origin. The area was included in the Mongol empire when the Mongols established their rule over China. Lost again under the Ming dynasty, Chinese Turkestan was finally reconquered by the Manchus in the eighteenth century and has been recognized as a part of China since the time when the modern West came in contact with the Chinese world.

The strategic role of Chinese Turkestan has become somewhat modified in modern times. When Czarist Russia expanded her frontiers across the Asiatic continent towards the Chinese border, the Inner Asiatic frontiers of China were threatened by a new type of attack by a modern Western state. The Russian expansion across Asia found its counterpart in the British conquest of India. From that time on the British regarded the high plateaus of Asia as potential basis for an attack on India through the mountain passes of the northwest. Chinese Turkestan became an area of conflicting British-Russian policies, and at the same time an anchor of the whole Chinese defense of Central Asia against Russian and British invasion.

Of the two powers, Russia was by far the more dangerous to Chinese control. Through her move into Asia, Russia became China's neighbor along a frontier of 3,000 miles. Her pressure was exerted in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as in Turkestan. The British-Indian border with China was shorter and the high mountain passes of the Himalayas and the Karakorum provided a

175 648 much greater physical barrier than existed on the Turkestan-Manchurian-Mongolian border with Russia.

II. Russian Advance in Sinkiang

In the middle of the last century when the Western powers, including Russia, opened treaty ports along the coast and in China proper, Russia had combined this coastal penetration with an inland advance. In the Treaty of Kulja of 1851, which was made public in 1861, the Russians secured the right to trade in Northern Turkestan by the establishment of trading centers in the Ili valley at Kulja. In the Treaty of Peking in 1860 Russia also secured the right to establish a consulate at Kashgar in southern Turkestan.

175 648 669 The Russian-British pressure on Turkestan came to a head in the 1870's when Chinese control was temporarily thrown off by the rebellion of Yakub Beg. This was the period when major rebellions were taking place within China, and the revolts against the ruling dynasty spread to the northwestern border. The Moslem rebellion began in the Northwest region of China and extended to Chinese Turkestan where one of the former ruling Moslem families which had been driven out by the Chinese administration into western Turkestan attempted to re-establish its power. Its leading military figure was Yakub Beg who soon took over the rebellious movement and attempted to set up an independent government over the southern and northern parts of Chinese Turkestan. During his stay in power, he negotiated treaties with both Britain and Russia. The British recognized Yakub Beg and permitted him to secure arms through India. A British envoy signed a treaty with his government at Kashgar in 1874, a treaty which was formally ratified by the government of India in 1876. In this treaty Sinkiang was opened to trade with India, and a British trading company was formed with the assistance of India. Through India, Yakub Beg established contact with the Sultan of Turkey in a Moslem religious alliance. At that time, the British believed that Yakub Beg would be able to maintain himself and hoped that Chinese Turkestan would become an independent or at least autonomous area, a buffer between India and Russia.

The Russian reaction to Yakub Beg's rebellion was a direct attack on the territory of Chinese Turkestan. When Yakub Beg had occupied Urumchi and moved towards the northwestern border area, the Russians moved troops across the border and occupied Kulja and the territory of the Ili valley in 1871. In 1872 they forced Yakub Beg to conclude a commercial agreement which opened Eastern Turkestan to Russian trade. In 1874-75, Russia concentrated troops on the border of southern Sinkiang. But unrest in Russian Turkestan prevented them from further military action. In 1876, they forced Yakub Beg to surrender the strategic moun-

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tain passes west of Kashgar to Russian control. The Russian government had thus used the unrest in Turkestan for military expansion into Chinese territory, although it declared at the time that the occupation was only a temporary move for the protection of Russian commercial interests and that the area would eventually be given back to China.

This Russian attack gave the Turkestan rebellion an even more dangerous character in Chinese eyes. What was at stake now for China was not only the subjection of a rebellious leader but the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asian position. China's realization of this danger became very clear in the discussions that preceded the Chinese military compaigns to reconquer Turkestan. Two views were expressed at that time on the importance of that area to China. One was represented by Li Hung-chang, who had come to power as the leader of the Anhwei army, one of the regional forces that had been established to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. In this campaign Li had had his main base at Shanghai and had come to control the financial resources of the central coastal region. Later his army had been used in the suppression of the Nien Rebellion in Anhwei and Shantung and after this successful campaign he had become governor-general of the capital province of Chihli and was the leading military figure in the north. Li Hung-chang was willing to abandon China's position in Central Asia in favor of strengthening coastal defenses. According to him the expenses of a Sinkiang campaign would seriously endanger the coastal defense, so important for holding the capital.

III. Policy of Tso Tsung-t'ang

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In contrast to Li's regional view on the importance of China's coastal area, Tso Tsung-t'ang, then in charge of the suppression of the Moslem Rebellion in the northwestern provinces of Shensi and Kansu, saw the control of Sinkiang as a vital part of the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asiatic frontier. According to Tso Tsung-t'ang, "The reason why great weight should be given to Sinkiang is the protection of Mongolia. In protecting Mongolia, one ensures the defense of the capital. When the fingers and forearms of the West and North work in unison and the topographical position is continuous then there is no break in the country's defenses. But if Sinkiang is not strong, then Mongolia will not be safe. Not only the border provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Shansi would be constantly open to invasion and it would be difficult to defend them, but also Northern Chihli and Shanhaikuan would not have a day of rest or sleep." (Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi, chüan 50, pp. 76a, b.) Tso argued that the defense of Sinkiang would be less expensive in the

175 648 long run than would be an inland defense of the northwest, if the Sinkiang passes were lost. The defense of Peking depended on the Chinese military garrisons at Kalgan, Uliasutai, and Kobdo in Mongolia; the defense of Mongolia depended on the control of Sinkiang; the defense of Sinkiang depended on the passes at Kulja and Chuguchak. He did not believe that there was a real military threat to the Chinese coasts because in his opinion the Western powers were interested in commercial privileges rather than in military conquest. When at that time the British minister to Peking intervened in support of Yakub Beg and suggested that the imperial government should allow the rebel leader to maintain his rule over Turkestan as an autonomous area under Chinese suzerainty, Tso Tsung-t'ang sent a memorial to the throne stating that the status of Yakub Beg was purely a domestic question, and that "if Britain wished to create a buffer state in central Asia she was herself well able to furnish the territory." (Arthur W. Hummel Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Washington, 1944, vol. II, p. 766.)

Tso Tsung-t'ang's main concern, however, was the Russian military invasion. It was his avowed strategy to use such overwhelming force in the defeat of Yakub Beg and to make the reconquest of Turkestan so convincing that Russia would have to live up to the promise which she had given at the time of the occupation in 1871 and return the Ili area to Chinese control. But the diplomatic negotiations between China and Russia which followed did not bring the results for which Tso Tsung-t'ang had hoped. In the draft treaty concluded in St. Petersburg in 1879, Russia returned only the city of Kulja and the eastern part of the Ili valley but retained the western part of the Ili area including the valley of a tributary, the Tekes, and most important of all, the strategic mountain passes of the Altai and related ranges. This treaty aroused a storm of indignation at the court in Peking. The government refused to ratify it and imposed a death sentence on the returning envoy who had negotiated it. The sentence was not carried out, but a new envoy signed another treaty at St. Petersburg in 1881 with somewhat more favorable conditions. While Russia retained some of the territory she had occupied, she returned the Tekes valley and the strategic passes to China.

After it had reasserted its authority over almost all of the Turkestan area, the Chinese government carried through an administrative reorganization in order to strengthen the ties with its outlying region. In November, 1884, an imperial edict made Turkestan into a Chinese province under the name of Sinkiang ("The New Territory"). Urumchi (the Chinese Ti-hua) became the provincial capital and the province was divided into more than twenty districts. Thus, while Chinese political control

175 648 was re-established, economic penetration from Russia and to a lesser degree from British India continued. In the treaty of 1881, Russia had established consulates at Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashgar, and Turfan. The treaty also stipulated that consulates should be established at Urumchi, Hami (Qomul), and Ch'i-t'ai, if the development of Russian trade warranted it. England arranged in 1884 for the stationing of a British trade agent at Kashgar.

In the following period the Chinese political position in Sinkiang was not threatened again by either Russia or England. Chinese control created, in effect, something of a buffer area for the conflicting expansionist interests of these two powers. Towards the turn of the century, attempts were made to delimit Russian and British areas of expansion in order to diminish chances of conflict. In 1895 the two powers agreed to delimit their respective areas of expansion in the Pamirs. In a decision of the Pamir Boundary Commission the two powers agreed to set aside a narrow corridor of Afghan territory which would extend from Afghanistan to the Chinese province of Sinkiang. This corridor would prevent a direct Russo-British-India frontier. The Anglo-Russian tensions came to a new height during the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. When the war was over, Russian and England came to settle all their conflicting interests in the Triple Entente of 1907. By that time the neutralization of the central Asiatic area of possible conflict had already been recognized for so long that Turkestan was no longer mentioned in the agreement.

IV Policy of Yang Tseng-hsin

175 648 635 The Chinese position in Sinkiang entered into a new phase with the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Revolution changed the relationship between the province and the new types of central governments that succeeded each other in China. In imperial times the Chinese governors were a part of the imperial bureaucracy, and the court had been able to appoint and recall governors more or less at will. It had also given the provincial administration a yearly subsidy of over two and a half million taels (a tael equals about 1.28 U.S. dollars). With the revolution, the central control over the province was greatly weakened. No more subsidy was forthcoming from China and the governors had to base their power and position almost entirely on local support. Yang Tseng-hsin, the Chinese governor of Sinkiang from 1912 to 1928 gained such support by giving the non-Chinese population groups greater economic autonomy. At the same time he maintained good relations with Russia by permitting Russian economic activities which had considerably increased since 1905. The Russo-Asiatic Bank had its branches at Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, and Kashgar with the right to issue paper currency. These branches played a large role in the local trade.

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648 The isolation of Sinkiang from the Chinese government became even more pronounced as a result of the events in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 gave the Mongols the opportunity to declare their independence from Chinese control. This move was in part inspired and supported by Czarist Russia which established itw osn control over Outer Mongolia. Though Outer Mongolia remained nominally a part of Chinese territory, Chinese control ended and Outer Mongolia became in fact a Russian protectorate. The loss of Outer Mongolia changed the position of China in central Asia and greatly affected her hold over Chinese Turkestan. Tso Tsung-t'ang had described Turkestan as the key position for the defense of Mongolia, which in turn was important for the security of north China and of the capital. Now Turkestan itself was outflanked by the Russian position in Mongolia. From Mongolia, Russian forces could at any time cut the corridor that led from the Chinese province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. Sinkiang, formerly the central basis of the Chinese military position in Inner Asia, now became an exposed advance position which could only be held in the long run if a new and safe connection with China Proper could be found.

Of still greater importance for the power sturggle in central Asia was the change brought about in Russia by the October Revolution. The new Soviet Russia soon resumed the Czarist policy of expansion in central Asia. But to the economic and strategic interests which had been the morivating force behind Czarist advance there was now added the Communist aim of infiltrating the neighboring area with its ideological and political organization. This Soviet advance began slowly and accelerated with the growing strength of the Soviet government. During the early years of the civil war in Siberia, Soviet Russia was in no position to resume an aggressive policy in central Asia. The Russian position in Outer Mongolia was also temporarily lost and regained only in 1922, when after the defeat of the White Russian leader, Ungern Sternberg, Outer Mongolia became a Soviet satellite.

[167] The outcome of the red victory in the civil war in Siberia had the immediate result of bringing a stream of White Russian refugees to the central Asiatic areas. In addition to smaller groups, two White Russian armies retreated into Sinkiang in 1920 and 1921. The number of these troops has been reported as 30,000 to 40,000 men, a much stronger force than the Chinese army of governor Yang Tseng-hsin. In Outer Mongolia, White Russian forces retreating at that time had been able to take over the government, but the Chinese administration of Sinkiang managed to bring the Russian influx into its territory fully under control. Most of the Russian troops let themselves be disarmed and were interned at Kuchengste. Other troops which had retreated to the Altai border region of Russia and Outer Mongolia retained their arms.

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648 The Altai region has been an area of conflict all the more critical because of the potential value of its mineral resources. In imperial time some control had been exerted over part of the area by the Imperial Amban in Kobdo in Outer Mongolia. The border between Chinese and Russian territory was also not clearly delineated, and the Chinese claim that the highest mountain ridge formed the border being at times contested by Soviet Russia. The area was mainly inhabited by Kazakh tribesmen who were closely related to similar groups at the other side of the border in Russian Turkestan. During World War I a number of Kazakhs from the Russian side had moved over into Chinese territory to escape the draft for labor conscription, and no control had been [563] exerted over these groups. Of all the Turkic people of the province of Sinkiang, the Kazakhs were the most nationalistic and unruly. The attitude of the Kazakh people played, therefore, an important role in the relations between Russia and Chinese Turkestan.

At the critical time, in 1920, when the White Russian influx became a problem, the Chinese governor negotiated with the Soviet authorities an agreement which established friendly relations across the border but at the same time enabled the governor to deal successfully with the problem of White Russian immigrants. He gained a Soviet promise of amnesty for all those White Russians who wanted to return to Russian territory and encouraged as many as he could to go back to Russia, while others continued their journey to China proper. At the same time, he asked for Soviet support in removing the armed White Russians from the Altai region and strengthened the Chinese position in that area by dividing it into regular Chinese districts and sub-district administrations. Connected with this political agreement was a trade agreement in which the Ili valley area was opened to Soviet economic activities. Two soviet consulated were established in this area, in contrast to the seven consulates which the Czarist government had maintained in its last years in Sinkiang. In exchange for the Soviet consulated the Chinese administration was permitted to maintain two consulated in Soviet territory. These consulates were to be established at Semipalatinsk and at Verkhenevelinsk on the border of Outer Mongolia. The agreement also abolished extraterritoriality, and in opening economic relations with the Soviets, Governor Yang gained Soviet release of the property of Chinese merchants in Russian territory which had at first been confisfacted by the new Soviet regime. Through this agreement of 1920 Chinese-Soviet relations were established in Sinkiang long before the beginning of official relations between the government at Peking and the Soviet government and even before the arrangement of Soviet support to Sun Yat-sen at Canton. The agreement of 1920 was broadened by the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1924, signed at Peking, which provided for the opening of additional Soviet

175 consulates. Soviet consulates were opened at Chuguchak, at
648 Sharasume in the Altai region, and at Urumchi and at Kashgar in exchange for the opening of Chinese consulates at Tashkent, Andijan, Zaisan, and Alma Ata.

The Chinese administration under Governor Yang thus maintained a very cautious policy of friendly economic relations with the Soviet Union. This policy was continued even after the leaders of the Kuomintang had broken with the Chinese Communists and had sent the Russian advisers home. The economic relations between Turkestan and Soviet territory remained close; the Chinese consul at Semipalatinsk was quoted by Izvesta as stating that Sinkiang had nothing in common with central China and that the commercial as well as the political relations between western China and the friendly republic of the USSR remained unchanged. Even after Governor Yang accepted the nominal authority of the National Government at Nanking, this policy did not change.

From the side of the National Government, however, the first attempts were now made to strengthen the physical link with Sinkiang. These attempts were later to be renewed during and after the years of World War II and led to the building of new communication links, a policy to be continued later by the Chinese Communists.

In 1928 the Sven Hedin expedition was sent by the National Government to explore a new road connection from Inner Mongolia to Chinese Turkestan as well as to investigate the possiblity of using older caravan routes to the south of Qomul. The expedition was treated politely by the Chinese administration but was closely supervised and restricted in its movements. Even so the routes which the Sven Hedin expedition investigated would not have provided a road between Nanking and Sinkiang which would not have been in easy reach of Russian forces based on Outer Mongolia.

V. Foreign Relations under Chin Shu-jen

While Sven Hedin's expedition was still in Sinkiang, the Russian influence was greatly increased when the Chinese administration of the province was changed. Governor Yang was assassinated, and the former chief of the Political Department, Chin Shu-jen, assumed power. The assassination was carried out by Fan Yao-nan, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, at a feast at which the Soviet consular officials and several other Russian guests were present. The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was in turn seized and executed by troops under the control of Chin Shu-jen, who himself then became governor. Under Chin's governorship there was soon an opportunity for great expansion of the Russian influence. In 1929 the Russians reputedly began building up Communist Party cells in

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175 648 Sinkiang. In 1930 the completion of the Turksib Railroad in Russian Turkestan along the Chinese border enabled Soviet Russia to intensify the exploitation of the Sinkiang economy. Ever since the Russian development of central Asia, the weight of Russian influence had increased and the Chinese National Government lagged behind in its attempt to answer this threat by a new development of the communications between Sinkiang and China.

175 648 669 The greatest increase in Russian influence came as the result of the revolt of the Chinese Moslems, the Tungans, in 1931, who called in as their leader Ma Chung-ying, a Moslem from Kansu who came close to capturing the provincial government. Governor Chin's administration was saved by Soviet Russia, which gave him arms and military support under the pretext that some Japanese had been on Ma's staff, implying that Japanese schemes were endangering Soviet interests in the province, although no proof has ever been brought forward for such Japanese activities. In order to get Russian support, Chin concluded in November, 1931, an agreement with Soviet Russia which was kept secret from the National Government. By this agreement, eight Soviet trade agencies were set up at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan; the tariff for Soviet products was reduced, and telegraph and radio communications were established with Soviet territory. Chin Shu-jen did not succeed, however, in suppressing the rebellion, and according to one account by a Mr. Tshumabay, then chairman of the GPU mission in Sinkiang, the Soviets, in order to weaken the Chinese military forces, did not at first provide the military support they had promised. When a Moslem force reached the outskirts of the capital of Urumchi, Chin turned over the defense to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, an officer of Manchurian origin. Sheng was placed in command of Chinese troops from Manchuria who had in their fight with the Japanese retreated on to Soviet territory and had been transported by Soviet Russia to Turkestan. Thus from the outset Sheng derived his military power from Russian support. He was substantially supported by another military force recruited from the White Russians living in Urumchi and neighboring cities. Within the ranks of this force could reportedly also be found Red Russian soldiers. When asked about this comradeship-in-arms the White Russians stated to members of the Sven Hedin expedition that there was no difficulty in working together for a common purpose. The equipment of both these forces was provided by the Soviet Union.

With these troops Sheng succeeded in driving off the Moslem attackers. In April, 1935, a coup d'etat by these Russian troops forced the retirement of Governor Chin, who fled to Russian territory and from there returned to China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai became governor and, with the help of Russian war materiel, including

175 military planes, succeeded in destroying the Moslem forces of
648 Ma Chung-ying who was eventually driven to Kashgar from where in
669 June, 1934, he fled to Soviet territory. All the three leading figures in the struggle for power, Chin Shu--jen, Ma Chung-ying, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai were thus in different ways under Soviet control. Chin had been supported and at the same time handicapped by the Russians who finally permitted him to return to China through their territory. Governor Sheng, his successor, depended from the very beginning on Russian support for his power. And Ma Chung-ying, the defeated aspirant for power, who might have established a closer link with the National Government, entrusted his fate to the Soviet regime. He was reportedly seen in Moscow at the beginning of 1936, but from that time on his fate has remained unknown.

VI. Policy of Sheng Shih-ts'ai

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648 From the outset Sheng Shih-ts'ai was strongly under Russian dominance. Soviet Russia did not only have influence over the locally recruited Russian forces and over the Manchurian troops of Sheng, both equipped with Russian weapons; it also sent a special tank regiment of 3,000 men, the so-called "Altai Volunteers," to be stationed near Komul on the main caravan route from the Chinese province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. This force was stationed in a strategic position ostensibly to guard against any Japanese advance from Inner Mongolia. In practice it also could interfere with any attempt of the Chinese National Government to re-establish its authority over Urumchi. Soviet military advisors supervised the training of the Chinese as well as the Russian troops, and through their influence communists were reputedly introduced also into the officer and private ranks of the Chinese forces. They also trained political commissars for the indoctrination of the Chinese forces. In addition to this control of the forces the Soviet government had a hold over the administration of the province. Two Russians, a Mr. Yuravlev and a Dr. Lapin, held high positions in the civil administration of the province and Russian advisers under the direction of the Russian consul-general had decisive influence in all important departments of government. Many of the Turks employed in the administration were recruited from West Turkestan or Turkic groups living in the Soviet Union. According to Chinese reports (see article by Yolbars Khan "Sinkiang Under the Control of Chinese and Russian Communists," Chung Hua Nien Pao, vol. 4, 1954, pp. 52-55), Governor Sheng was told by the Soviet consul at Urumchi that he had to follow Party orders. This was the time when, after the Sian kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek, a united front had been established in China proper for the war of resistance against Japan. During the time

175 648 when this united front continued in operation, in 1937 and 1938, a number of Chinese Communists were brought in who seemed to have worked in close cooperation with the Soviet advisers.

When he came to power, Governor Sheng was given a Soviet loan of five million rubles for reconstruction. For the plans of reconstruction he was provided with Soviet technical advisers. In 1937 Sheng introduced a three-year plan of reconstruction for which he received a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans; a second plan was introduced in 1940. These funds were used to build motor roads, among other things, and to introduce a large fleet of Soviet trucks. It was reported that 1,350 miles of telephone lines were installed by 1941. By 1939 twenty factories had been set up in the province and over four hundred tons of Soviet machinery had been imported for the exploitation of oil resources and the establishment of an oil refinery northwest of Urumchi. In november, 1940, Governor Sheng concluded a secret agreement with the Soviet Union which included permission for Soviet Russia to prospect for and exploit tin and other mineral resources in Sinkiang, and which gave Soviet Russia control over the mineral resources of the province. (The text of this agreement was published in 1950 in Formosa and appeared in 1954 in the American Journal of Foreign Affairs, and in November, 1954, in the German newspaper, Ost-Probleme.")

175 648 669 While extending their military and economic influence over the government of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the Soviet government attempted to deal separately with a group of Kazakhs in the Ili and Altai regions who had begun in 1940 to work for an autonomy of their region. When some of their leaders were invited to Urumchi and arrested there at the beginning of 1940, the Kazakhs rose in revolt in February of that year. A truce was concluded on May 15, 1940, in which the insurgents agreed to cease fighting provided that no more Russian troops would be brought into their area. But fighting soon broke out again and the Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, succeeded by the end of 1940 in establishing a provisional government in the Ili and Altai region which was called the National Republic of East Turkestan. A Soviet attempt to deal with the government of Osman Batur failed. Osman Batur turned down the Russian offer of arms which was coupled with a request to withdraw his forces from the Altai region and move them to the Ili area. In September 1941, the insurgent leadership split. Abdulaziz Kasim, a leader who was a Soviet citizen, concluded an agreement with the Soviets, while Osman Batur and his followers continued their fight against Soviet troops as well as the forces of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai. At the beginning of 1942, the Soviets brought 23,000 troops into the Altai area but the critical situation in the war with Germany forced the Soviets to discontinue their campaign and to concentrate on the protection of a few bases in Sinkiang.

175 648 In the meantime Governor Sheng attempted to end his dependence on Soviet Russia and to turn instead to the National Government. When the pressure of the German advance forced the Soviet government to withdraw most of its forces from Sinkiang, it attempted to maintain its position by disorganizing the Turkestan administration. Aside from the negotiations with the Kazakh rebels, the Soviets made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Governor Sheng when they feared he would seek cooperation with the Chinese National Government. This Russian move precipitated a switch of Sheng's administration to the Chinese side. Sheng drove out his Russian advisers and arrested large numbers of his staff who had been cooperating with the Russians as well as with Chinese Communists who had been brought in through Russian support.

175 648 668 The cooperation between the Soviet representatives in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communists during this time seems to have been close. While the Russian representatives conveyed the policy line as determined in Moscow and provided the military and political power behind it, the Chinese Communists infiltrated Sheng's staff and helped to work out many of Sheng's administrative measures. For instance a currency reform instituted in 1938 was claimed to have been the work of the brother of Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-min who had come to Turkestan with the Chinese Communist group under Russian protection. The Communists also established the Fan-ti-hui, or Anti-Imperialist Association which was used for propaganda and intelligence. When Governor Sheng broke with the Soviets and turned to the National Government, he attempted to eradicate this Chinese Communist group. Mao Tse-min and a number of others, including Governor Sheng's secretary, were executed, and many were imprisoned.

VII. Chinese Nationalist Attempt to Reassert Nationalist Influence

175 648 The new active interest which the National Government took in Sinkiang was related to the military situation of the time. The Russian withdrawal was the result of the military defeats brought on Soviet Russia by the Nazi armies which threatened Moscow and forced a concentration of all available Russian troops at the European front. The Chinese National Government could not count on any further Soviet support in its war against Japan, and the further developments in Soviet Russia were uncertain. Even if Soviet Russia could hold out, this seemed an opportune time to eliminate the dangerous Soviet control which was no longer compensated by any military advantage.

The Chinese situation had become still more desperate after Pearl Harbor and the Japanese conquest of the mainland of southeast Asia. Cut off from the supply routes which could bring in

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175 support from its new military allies, the Chinese National Govern-
648 ment searched for new links with the outside world. In February 1942
N on his visit to India, Chian Kai-shek explored the possibility of the
*175 supply route via Tibet through Chinghai Province. While this long
*648 and arduous route never became of major importance, it served as
491 a communication link over which large commercial caravans
S passed for many years, even after the war. This development
175 brought new importance to Chinghai Province where the Moslem
648 general, Ma Pu-ch'ing, was appointed Pacification Comissioner
by the National Government. This appointment was of still greater
importance for the Sinkiang Government. As a Moslem, Ma Pu-ch'ing could become a potential rival of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai in extending his influence over the Moslem Turks of Sinkiang Province, as Ma Chung-ying had done before him. More important still was his control over the strategically located province of Chinghai. From Chinghai was to open a route to the Tarim Basin and to the southern part of Sinkiang. Since this route passed to the south of the Nanshan Range, it was better protected from any Soviet threat from Outer Mongolia than was the caravan route of the Kansu corridor. This corridor to Sinkiang had been controlled by the Russian tank force at Qomul while the new route, if developed, would give the National Government a passage to Sinkiang not so easily threatened from Soviet-controlled territory. In fact, the build-up of Chinghai as a strategic center was the logical Chinese Nationalist answer to the Russian domination of Outer Mongolia. Sinkiang, formerly a center of the Chinese Inner-Asian position, had now become a contested frontier area which could be held only if a relatively safe and practicable connection could be opened up. From this time on, the Chinese position at Sining and the Kokonor and in the Tsaidam area became of key strategic importance.

S While the Chinese National Government was beginning to re-
175 establish its position in central Asia, it negotiated with Sheng Shih-
648 ts'ai. Chiang Kai-shek himself came to Lanchow in Kansu and the
chief of the northwest headquarters at Sian, General Chu Shao-liang, flew twice to Urumchi for negotiations with Governor Sheng. The second time he was accompanied by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Wu Chunghsin, who was in 1944 to become successor to Governor Sheng. At this time, Wu Tse-hsiang (Chaucer H. Wu) became Governor Sheng's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. In the fall of 1943, Governor Sheng himself flew to Chungking to confer with Chiang Kai-shek, As a result of these talks, the National Government
began to subsidize the Sinkiang administration. Several thousand
S Chinese refugees were moved into Sinkiang between 1942 and 1943,
[167] and at the beginning of 1943 Nationalist troops were also sent in.

This Nationalist advance was paralleled by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops which began in spring of 1942 and was almost

175 648 completed by March 1943. Soviet Russia not only withdrew its military forces but also retreated from its economic expoitation of Sinkiang. The Soviets capped the main oil well north of Urumchi and shipped back to Russia all the movable machinery from the oil refineries and the gold, copper, and iron mines which they had set up in Ili, Chuguchak, and in the Altai area, and from the factories they had built in Urumchi and other cities.

This Russian retreat was, however, far from complete. The Soviets maintained their consulates in all the larger cities of Sinkiang with a staff of several hundred people. At these consulates the Russians left military guards. At Urumchi a company of Soviet infantry with a strength of at least four hundred men was left behind to guard the consulate. Other consulates were guarded by units of ten to fifty men each. Other units were left behind to guard the gold, copper, and iron mines in the Ili and Chuguchak regions as well as the oil wells at Wusu and at Urumchi where the valuable machinery that could not be removed was protected by these troops. Soviet troops also continued to guard the airfields at Kulja, Urumchi, Kashgar, and Turfan. In each Soviet
175 consulate the biggest department was the propaganda section.
648 These departments distributed among Turks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz,
208 and Mongols pamphlets printed in Soviet Russia. Agents of the consulates traveled throughout the province giving out these pamphlets and explaining the contents to the illiterate. The pamphlets gave favorable accounts of the Turkic people within the Soviet Union and contained material on methods of agriculture, irrigation, and animal husbandry. Altogether, the Soviet consulates concentrated more than before on the support and protection of the nationality group who had started to fight the Chinese administration. Although the Soviets did not establish Communist Party cells among these nationality groups, they attempts to infiltrate their leadership. And since Chinese policy aimed at the suppression of this nationality movement, the nationality groups depended on the intervention of the Soviet consulates with the Chinese administration for the protection of the lives of their leaders. In several cases the Soviet representatives prevented execution and in other cases secured the release of imprisoned nationality leaders. As a result the Turks, the Kirghiz, and the Kazakhs, and Mongols, had to accept the orders of Soviet agents in their dealings with the administration of Governor Sheng.

175 648 VIII. Soviet Efforts to Regain Power in Sinkiang.

By 1944 the defeat of Nazi Germany enabled Soviet Russia to return to an active policy in Sinkiang. The Soviets supported a
[669] Kazakh uprising which broke out in the Ili valley on November

175 648 669 7, 1944. This Kazakh uprising occurred in the three border districts of Ili, Chuguchak (Tacheng), and Ashan (Altai) and resulted in the establishment of an "East Turkestan Republic." These districts on the Soviet border were preponderantly Kazakh in population and comprised almost one sixth of the population of the province. They are rich in oil, coal, iron, tungsten, gold, lead, and reportedly also in uranium; they also have rich agricultural soil. The revolt was in the hands of experienced Kazakh leaders who had been in practical control of much of the area since their earlier uprising in 1940. When they had attempted in 1943 to declare their independence, they had been forced to abandon this plan by the threat of military action from the Soviet troops that were guarding the closed mines in the area. But by 1944 the Soviets were willing to support them. Their uprising resulted in fighting in the Ili valley for over a month until the Chinese provincial troops gave up the city of Kulja which remained under the control of Kazakh insurgents. From Kulja the rebel forces moved north to extend their control over the Chuguchak region and then captured the town of Manass close to Urumchi. The rebellion also spread to some cities of southern Turkestan. When attempts to suppress the rebellion by military forces failed, the Chinese National Government, which by this time was reasserting its authority over Sinkiang, sent General Chang Chih-chung to Sinkiang in September 1945 to negotiate with the rebels. These negotiations were handled through the mediation of the Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi. After many meetings between October 1945 and June 1946, the negotiations resulted in three agreements signed by General Chang and three Kulja delegates. The agreements resulted in the abolition of the "East Turkestan Republic" and of its local flag but they practically secured autonomy for the rebellious districts and troops. They also resulted in the [635] reorganization of the provincial government. The new governor, Chang Chih-chung had two vice-governors as his assistants, one [563] an Uighur, the other a Tatar. The appointment of representatives of the nationalities to such positions was an attempt to pacify the revolt of the nationalities against Chinese rule. Governor Chang did not, however, regain any control over the autonomous group which continued to rule the vital border districts of Sinkiang under the leadership of Akmedjan, Burkhan, Isakh Beg, and Saifuddin. The national government troops under Governor Chang did not control the area west of Urumchi and the products of this region, including the oil, coal, and mineral products, went to the Soviet 175 side. From 1943 on the Soviet resumed the working of the tung- 648 sten mines and since 1945 the Soviets have reportedly obtained [135] diamonds, gold, bismuth, and uranium from this area. An attempt by the Chinese government to end this secret exploitation of

175 Turkestan resources by proposing an open trade agreement in No- 648 vember 1946 remained unanswered by the Soviets.

The Chinese attempt to regain control by Chang Chih-chung's policy of negotiation was based on military measures aimed at strengthening the strategic position. Along the whole route from Lanchow to Urumchi, blockhouses were maintained at distances of about twenty miles. And at the same time a new effort was made to open up the route from Ching-hai. The new Moslem governor of [491] the province, Ma Pu-fang, received Nationalist support in his efforts to build a road from Sining along Lake Kokonor towards the Tarim Basin. This road had been driven well past the Kokonor before the Communist victory in 1949. The National Government [701] had also strengthened the military force in Sinkiang. In addition to the six divisions which Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai had left behin, four divisions of Nationalist troops had been sent to the province and two divisions of Ma Pu-fang's cavalry from Chinghai had also been brought in, bringing the total of Chinese forces up to twelve divisions, or about 100,000 men, which have remained there since the Communists took over.

In spite of this military force, Governor Chang Chih-chung did not succeed in transforming the agreements concluded with the Kulja group in 1946 into a working arrangement. He demanded that the reorganization of the forces of the Kulja area should be preceded by acceptance of Chinese control. He also wanted the approval of the Sinkiang Nationalist leaders for the railroad to be built from China into Sinkiang and the acceptance by Sinkiang of the Chinese Nationalist currency. The Sinkiang Nationalist leaders refused these conditions, and in May 1947, Chang Chih-chung resigned as governor and was succeeded by an Uighur, Masud Sabri, who was a compromise candidate acceptable to the Chinese National Government. In July 1947 the Kulja nationalists broke with Masud [669] Sabri and maintained their own autonomous administration under Akmedjan. The situation remained in a deadlock and the Kulja group was reportedly receiving aid for its troops from Soviet Russia. The Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, who had formerly joined the Kulja group, had broken with it on account of the Soviet support and had withdrawn with his own forces to the Altai border region.

To overcome the deadlock with the Turkic Nationalists, the National government agreed in December 1949 to the appointment of one of the Nationalist leaders as governor of the province. This was Burkhan who was by origin a Russian Tatar and a man with whom the Kazakh nationalists were willing to cooperate. In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung flew once more to Sinkiang to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty. But all these moves by the National Government to appease Soviet Russia by economic concessions and to appease theRussian-supported Kulja Nationalists

175 a change of the provincial administration came to nothing because
648 of the rapid disintegration and collapse of the National Government
in 1949. The Sinkiang Provincial Government had a formal decla-
[635] ration of adherence to the new Communist regime in Peking in
[668] September 1949.

IX. Sinkiang Under the Chinese Communists

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648 After the victory of the Chinese Communists, both Soviet and
669 Chinese policy changed in its attitude toward the Sinkiang Nationalists.
668 While they had been supported and equipped with Soviet arms against
the Chinese provincial administration under the National Govern-
ment, they were now suppressed by the Chinese Communists with
Russian help. Soviet troops which were greatly increased and have
been estimated as consisting of about 50,000 men during this
time were instrumental in defeating the independent forces of Os-
man Batur who was captured and executed in April 1951 at Urumchi,
together with over 13,000 of his followers. The key Nationalist
leaders of the Ili area who had been formerly supported by Soviet
Russia were eliminated in another way. While on their way to
Peking to participate in the opening of the Communist People's
Political Consultative Conference, Akmedjan, Isakh Beg, and
several other leading figures were killed in an airplane crash on
August 29, 1949. The leaders who remained behind, Burkhan and
175 Saifuddin, were willing to work with the Chinese Communists
668 and Soviet Russia along a new line of policy which condemned the
[648] former nationalism and re-interpreted the previous fight in an
anti-Kuomintang line. The new leaders were willing to admit
former "mistakes: in their nationality policy which had not made
a clear distinction between opposition to "rapacious Kuomintang
officials, plundering Kuomintang troops, and the oppressive
Kuomintang police," and hostility to the "entire Han race."
This previous "narrow nationalism" was described as harmful
and the aim was now to establish full unity between the formerly
rebellious districts and the rest of the province. The Ili armed
forces were dissolved and integrated into the Chinese Communist
Army and a new policy was introduced of ridding the province of
its "feudal oppression."

175 This new policy propagandized by both Burkahn and Saifuddin
668 aroused strong nationalist opposition. In 1951, a Kazakh revolt which
669 continued in the Ili area spread towards the east. The move-
ment was attacked by Burhan as representing the "reactionary
bourgeois class, such as pan-Turkestanists and pan-Islamists"
who were trying to undermine the "solidarity among various races
in the People's Republic of China." He stated that "what has been
[661] regarded as progressive at one time may become reactionary at
another time," and ordered the liquidation of all "reactionaries,

175 counter-revolutionaries, and pan-Turkestanists" and demanded
668 that the "people of various races" be taught" the spirit of patriotism
669 and internationalism." Simultaneously, a large-scale
661 purge was undertaken to liquidate most of the original revolutionary
leaders in the three western districts who had not perished in the airplane crash of 1949. These leaders were replaced by Chinese Communist cadres. The new policy was carried through with great bloodshed. According to a statement by Burkhan in January 1952, over 120,000 "people's enemies" had been liquidated. About 60,000 people attempted to flee from Turkestan, of whom only about 35,000 survived and reached safety in other countries. Large number of people were arrested and used as forced labor among the construction works introduced by the Chinese Communists under Russian guidance. Bollowing this purge, a re-education campaign was carried on by "friendship delegation from Peking, and in the words of the New China News Agency: "It was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of the fatherland." (See Allen S. Whiting, 'Nationality Tensions in Sinkiang," Far Eastern Survey, January 1956, vol. 25, no. 1.)

175 This policy was carried through with the backing of Russian
648 troops as well as the Chinese Communist troops of the First
Army Corps which had moved in after 1949. At the time of the
668 Korean war, some of the Chinese troops were withdrawn
669 for Korea, and the Russian forces were reportedly increased
661 from 50,000 to 70,000 men. They were garrisoned along the
northern route at each important point.

These Russian troops have thus helped substantially in the suppression of the Turkic nationalism which Soviet Russia had formerly built up and equipped against the Chinese Nationalists. Once before, in 1942, when Soviet Russia partly withdrew from Sinkiang, these nationalists had been left at the merch of the Chinese administration. Many had been arrested and executed, although the Soviet consular officials had continued to intervene on the behalf of some of these nationalist leaders. In 1949, however, the movement was crushed and its very motivation was attacked. Only those leaders survived who were willing to cooperate fully with the new Communist line.

175 Although the Russians gave full support to the Chinese Communists
in their reconquest of Sinkiang, the potential remained for Sino-
648 Soviet rivalry over control in Sinkiang. For the economic development
668 of the province, the Chinese Communists remained dependent
on Russian equipment and on Russian technicians. In the Sino-Soviet treaty of February, 1950, the two governments agreed on the establishment in Sinkiang of joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for exploitation of oil and non-ferrous metals in the province. The Soviet control of these companies indicated the political importance of

175 the Soviet economic stake in Sinkiang.

648 Over the next years, the strength of the Chinese Communist
668 government increased within the Soviet-Chinese relationship. The treaty of 1950, concluded by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow after lengthy haggling, was replaced in December 1954 by a new treaty concluded at the occasion of a visit of Krushchev and Mikoyan in Peking. Among other concessions, this new treaty provided for the liquidation of the Soviet shares in the fprmer joint stock companies. Nevertheless some element of Soviet control remained since the Soviet shares were to be repaid through deliveries of raw materials and other commodities from Turkestan. The whole industrial and communications development of the province which was to be rapidly expanded under the Chinese Communist Five Year Plans depended also on Soviet economic and technical assistance. Most important, Soviet Russia has reportedly kept possession of the atomic energy center at Mirgrad in the Takla Makan Desert and has through the maintenance of military forces full control over the exploitation of uranium deposts in the Altai region where a large number ofRussians, estimated by one observer to be as large as 80,000, has been reported.

On the other hand, a recent British correspondent (New York
648 Times, August 13, 1956, p. 9) has reported that throughout the
668 region "up to the Soviet borders, the direct control of the Central Government on development plans and on political life is everywhere apparent. There are Soviet advisers and experts and plenty of Soviet machinery, but no more than in other parts of China, and the over-riding impression is that China is in complete charge.

"Peking's orders stretch into the remotest villages, where the ever-present cadres and Party members are kept in constant touch with the capital through provincial committees. Nowhere is there any external evidence ofSoviet influence outside the technical sphere."

This observation of a Chinese Communist administration directed from Peking does not necessarily exclude consideration of Russian military and economic decisions for Sinkiang by the Chinese policy-makers in Peking. Nor does it exclude the possibility of conflict in the districtuion of the Turkestan resources between the Soviet and Chinese Communist economies, especially in the case of the uranium exploitation at present obviously in Soviet hands. The railroad from Lanchow to Aktogai in Russian
[496] Turkestan, which in 1956 has been pushed beyond the Yumen oil fields in Kansu, is the most important physical link between the two economies but is also a highway for a vast and growing stream of young Chinese immigrants who are brought in to work on the oil fields, the railroads, and the construction of new towns and factories. This movement, which is aimed at filling up the

● 648 thinly po[illegible]ted area with a Chinese population, is the most
668 important factor in the reassertion of Chinese control. The
Chinese link with Turkestan is also not limited to the railroad
under construction which will run along the old caravan route
via Qomul, Urumchi, to the Soviet border. In addition the
[491] Chinese Communists follow the policy of the National Government
[496] in the construction of road and railroad connections through
the Tsaidam Basin. This area is reportedly also to be developed
by Communist China into a new key industrial center in central
Asia. Oil and mineral resources are claimed to exist in abundance. The Tsaidam region is farther away from the Soviet or Outer Mongolian border than is the main railroad line and it provides a position in depth in the Chinese Communist connection with Sinkiang. In its advance into central Asia, the Chinese Communist regime seems to follow the main strategic considerations which had been observed by previous Chinese governments

With the shrinking distances and the means of modern industrial development, the importance of Sinkiang with its rich natural resources has vastly increased. There is at the moment no indication of any hitch in the Soviek-Chinese cooperation in the province. But should any conflict evolve between these Communist organizations, Sinkiang must, by the very reason of its geographic location and economic importance, become one of the decisive areas of conflict.

N III. Resentment of Chinese Rule

*563 These internal differences have made it impossible for the
578 people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united
action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated govern-
S ment of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is
[162] non-Chinese, yet the forces of nationalism and of religion, which
at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to
transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary move-
ment and complete independence.

There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a foreign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Moslems (the Dungans) have found themselves caught between two fires. At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists, and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Moslem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

N The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the
*175 system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China,
657 but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-
*563 t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as
578 an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his
S own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social struc-
175 tures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing
657 Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He
563 considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large
578 numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mon-
gols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them, while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the previous Manc[illegible]rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs; they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

S In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion
175 are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have
669 been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short
• 648 period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control.
668 Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the
ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into
Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has
flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the

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175 Moslems were rising in China Proper, a descendant of the Khojas
669 was able to move from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865
• 648 he ruled Kashgar and Yarkand. Soon, his chief of staff, Yakub
668 Beg, replaced him and conquered the rest of Chinese Turkestan. Helped by foreign aid and diplomatic recognition, Sinkiang remained independent and under Moslem rule for over a decade. After the death of Yakub Beg in 1877 and the recapture of Sinkiang by Tso Tsung-t'ang, the dream of a great Turkic Empire, extending from the Caspian to the western frontier of China, continued to exist. Turanism (Pan Turkism or Pan Turkistanism) gradually came to acquire the ideological formulations of modern nationalism.

S
175 A Moslem uprising of proportions dangerous to the Chinese
669 government broke out in 1931 under the leadership of Ma Ch'ung-
648 ying, who led an army of Chinese Moslems from Kansu into Sinkiang. His defeat in 1934 by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was partly due to the aid of Russia. It regarded Ma as a collaborator and advance scout of the Japanese whose invasion of Central Asia seemed imminent.

S
175 The most recent example of an anti-Chinese uprising culmin-
669 ated in 1944 in the establishment at Kulja of the "Eastern Turkistan
669 Republic." Unlike previous purely Moslem uprisings, the Kulja
668 movement was an expression of "coalition nationalism," and it
S attempted to unite all the non-Chinese of Sinkiang. The Kulja
[646] government was headed by a council made up of an Uighur, a Kazakh, and a "White" Russian. In the years that followed until the victory of the Chinese Communists, there were alternate periods of fighting, negotiations and near co-existence between the National Government and Kulja. The insurgents' chief demand was for autonomy and self-government, rather than for complete independence from China. Agreements, guaranteeing cultural freedoms and substantial independence in the administration of the local government, were made but were never really carried out. In 1947, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landlord, became Chairman of Sinkiang, the first non-Chinese to hold that position. But as he was considered by many members of the Kulja Government to be an agent of the C.C. Clique and the National Government, the movement split for and against him, and a new deadlock was created. In December, 1948, Masud Sabri was replaced by Burkhan at a time when no assembly was in session to accept or reject him. It is difficult to know to what degree the Kulja Government had been swayed by Communist or Soviet Russian influence. Only one thing was certain - the government was strongly anti-Chinese. But with the Communist victory, the entire provincial government of Sinkiang turned to the new regime and a completely new situation emerged.

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*668 Thus, there have been two major types of independence movements in the Northwest, one purely Moslem and the other seeking

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*668 collectivize was slight, but the speed toward socialization has
177 been increased greatly especially since the middle of 1955. The
plans call for a continuation in the breakdown of privately-owned
S farms. In Sinkiang the 1702 production cooperatives which existed
[668] in 1955 are to be increased to 3469 in 1956. By 1960, 85% of all
[177] households are scheduled to be at least semi-socialized. Furthermore,
[474] a relatively large number of mechanized state farms have
been instituted in the Northwest (China News Agency No. 112.).
It is not surprising that these rapid changes, combined with methods
of terror and intimidation, should result in peasant opposition.
(Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955.)

N
4. Religious organizations

*668 Religious organizations have also come under attack. Counter-revolutionaries
798 are suspected of hiding in them and of using them
669 for propaganda activities and espionage. Sinister anti-government
activities are attributed to the traditional secret societies, especially
N
*668 I-kuan-tao, which has many branches throughout China and
appears under various names. It is estimated to have 100,000
575 members in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. Secret society activities
have existed among the Chinese Moslems since Tso Tsung-t'ang's
invasion of the Northwest. Only now are they being suppressed.
It is unlikely that, after such a long existence, the Communists
will succeed in completely uprooting the organizations in the very
near future.

N
C. Centers of Resistance Abroad

*668 It is clear that no effective organs of opposition can exist in
669 the Northwest under conditions of terror and in the face of a centralized
system of police and military control. All that can be
expected is individual terror and sabotage - a method of opposition,
nevertheless, that continues to give the administration constant
irritation and worry. Moreover, if historical precedent can serve
as an indication for the future, a rebellious movement can attain
political significance only when military aid from abroad is available.
This was the case during World War II, for instance, when
the Turks of southern Russia rebelled against the Soviet regime
and sided with the Germans. At present only two important centers
of resistance exist abroad. One is the so-called National
Turkestanian Unity Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik
Quomitasinin), headed by its president, Veli Kayum Khan, a member
of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan; the other is Formosa, the
rallying point of all anti-Communists from the mainland.

1. The Turkestanian Unity Committee

N
Few people in the West are aware of the existence of an East
*668 and West Turkistan government-in-exile, which is supported by
669 the Turks of Central Asia and by Turkestanian refugees. Due to
648 their fear of political entanglements with Russia, none of the

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N countries bordering Soviet and Chinese Turkestan have given offi-
*668 cial recognition to this government-in-exile. It has its headquar-
669 ters far from Central Asia - in Düsseldorf, West Germany. How-
648 ever, the National Turkestanian Unity Committee is supported
S unofficially by many of the Moslem countries of the Middle East
668 and Central Asia, such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
669 Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In each of these
• 648 countries the Committee maintains a representative office staffed
by two members from each Turkish clan from Eastern and Western Turkestan. Iraq is the exception where there is only one representative. In addition to giving financial aid to the exiled government, these countries render assistance in getting Turkestanian refugees temporarily settled. They also allow the establishment of National Turkestanian Unity Committee branches within their borders.

The Committee is composed of ten departments, each of which is under the combined direction of President Veli Khayum Khan and a secretary. These departments are: 1) Organizations and Social Institutions; 2) Science; 3)Information; 4) the Press; 5) Public Health; 6) the Clergy (Turkish: Ulema); 7) Military Affairs; 8) Education, directed cooperatively by all members; 9) Women's Activities; and 10) Foreign Relations, of which Veli Khayun Khan alone is the head.

The spiritual leader of the movement for an independent Turkestan is the famous turkologist Zeki Velidi Togan, who is now a member of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Istanbul. A native of Bashkiria, Zeki Veliki Togan studied and taught Arabic literature at the University of Kazan. In November, 1917, he became president of Bashkiria. In 1922 he led the Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule. With their suppression, he fled to Tashkent, and from there to Turkey.

During the Second World War, the National Committee gave Germany effective aid against Russia, but its aim always has been independence from any foreign power. "The Germans, as the enemy of our enemy, were temporarily our friends, but we envisaged this state of affairs only for as long as they were fighting against the Russians." (Milli Turkistan #79B, p. 5). The ultimate goal of the Turkestanian government-in-exile is to liberate all of Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, a territory of about four million square miles with a population of over twenty million. The leaders of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee claim that they are able to maintain contact with the peoples of Central Asia and that messengers frequently cross unguarded mountain passes to take contraband literature to Communist-controlled countries, and return to the West with reliable information of conditions under Communist rule. Naturally, it is difficult to estimate the degree of influence which the National Turkestanian Unity

N Committee holds over the people of Northwest China. Nor is it
*668 possible to predict to what extremes a fanatically nationalistic
669 movement may go in order to establish a Greater Turkestan Em-
648 pire, or the new sufferings which such a Turkic regime may mean
S to others.

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[669]
[648]

2. Formosa

Since 1949, Formosa has been the natural center for anti-Communist activities. The Nationalists attempt to maintain contact with the border regions, but it is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of such an espionage or sabotage system. Refugees from the Northwest and elsewhere are given subsidies. Frequently they are employed in the anti-Communist propaganda and planning undertaken by Taipeh. The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs sponsors radio broadcasts to the Northern, Northwestern and Western border regions, and has done most of the planning for the eventual overthrow of the Communist regime. These include, 1) a draft plan for the administration of the border regions during the counter-offensive, 2) a draft plan for anti-Communist work to be handled by the anti-Communist agencies in the border regions (although no details are given about them), and 3) plans for the training of administrative personnel from the border regions. The Commission has also been publishing books and pamphlets on the problems of these areas.

An anti-Communist branch of the China Islam Association also has its headquarters on Formosa. It serves as a center for Moslem refugees from the Northwest, as well as from Inner Mongolia and China Proper.

Aside from these organizations, there are also individuals who possibly may form a nucleus for future anti-Communist leadership. They include such people as General Pai Chung-hsi, who works closely with the China Islam Association on Formosa, Yolbas Khan, one of the Kazakh leaders who fought with Osman Batur, Ma Hung-k'ui, the former governor of Ninghsia who now lives in San Francisco, and Ma Pu-fang, the former governor of Ch'inghai, who escaped to Formosa and thence to Egypt in 1949. The latter two are devout Moslems and have fought actively against the Communists in the Northwest. Ma Pu-fang is remembered for his enlightened rule and is trusted by the Moslems in all parts of the Northwest. (See section Biographies for details on these men).

Thus, the potential organization and leadership for a non-Communist government in the Northwest exists. Their practical value must remain slight as long as the regime in power continues to be centralized and as long as it gives the people enough material benefits to take the place of political freedoms.

S 4. Cultural corps

668 In the army, cultural work corps promoted propaganda by means
708 of entertainment. In local dances and songs, the Cultural Work
208 Corps of the Fifth Army (originally the Sinkiang National Army)
in the summer of 1951 promoted the Party's Nationality policy and
545 the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement in Sinkiang. They
visited various villages and regularly attracted an audience of
S from three or four thousand to ten thousand people. The members
[563] included thirteen minority groups living in Sinkiang. Some of
[484] them went to Peking in 1953 and presented a performance of 21
• [648] acts before the audience in the capital.

S The visit was returned by the Central Nationality Dancing
668 Corps of Peking which sent a performing team of 140-odd members
648 to Sinkiang in April, 1955 to celebrate the establishment
545 of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. It spent more than
half a year in Sinkiang and returned to Peking on November 13
after having visited ten special districts, three autonomous chou,
seven counties, two state farms, three mines in Sinkiang and two
cities (Lanchow and Su-chou) in Kansu. It performed 112 times
before audiences of various nationalities totalling more than
439,000 people.

N IV. The Methods of Propaganda.

*668 Besides those already mentioned, the Communists are using
208 many other methods of propaganda. Parading, signature drives,
circulation of pictures and pictorial stories, large-scale welcome
meetings for important personnel sent from Peking, lantern slides
and movies produced by the Party and the government, theater
activities such as opera, drama, dance, and concerts all have
been used as means of propaganda. The public accusation meeting
is another form. No matter what the main target of a particular
accusation meeting may be, whether a landlord or the U.S.A.,
the accusation always carries out the propaganda of the day,
whether it be the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement or land
reform. Other kinds of meetings are equally useful. "Model
S Peasants Rallies," held in the main farming districts of Sinkiang
[668] are the place to promote propaganda for increasing production as
[208] well as for denouncing germ warfare.

N A. Festivals

*668 Festivals are always good opp;rtunities for promoting propaganda.
796 In Northwest China where most of the minority groups are
followers of the Moslem religion, the Islamic festivals are used
*[563] as a time to express the thoughtfulness of the Communist government.
[771] For instance, during their celebration of the three major
[651] Moslem festivals of the year, the butchery tax on beef and mutton
consumed by Mohammedan communities is exempted. Further-

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BIOGRAPHIES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

Burkhan Shahidi
Chinese name: Pao-erh-han

159 Burkhan was the last governor of Sinkiang under the Nationalist Government, and the first governor of Sinkiang under the Communist regime. He is a Uighur, born in 1894 at Aqsu, Sinkiang. In 1912 he went to Berlin, Germany, and in 1916 was graduated from the University of Berlin specializing in economics and political science. Following his return from Germany, he took different positions in the local government in Sinkiang. Under the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen (1927-1933) he was in charge of foreign affairs. Later he was sent to Germany again to investigate political and economic conditions. Under the administration of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai, for some time, he served as commissioner in the Altai (A-shan) region. In 1937 he was appointed by the Nationalist Government as the consul to Saizan, Soviet Central Asia. When he returned home the next year he was accused by Governor Sheng as a German spy and was imprisoned for seven years until the end of 1944, when Governor Sheng was relieved of his governorship.

159 669 631 In the early stages of the Sinkiang disturbances, which lasted from 1944 to 1949, Burkhan played a rather insignificant role. Under the administration of Governor Wu Chung-hsin, 1944-1945, he served as deputy commissioner for civil affairs, and later as the political commissioner of the first region. When the Sinkiang disorders developed to such an extent that the Central government had to send a special representative, General Chang Chih-chung, to Sinkiang with the hope of settling the differences between the rebellious tribes in Ining and the so-called Youth Corps of Eastern Turkestan, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as Governor of Sinkiang in 1946, and Burkhan was appointed as one of the lieutenant governors.

The Sinkiang situation continued to develop from bad to
worse. Unable to solve the complicated problem, Chang Chih-
chung in 1947 recommended Maksud Sabri (Mai-ssu-wu-te) a
member of the Kuomintang and a minority leader in Sinkiang,
for governor. In May 1947 the Central government appointed
Maksud in the hope that he, being a native, could better handle
the situation. Rebellious forces, however, aimed their attack
at Maksud. At this crucial time, Burkhan suggested to Chang
● [648] Chih-chung, who was still political chief for the Nationalist Gov-
ernment in the Northwest, that the only possible way to settle
the Sinkiang problem and improve relations between Sinkiang
and the Soviet Union was to remove General Sung Hsi-lien,

S
159 military commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang. He
669 further hinted that he might be in a position to persuade Russian
648 authorities to render help for developing Sinkiang under Chang's
631 leadership. Thereupon Chang Chih-chung recommended Burkhan
as a member of the State Council of the Nationalist Government
in Nanking, and sent him to Nanking to negotiate with the
Soviet ambassador. By December 2, 1948, a secret agreement
was reached between Burkhan, as personal representative of
Chang Chih-chung, and the Soviet ambassador. The prerequisite
of the secret treaty was the removal of the Nationalist commander,
Sung Hsi-lien. The important clauses included closer
cooperation between Chang Chih-chung and the Chinese Communist
Party for the purpose of liberating Sinkiang, and in
return, the government of the Soviet Union would give assistance
toward reconstruction of Sinkiang. Chang had no choice but
to remove both General Sung Hsi-lien and Governor Maksud,
and recommend Burkhan as governor of Sinkiang. On December
S 31, 1948, the Central Government formally appointed Burkhan.

159 On January 10, 1949, Burkhan officially took over the office.
In his open letter to the peoples of Sinkiang, Burkhan stressed
648 the pro-Russia attitude of General Chang Chih-chung. When
631 Chang called a conference of the political and military chiefs in
the Northwest, rumors spread that Sinkiang would be given to
the Soviet Union or was preparing to surrender to the Communists.
When Burkhan returned from the conference he denied all
these rumors. By March 1949, the entire situation in the interior
S of China had made a drastic change. In Sinkiang, prices had
[458] become extremely high. Burkhan proclaimed his policy of economic
self-sufficiency in Sinkiang by issuing silver dollars and
silver dollar notes as the new currency and discontinuing use of
National gold yüan notes. In May of the same year, Burkhan extended
S the Sino-Russian Aviation Pact for another five years.
159 In the meantime Manchuria had been taken by the Communists,
668 and the whole of north China was also put under the control of
669 the Communists with the surrender of General Fu Tso-i, while
in Central China, a Soviet regime was also formed. Generalissimo
631 Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement from his presidency,
and General Li Tsung-jen, vice-president of the Nationalist
Government, took over the power and began to negotiate
peace with the Communists.

N In July, 1949, the Communist troops had begun to move into
*[668] Kansu Province. On September 23, 1949, the Communist general,
[669] Wang Chen, received the surrender of the Nationalist
troops at Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu Province. On September 25, two
days after the surrender, Burkhan, together with the commander
of the Nationalist troops in Sinkiang, cabled to Peiping to
announce their severance of relationship from the Nationalist

159 At the same time the Pei-t'a-
669 shan (Bogdo Baitik) Affair broke out when Outer Mongolian
635 invaders attacked Sinkiang. Meanwhile, the Communists began
668 their revolution in southern Sinkiang. Realizing the hopeless-
● [648] ness of the situation, Chang Chih-chung continued his retreat. First he removed the commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang, General Sung, then dismissed Maksud as governor and in December 1948 recommended Burkhan, a pro-Russia Uighur, for governor of Sinkiang. With such a political shifting, the whole of Sinkiang was soon taken over by the Communists.

Just before the seizure of Sinkiang by the Chinese Communists, Maksud fled to Formosa where he new resides.

159 Osman Batur (Usman Batur): Native leader, anti-Communist
648 A Kazakh, background and early career unknown; 1940,
669 opposed the arrest of Kazakh leaders by Sheng Shih-ts'ai; 1941, revolted in the Altai (A-shan) region and fought off the provincial troops; 1942, defeated; withdrew to the border of Outer Mongolia, arrested and jailed for four months in Outer Mongolia; released upon agreement reached with Outer Mongolian authorities. Organized the Altai Kazakh Restoration Society, organized army with arms and supplies from Outer Mongolia and reportedly from Soviet Russia; 1944, led revolt against the provincial government, captured the cities of Chunuchak (Ta-ch'eng) and Altai (A-shan); with establishment of the East Turkestan Republic at Kulja, Osman was made administrator of the Altai Region with headquarters at Sharasume (Ch'eng-hua) and also given command of the troops in the Altai region; 1948, broke with the leaders of the Ili group who, it was charged, were discriminating against the Kazakhs; led his force of six thousand men to join the Nationalist army; stationed at Peitashan (Bogdo Baitik). June 1948, his capture of eight Outer Mongolian soldiers who had crossed the broder precipitated Outer Mongolian forces' invasion of Peitashan. Invasion repelled by Osman Batur. 1949-51, led anti-Communist guerrillas against the Communists; March 1950, deputy commander of the East Sinkiang Region Headquarters of the Chinese People's Anti-Communist National Salvation Army; deputy commander of the First Front Army; July 1950, covered the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces into the Chinghai-Tibetan border and eventual flight to India; February 1951, ambushed and captured by Communist forces; April 1951, publicly executed at Urumchi by the Communists.

Osman Batur was the best military commander of the Ili insurrectionists and apparently a man who had the interests of his fellow Kazakhs at heart. He split with his colleagues such as Akhmejan Kasimi and Saifuddin, who were at that time making overtures toward the Chinese Communists and Soviet

S 159 • 648 669 authorities. Moreover, Osman was not given a post in the government of the East Turkestan Republic, but only a regional post, despite the fact that he had helped in the establishment of the republic, and his Kazakhs were discriminated against. When he joined the Chinese Nationalist Army and repulsed the Outer Mongolian invasion, he was hailed throughout China as a hero. Later, he was the rallying point of the resistance of the Kazakhs and other anti-Communist forces in Sinkiang.

N 159 Pai Hai-feng: Mongol, army officer

A native of Jehol Province and a member of the Kharchin Banner of the Mongol tribe in Inner Mongolia. Dates unknown. Graduated from the first class of the Central Military Academy; went to Russia and studied in the Oriental University. 1931-1932, served in the Peiping Branch of the National Military Council; later succeeded Yun Chi-hsien as commander of the Mongolian N [701] Police of Pai-ling-miao, Suiyuan. During the war period, 1937-1945, when the police were reorganized into a brigade of the regular army, he served as commanding officer of the brigade and was eventually promoted to commander of a division. In the meantime, also served as a special representative of the Kuomintang to the Mongol Banners in Chahar, and Suiyuan Provinces as well as the representative of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps for that region. 1943, resigned from his duties with the Kuomintang Party.

N 159 631 When the Communists took over North China in 1949, he served as a member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, and as vice-director of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 1953, a member of the Northwest Administrative Council, and vice-dean of the Northwest Nationalities College.

N 159 631 *668 Pai Ju-ping: Communist

A native of Shensi Province; dates unknown. During the period of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government, served as the director of financial affairs in the Administrative Commissioner's Office in western Shensi, and later as finance commissioner in the border government. 1950, when the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest was formed, he served as a member of the council and as director of the Department of Finance. In January 1953, the Northwest Administrative Council was established to replace the Military and Political Council of the Northwest. He serves as a member of that council and concurrently as vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission in the council. 1955, director of the Central Handicraft Administrative Bureau in the State Council.

159 669 Ma Chung-ying, attacked Qomul (Hami) and Barkol (Chensi) from Kansu Province. Sheng was appointed chief of staff to the Pacification Commander in the eastern region of Sinkiang. Sheng's military training and his experience gained in the Northern Expedition proved him superior to the rebels. When the rebels were defeated, Sheng was promoted to the chief of staff in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of Frontier Defense. In 1932 when the revolts among the Moslems started again in the eastern region of Sinkiang, Sheng was appointed as Pacification Commander in that region. He put down the disturbances in Qomul, relieved Urumchi (Tihua), besieged by the Moslems, and recovered a number of cities such as Turfan and Fu-kang. His reputation and prestige were soon recognized by the peoples of Sinkiang. Finally in 1933, a conspiracy broke out to oppose the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen. Taking this opportunity, Sheng joined forces with the "revolutionaries." As a result, Governor Chin fled and Sheng was appointed as the Provisional Commander-in-Chief of Frontier Defense. In September of the same year, Sheng was officially appointed as the Frontier Commander of the Central Government in Nanking.

159 669 648 The immediate tasks facing this new leader of Sinkiang were the quelling of insurrections led by General Chang P'ei-yuan of Ili and the rebel Ma Chung-ying of Qomul. To consolidate his newly acquired power, Sheng had to obtain outside help to suppress his internal troubles. So in October 1933, Sheng sent his representatives to Soviet Russia to negotiate with the Russian government for the Red Army to enter Sinkiang and help him. The Soviet Red Army entered Sinkiang in 1933, and by June 1934 the whole of northern Sinkiang was pacified. After the successful conclusion of this military achievement, 159 648 Sheng Shih-ts'ai allied himself further with Soviet Russia by signing the first secret agreement with the Russian government, on May 26, 1934. The main terms in this secret treaty included the loan of five million rubles to Sheng by the Soviet Union and the employment of Russian advisors and technicians by the Sinkiang government.

[643] During the next ten years, 1933 to 1942, Sheng became absolute ruler of Sinkiang with the full support of the Soviet Union. 159 64 Immediately after he took over, Sheng proclaimed his eight-point policy: (1) racial equality, (2) freedom of religion, (3) agricultural relief, (4) financial reform, (5) political reform, (6) promotion of education, (7) self-government and (8) improvement of the judicial system. In 1935 he made known his famous "six policies" which would be followed as the guiding principles of his "reconstruction of a new Sinkiang." These six policies were: (1) anti-imperialism, (2) kinship with the Soviet Union, (3) racial equality, (4) peace, (5) honest administration and (6)

159 reconstruction. Following these proclamations and policies 64 Sheng made some drastic changes, such as the employment of minority groups in the government offices, appointments of Communists from Yenan (then headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party), and the use of Russian advisors and technicians. In the military maneuvers, Sheng invited the so-called Eighth [669] Regiment of the Red Army to Sinkiang to help in the suppression of another rebel, Ma Hu -shan, of Khotan (Hotien) in 1937. Thus Sheng Shih-ts'ai finally put both the southern and northern parts of Sinkiang under his rule, and the whole of Sinkiang, during these ten years, was under the influence of the Soviet Union.

159 The year 1941 marked another turn which ended the rule of 648 Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang and restored the normal relationship between Sinkiang and the Nationalist Government. Sheng severed his tie with his Soviet ally. This decision was obviously not accidental. There were several factors which forced Sheng to his drastic action. First and most significant was the gradual encroachment of power by the Soviet agents and the rumored "conspiracy" initiated by the Russian military advisors and aimed at Sheng. The second was a series of murders carried out by Soviet agents against Sheng's associates, including his own brother, Sheng Shih-ch'i. The third factor was the international situation. Hitler's armies in Europe were deep in Soviet Russia, and Japan was reported to be preparing for another front against Russia in Siberia. Thus the position of the Soviet Union, Sheng's ally, was at its lowest ebb. The fourth factor 159 was a series of visits by representatives from the Nationalist Government, including Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and their arguments. When Sheng made his decision, he sent notice to the Eighth Regiment of the Red Army stationed at Hami to evacuate Sinkiang. In the meantime he began to get rid of the Communist officers in the local government. In the early spring of 1943, a group of government officials sent from Chungking arrived in Urumchi. By the end of 1943 the turn-over was completed, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai once again threw himself into the embrace of the central government.

In August 1944, however, when the news of the defeat of the Germans by Soviet troops reached Sinkiang, Sheng staged another incident. He charged the group of officials sent by the central government with pro-Communist activities and put them in jail, then reported to the central government in Chungking. Fortunately, this time the situation was completely under the control of the central government. A few days later, on August [645] 29, 1944, the central government appointed Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and sent a special plane for him. On September 11, Sheng, accompanied by General Chu Shao-liang, regional commander of the Northwest, and Hsu En-

N 159 arrived in Sian in November 1868. From 1867 to 1872, for six 669 years, Tso fought with the Mohammedans, and finally in February, 1871, the headquarters of the Mohammedans, Chin-chi-pao, was taken by Tso's troops and their leader, Ma Hua-lung, was executed. In August 1872, Tso finally arrived in Lanchou, Kansu. By November 1873, the whole province of Kansu was liberated from the Mohammedans, and Tso was made the associate grand secretary. In 1874 he was promoted to full grand S [669] secretary. In 1875 the trouble in Sinkiang broke out, and Tso was ordered to take charge of the military affairs of that area. After all the preparations were made, Tso began moving his troops westward to Sinkiang, and by 1877, both the northern and N [554] southern regions of T'ien-shan were recovered. In 1878, the whole region of Sinkiang was restored and Tso was awarded by promotion to second class marquis (hou) and his lieutenant, Liu Chin-t'ang, was made a baron. In 1880, when Tseng Chi-tse N 159 [648] was sent to Russia by the Manchu government for the second negotiation of the return of Ili which the Russians occupied during the Turkestan uprising, Tso was ordered to move his troops to stand by for any eventuality. But in August 1880, Tso was suddenly summoned back to Peking. He arrived at the capital in February 1881, and was appointed to serve in the Grand Council and the Tsungli yamen. In 1881 he was appointed governor-general of Kiangnan and Kiangsi. In 1883, he quelled a minor uprising in southern Shantung. By August 1884, the conflict with France began and the coast of Fukien became seriously involved, so Tso was once again appointed high commissioner of that province, and in December 1884 he arrived in Foochow. In the spring of 1885, negotiations with the French were resumed and by June 9, 1885, a treaty was signed by Li Hung-chang with the French representative. In September 1885, Tso died in Foochow. He was granted all posthumous honors and was canonized as Wen-hsiang.

The achievements of Tso Tsung-t'ang in the Northwest can be summarized briefly in the following points; First, his military achievements had consolidated the political control of the Manchu Dynasty in the north. The pacification of the Nien revolts in Chihli and Shantung, the suppression of the Moslem uprising in Shensi and Kansu and the defeat of the Sinkiang rebels, chiefly Pai Yen-hu and Yakub Beg, all contributed heavily to the restoration of Ching power in the Northwest.

S [648] Secondly, his diplomatic triumph in dealing with both Russians and British in Sinkiang had secured that territory under the Chinese administration. During the civil war in Sinkiang, N 159 the Russians occupied Ili and the British supported Yakub Beg S in the south. At one time when the northern region of T'ien-669 shan was recovered by Tso-s troops, British diplomats 648

N 159 S 669 648 suggested to the Manchu Government that Yakub Beg's realm be recognized as a protectorate state. But Tso Tsung-t'ang frustrated this attempt by defeating Yakub Beg and recovering the territory of southern Sinkiang. When the negotiations for the return of Ili were going on between China and Russia, Tso again moved his troops to Qomul (Hami) to prepare for any possible break of the negotiations and recover Ili by force if necessary. As a result, Ili was returned to China and the whole Sinkiang territory was preserved as a part of China.

N 159 S 635 Thirdly, he should be credited for his statesmanlike foresight for his proposal of making Sinkiang into a new province on an equal footing with the rest of the provinces. On this matter he had memorialized five times to the Ching Government, insisting that Sinkiang must be given the status of a province to defend the border of the Northwest. Although Sinkiang Province was finally established after the death of Tso, the credit must go to him.

N 159 Though his achievements in the Northwest were great, they were of a military nature. Politically and economically speaking Tso's achievements during his twelve long years in the Northwest were rather limited and insignificant. He was primarily a military man. Though he held positions as governor or governor general, his primary duty was involved in the pacification of bandits and uprisings. His importance in the history of modern Northwest China should not be minimized, however, but should be recognized and praised.

Veli Kajum-Khan: Anti-Communist political leader

S 159 Born in 1904 in Tashkent, a member of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan. 1921, went to Germany, graduated from the agricultural school of Berlin and from the school of foreign affairs of the Berlin University. 1926, sentenced to death in absentia by Soviet authorities in Samarkand; 1925-41, active in the publishing field, in politics and in the Turkistan liberation movement; until 1940, publisher of the newspaper "Der Nähe Osten," and an information bulletin on Turkistan. S 159 668 648 Since 1941, concerned with the work of looking after the welfare and expediting the liberation of Turkistanian prisoners of war in Germany; 1945, organized ex-prisoners into the nucleus of the National Turkistanian Union Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik Qomitasinin) located at Bonn am Rhein; head of the Committee; founder of the Turkistanian Legion; 1945-47, served as a witness at the International Trials at Nürnberg; 1947, re-elected head of the National Turkistanian Unity Committee; 1953, re-elected president of the Turkistanian refugee organization.

Veli Kajum-Khan, as founder and director of the Turkistanian Legion, has directed more than 180,000 Turkistanian exiles

S 159 668 648

in Europe, while his National Turkistanian Unity Committee, in which he is president, has, unofficially, the support of such countries as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In each of these countries, with the exception of Iraq, the committee has a representative office staffed by two members from each Turkish tribe of East and West Turkistan. Among his many activities, Vali Kajum-Khan has also the supervision of the political and ideological education of exiled Turkistanian youths. He publishes various Turkistanian newspapers and maintains important contacts with his native country.

N 159 *668 S 159 668

Wang Chen (1908-): Army officer, Communist Party member

Born in 1908 in Hunan in a poor farmer's family. Studied in grade school for three years. Railway worker, member of railway workers' union, 1924; joined Communist Party, 1927; member of the Executive Committee of Communist Youth, 1928; secretary of Communist Party at Liu-yang, Hunan; political commissioner, First Independent Division of Hunan and Kiangsi, 1932; political commissioner, Sixth Division, 1934; chief of staff to General Li Hsien-nien, 1937; since 1952, first secretary in the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Communist Party; in 1950-52, commander, First Field Army, Acting Commander, Sinkiang Military Area. Member of the National Defense Council, 1955.

Wang Chen's outstanding status in the Party is due partly to his long membership in the Party and partly to his excellent record and achievement both as an army officer and as a worker. He participated in the Long March, 1935-36. He won fame in the army when he led a vanguard unit which marched from the Yellow River down to Kwangtung Province, hailed as another "long March." When he was stationed at Yenan, the capital of the Communists, he was given the task of utilizing the soldiers to do production jobs, and the result was that the army became a self-supported team which not only got no help from the government, but paid taxes to help support the government. When the military campaign of the Communists began, Wang Chen played a rather significant role by taking over the whole of the Northwest territory. First he received the surrender of Kansu on September 23, 1949; then on October 21, 1949, he flew to Sinkiang and took over that province.

In Sinkiang, Wang's first job was to crush the opposition, whom he denounced as counter-revolutionaries. His troops took part in destroying the forces of Osman Batur and in pursuing the fleeing Kazakhs to the border of India. In his capacity as first secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP, a post he held for only a year, he helped further the so-called united front of the workers and farmers.

N **Yang Shen-chih: Local leader**
159 A native of Kansu Province, dates unknown. An influential
631 local leader. From 1949, member of the Military and Adminis-
trative Council for the Northwest, member of its Land Reform
Commission and vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory
Commission; since 1953, member of the Northwest Adminis-
trative Council and vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory
Commission.

S **Yang Tseng-hsin (1860-1928): Former governor of Sinkiang**
159 Born in 1860 in Yunnan Province, holder of both the Chu-jen
and Chin-shih degrees of the late Ch'ing Dynasty. In 1889, mag-
istrate of Chung-wei district of Kansu, later promoted as the
chou commissioner of Hochow, Kansu. He also commanded
troops under Chen Sheng-ch'uan. In 1901, he joined the staff of
Wei Kuang-t'ao, governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, and
was appointed superintendent of the army school in Kansu. In
1908 he was given the position of circuit commissioner of Aksu
S Circuit, Sinkiang. In 1911 he was transferred to the Chenti Cir-
693 cuit and concurrently held the positions as prosecutor. In 1912
652 he was promoted to provincial treasurer of Sinkiang. When the
635 newly appointed governor, Yuan Hung-yu, was murdered on his
way to Urumchi (Tihua), Yang was appointed governor of Sin-
kiang. His title was changed several times, but his actual posi-
tion remained as the political and military boss of Sinkiang
from 1912 to 1928. When Yuan Shih-k'ai enthroned himself as
S the emperor of China in 1916, Yang was awarded an earldom of
554 the first rank. In 1928, he pledged his support to the Nationalist
635 Government in Nanking, and was appointed the provincial chair-
man of Sinkiang. He was assassinated in July, 1928.

S In the history of modern Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin was the
159 only person who ruled Sinkiang for seventeen years. He was
635 credited, during his administration, with restoring peace and
prosperity to the province. During those seventeen years, he
S smashed the secret society, Ko-lao-hui (Elder Brother Society),
575 defeated the invasion of Kobdo and Altai (A-shan) by the troops
648 of Outer Mongolia in 1928, quelled the disturbances of the Ka-
zakhs who fled into Sinkiang from Soviet rule in 1917, and paci-
fied the defeated White Russian troops who also escaped into
S Sinkiang during the Soviet Revolution in 1917. Internally, he
563 adopted the policy of racial equality among the different tribes
641 within the border of Sinkiang. Diplomatically, he improved the
648 trade relations with Russia and settled the border troubles. But,
because of his autocratic and dictatorial attitude toward his
subordinates, and his cruelty toward his opponents, he made
enemies who brought about his assassination.

439 Russia which provides it with manufactured goods, and
its own most noted product is sulphur.

363 The streets of Urumchi present a mass of low, form-
less, utilitarian buildings, covering a large area. The
344 Governor's Yamen, which occupies a large enclosure,
contains spacious courtyards dominated by a high
tower, from which the surrounding country can be
surveyed. Second in importance to the Government
buildings is the new Post Office, constructed with a
view to dealing with large quantities of mail material.
205 The postal system is excellently controlled, and for
many years the position of Postal Commissioner has
been held by a Westerner, who, at the time of our visit,
was an Italian. Thanks to energetic organisation, the
enforcement of a time limit on the couriers, and the
careful division of the road into well-regulated stages,
Urumchi is brought within forty-five days of Peking—
a truly marvellous accomplishment. The direct postal
communication with Europe via Chuguchak, Semi-
palatinsk, and Omsk was suspended during the war,
but is now once more available, by which means letters
206 can reach London in twenty-eight days. There is a
wireless installation in daily communication with
Kashgar, but this is under the strict supervision of the
Governor. The Russo-Asiatic Bank formerly had a
471 branch office here, and a few Western firms have opened
agencies through which they now carry on business.

563 The stream of *emigrés* who left Russia at the time of
361 the Revolution, have had an important bearing on the
development of Urumchi, which has resulted in the
formation of a Russian quarter. Here the impoverished
● [648] refugee, the Nogai, and the Sart live side by side, and of
recent years the Soviet Government has appointed a
Consul General to guard their interests. Permission to
erect a statue of Lenin in the Consular grounds has been

636 20 this end he allows no newspaper to be published in his territory, and the postal, telegraph and wireless offices are under the control of his appointed censors. News from the outside world filters through but slowly, and 636 all restaurants are posted with the announcement: [579] '*No political discussions allowed.*' It is certainly to Governor Yang's credit that the roads of Turkestan are notably free from brigandage, and during the past decade of civil war in China, Turkestan has remained [648] peaceful. At the time of our visit the whole Yamen was busy with preparations for the journey to be shortly taken by the Governor's son and suite to the town of Zaisan in Russian territory, where the young man had been appointed Chinese Consul.

660 We were the first British women who had ever visited Urumchi, and our application for passports to cross the Russian frontier at Kuswun created a precedent. Three years previously some of our boxes were stolen from a Kansu inn, and our British passports were lost with them. The papers with which we now travelled were passports written in the Chinese language, and issued by the Chinese Foreign Office and British Consul in Hankow. These documents refer to us by our Chinese names only. We had early made application for permits to travel across Russia, which request had been forwarded to Moscow by the Soviet Consul in Urumchi, and on the day after our arrival word came that this permission was granted, when we immediately presented ourselves to make personal application for a visa. This was duly affixed to the Chinese passport, and all possible help and information with a view to making the journey easy was given to us by the Consular Staff.

The weeks of our stay were very happy and interesting and the time passed only too quickly ere arrangements

361 This town is known to Russians as Chuguchak, to
Chinese as Tacheng, but colloquially it is always called
136 Behya—' The Town of Seagulls '—because these birds,
following the course of the Irtish River all the way from
Arctic regions, collect here at certain seasons of the year.
We had in fact already seen them in the Gobi further
south, but could scarcely credit them to be really
seagulls until we learnt that it is their habit to follow
[487] the great rivers as far as their sources. Geographically
and politically the position of Tacheng is an important
one, forming as it does the one outlet towards Siberia
361 for all Turkestan. It is a populous, busy city, with
important Chinese and Russian quarters. There is a
[648] Russian Consul in residence, part of whose duties
consists in the issuing of temporary passports to drivers
and carters passing to and fro over the border. There
[205] are postal and telegraph offices and a military station.
[206] The postmaster, Mr. Chang, was very helpful and
friendly. He knew something of foreigners' tastes,
[712] being a Hankow man, and suggested that ' the ladies
might enjoy a drive round the city,' and he therefore
000 sent his Russian carriage and driver to show us the
sights. Having completed the *Grand Tour* this man
then asked us if we would like to see some more.
' Certainly,' we said, ' show us all there is worth seeing,'
whereupon, with a grin, he whipped up his horse, and
starting off at a good pace took us exactly over the
same ground as before! The smart carriage, with
strangers seated in it, attracted some attention on its
first round, but when we appeared the second time the
shopkeepers themselves came to their doors, exclaiming,
' Here they come again ! ' while one, making a movement
with his hand, indicated that we were on a perpetual
circular tour. To ' save face ' we therefore drew up
before some of the shops, and enquired the price of many
of the goods, though we had not the slightest intention